Housing Authority of City of Everett v. Terry
| Decision Date | 19 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56716-6,56716-6 |
| Citation | 114 Wn.2d 558,789 P.2d 745 |
| Parties | HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF EVERETT, Washington, Respondent, v. Ray TERRY, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Evergreen Legal Services, Gregory D. Provenzano, Everett, Robert S. Friedman, Kirkland, for appellant.
Newton, Kight, Adams & Castleberry, Lorna S. Corrigan, Everett, for respondent.
Respondent Housing Authority of the City of Everett brought an unlawful detainer action under our Landlord and Tenant Act, Title 59 RCW, against Appellant Ray Terry, a mentally handicapped person, for breach of a lease covenant by creating a "threat to the health and safety of other residents" of the housing complex. But Respondent did not comply with the notice provisions of RCW 59.12.030(4) which require a 10-day opportunity to comply with a breached covenant in a lease. The trial court ruled that federal law preempts the Washington statutory notice requirements.
We hold that there is no federal preemption of the statutory notice provisions and that there is no jurisdiction without statutory notice. We reverse the trial court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Appellant Ray Terry has lived in the same apartment in the "Baker Heights" federally subsidized housing complex since 1982. The unit is owned and operated by Respondent Housing Authority of the City of Everett. Mr. Terry is eligible for residence in the complex because, at age 17, he suffered traumatic brain injury which left him handicapped and with limited income.
The trial court, the Honorable Paul D. Hansen, found that "[a]s a consequence of his injuries, [Ray Terry] is often disagreeable and his conduct has been, from time to time, unpleasant and intimidating." Since 1984, most of Appellant's unpleasant and intimidating conduct has been directed at his neighbor in the housing complex, Ms. Bessie B. Neighbors. On at least one occasion, Mr. Terry tried to run her down with his automobile, driving over the lawn of her sister's home and coming to a stop only one foot away from the porch on which she had taken refuge. Numerous other incidents directed at Ms. Neighbors included "verbal threats, physical intimidation and destruction of property."
In June of 1988, Ms. Neighbors obtained the first of a series of civil protection orders against Mr. Terry. He repeatedly violated those. From June through October 1988, Ms. Neighbors filed approximately 12 written complaints with the Housing Authority against Mr. Terry. On October 19, 1988, the Housing Authority terminated Mr. Terry's lease for violation of the following covenant:
[Tenants agree to c]onduct themselves ... in a manner which will not disturb neighbor's [sic] peaceful enjoyment of their accommodations and will be conducive to maintaining the development in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition....
The Notice of Termination of Tenancy, served October 21, 1988, which demanded surrender of the premises by October 31, 1988, did not provide for the statutory 10-day opportunity to comply with the breached covenant required under RCW 59.12.030(4). It provided:
You are further notified that in that your continued tenancy has created a threat to the health and safety of other residents, the Notice is not subject to appeal pursuant to the Housing Authority's Grievance Procedure.
On November 10, 1988, the Housing Authority filed an Unlawful Detainer action pursuant to Chapter 59.12 RCW, based solely upon the October 21, 1988, notice served on Mr. Terry. He raised an objection to subject matter jurisdiction for lack of statutory notice, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. His motion was denied by a Snohomish County Superior Court Commissioner. A Motion for Revision of the Commissioner's Ruling was similarly denied by the Honorable Daniel T. Kershner, Judge, who agreed with the Housing Authority's argument that federal law preempted the notice requirements of RCW 59.12.030(4).
Appellant Terry also raised as an affirmative defense a claim of discrimination based upon the Housing Authority's alleged failure to make a reasonable accommodation for his handicap. He had sought a transfer to alternative "Section 8" housing, 1 but was denied the transfer by the Housing Authority. Respondent maintained it was under no duty to accommodate a tenant's handicap.
Appellant Terry did not appeal the Superior Court's denial of his procedural motion, and proceeded to trial. After a 2-day bench trial, the Honorable Paul D. Hansen ruled in favor of the Housing Authority. Mr. Terry appealed.
By Order dated November 22, 1989, the Court of Appeals, Division One, certified the case to this court, identifying the following "issues of broad public import which [require] prompt and ultimate determination:"
1. Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction in this unlawful detainer action when the plaintiff public housing authority allegedly failed to serve the tenant with the proper notice of termination of tenancy? [and]
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that federal law preempts the notice requirements of the unlawful detainer statute in housing authority leaseholds?
This court accepted certification on December 13, 1989.
Appellant Ray Terry continues to reside in the same Baker Heights apartment. His behavior towards Ms. Neighbors allegedly persists unabated, although counsel for Mr. Terry denied this in answer to a question during argument before this court.
The following questions are presented by this case:
(1) Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer action when the plaintiff has not complied with the notice provisions of RCW 59.12.030; if not, then
(2) Whether federal law preempts the notice requirements of RCW 59.12.030 in housing authority leaseholds; if so, then
(3) Whether a landlord has a duty to make reasonable accommodations to the handicap of a tenant; and (4) Whether an award of fees and costs is appropriate in a case where Appellant elected to go to trial before exhausting procedural appeals, and where Appellant appeals substantive, as well as procedural, questions.
Appellant Terry claims that, without compliance with the statutory notice requirements, the Superior Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. He further claims that, in refusing to transfer him to "Section 8" community housing, the Housing Authority discriminated against him because it failed to make a reasonable accommodation for his handicap.
Respondent Housing Authority seeks a "best of both worlds" mixture of state and federal procedures. It first sought to substitute a state trial for a federal grievance hearing. This is permissible. It then sought to substitute a federal notice for a state statutory notice. This is not permissible.
In this case, the Housing Authority elected to bring an action for unlawful detainer under Chapter 59.12 RCW. It is undisputed that the Housing Authority did not comply with RCW 59.12.030 which establishes the types of notices that must be given tenants in commencing unlawful detainer actions. The Housing Authority does not suggest that Mr. Terry waived the notice requirements of the unlawful detainer statute.
The unlawful detainer statute is in derogation of common law, and must therefore be strictly construed in favor of the tenant. 2 "By reason of provisions designed to hasten the recovery of possession, the statutes creating it remove the necessity to which the landlord was subjected at common law, [sic ] of bringing an action of ejectment [under Chapter 7.28 RCW] with its attendant delays and expenses." 3 However, in order to take advantage of its favorable provisions a landlord must comply with the requirements of the statute. 4
"Where a special statute provides a method of process, compliance [with that method] is jurisdictional." 5 In an action for unlawful detainer alleging breach of covenant, a notice which does not give the tenant the alternative of performing the covenant or surrendering the premises does not comply with the provisions of the statute. 6
In this case, the action was brought because Mr. Terry allegedly breached a covenant in his lease. 7 Therefore, he was entitled to a notice which would provide him with, and inform him of, a 10-day period during which he could comply with the requirements of his lease. 8 The document he received did not contain the statutory notice of opportunity-to-correct. Because it gave deficient notice, the Housing Authority could not prove a cause of action for unlawful detainer. 9 The Snohomish County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The "jurisdictional condition precedent" 10 of proper statutory notice was not met. Under Washington law, Mr. Terry's motion to quash the process should have been granted. 11
Although this court has previously stated that there is a "strong presumption against finding congressional intent to preempt," 12 the Housing Authority argues that the 10-day opportunity to correct a breach of covenant provided by RCW 59.12.030(4) is preempted by a congressional intent to achieve prompt eviction of tenants under circumstances such as those presented in this case.
A party arguing preemption must demonstrate either the "congressional intent to preempt state law" or such a "direct and positive" conflict 13 that the federal and state acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together. 14 The Housing Authority "does not assert the existence of either an express or implied intent to preempt state law requirements." 15
Facially, there appears to be no conflict between RCW 59.12.030(4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l )(3)(A). 16 The federal statute provides for a notice before termination of a lease of "a reasonable time, but not to exceed 30 days," while the state statute requires notice and a 10-day opportunity to correct a breach of covenant to avoid forfeiture of a lease. ...
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