Housing Authority of City of Corpus Christi v. Massey
| Decision Date | 05 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-93-033-CV,13-93-033-CV |
| Citation | 878 S.W.2d 624 |
| Parties | HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, Appellant, v. Frances MASSEY, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
William Robert Anderson, III, Sorrell, Anderson & Lenrman, Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Nancy B. DeLong, Coastal Bend Legal Services, Corpus Christi, for appellee.
Before DORSEY, GILBERTO HINOJOSA, and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., JJ.
The trial court permanently enjoined appellant, the Housing Authority of the City of Corpus Christi ("Housing Authority"), from executing a writ of possession, issued pursuant to the judgment of County Court at Law No. One granting possession of Frances Massey's property to appellant. By thirty-three points of error, the Housing Authority appeals from the trial court's judgment. We affirm.
On June 1, 1990, appellant brought a forcible entry and detainer action against Massey for violations of her lease provisions, including threats to the health and safety of residents and disturbance of peaceful enjoyment of tenants' accommodations. A Justice of the Peace awarded possession of the premises to the Housing Authority. On appeal, the County Court at Law No. One (Court No. One) affirmed the judgment in August, 1991.
For the next nine months, subsequent to the eviction judgment, Massey continued to reside on the premises. During this time period, the Housing Authority continued to accept her monthly rent payments until May 6, 1992, and to provide services such as extermination and plumbing repairs. The fees for these services were charged to Massey's account. The Housing Authority also recertified the Massey household for residency and lowered her rent. 1 Additionally, Massey discussed the eviction with George Hodge, manager of the housing complex, and was told that she need not worry about having to move.
On May 4, 1992, Massey received a notice of termination of lease. On May 7, 1992, Court No. One issued a writ of possession to the Housing Authority to enforce the court's previous judgment. As a result, on May 11, 1992, Massey filed an original petition for injunction in County Court at Law No. Three (Court No. Three). Court No. Three granted a temporary injunction and on September 23, 1992, permanently enjoined the Housing Authority from executing the writ of possession to enforce the judgment of Court No. One. Appellant challenges Court No. Three's judgment granting the permanent injunction.
By points of error one through six, the Housing Authority contends that Court No. Three, the trial court below, lacked jurisdiction over the matter and that it erred in issuing the permanent injunction because Massey's action was an impermissible collateral attack on the final judgment of Court No. One.
The nature of an attack on a judgment is defined as follows:
A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to amend, correct, reform, vacate, or enjoin the execution of same in a proceeding instituted for that purpose, such as ... an injunction to restrain its execution, etc. A collateral attack on a judgment is an attempt to avoid its binding force in a proceeding not instituted for one of the purposes aforesaid....
Ernell v. O'Fiel, 441 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 33 S.W. 325, 327 (1895)) (emphasis added); see also Employers Cas. Co. v. Block, 744 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex.1988). The jurisdiction of one court cannot be questioned in a different forum if the issue was fully and fairly litigated in the rendering court. Bass v. Champion Int'l Corp., 787 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1990, no writ). An earlier judgment of one court serves as estoppel from litigation of the same issues in later proceedings. Id.
In filing the injunction action, Massey is not questioning the validity of Court No. One's judgment. Rather, this case is an original proceeding in which she seeks new relief based on new facts which developed after the previous final judgment was rendered. The granting of an injunction is in no way an attack on the findings of the prior judgment. The injunction action is an entirely new proceeding, irrespective of the first cause of action, and is based on an alleged new lease between the parties. Massey is attacking the Housing Authority's actions subsequent to Court No. One's judgment, not the judgment itself. It is undisputed that Court No. One's judgment was valid under the circumstances then existing. However, appellee asserts that new facts, namely a new lease, now exist and the Housing Authority must bring a new forcible entry and detainer action to evict Massey. Thus, Massey's action in Court No. Three is not an impermissible collateral attack on the validity of the previous judgment and Court No. Three had jurisdiction to rule on the petition for injunction. We overrule appellant's points of error one through six.
By points of error seven through twelve, the Housing Authority asserts that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Massey from bringing the present action since the claims and issues were actually litigated in the first action. Res judicata or claim preclusion bars the relitigation of claims within the instant lawsuit that were actually litigated or could have been litigated in the earlier lawsuit. Van Dyke v. Boswell, O'Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex.1985); Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex.1985); Ambrose v. Mack, 800 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied). A prior judgment serves as an absolute bar to the retrial of claims pertaining to the same cause of action when a subsequent suit involves the same parties, issues, and subject matter. Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984); Ambrose, 800 S.W.2d at 382.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of any ultimate issue of fact that was actually litigated and essential to the judgment in a prior suit. Van Dyke, 697 S.W.2d at 384; Ambrose, 800 S.W.2d at 382. To invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel, appellant must show that: (1) the facts to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the present parties were adversaries in the prior action. Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.1991); Ambrose, 800 S.W.2d at 382.
Massey's action for injunctive relief in Court No. Three is based on the theory that the Housing Authority waived its right to possession when it did not obtain a writ of possession until nine months after the forcible entry and detainer judgment was entered. She asserts that in the months ensuing the rendition of the prior judgment, new facts developed to establish the creation of a new landlord-tenant relationship. Because of the waiver and new landlord-tenant relationship, Massey contends that the Housing Authority must bring a new forcible entry and detainer action in order to evict her.
The facts pertaining to a new landlord-tenant relationship and waiver of right to possession arose after the prior judgment by Court No. One. Therefore, these facts were not fully and fairly litigated in the first action and they were not essential to the determination of the prior judgment. Moreover, the facts present new issues which were not actually litigated or could have been litigated in the original cause of action. Although the same parties are involved in the two suits, different facts and issues exist which render the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel inapplicable to Massey's action for injunctive relief in Court No. Three. Appellant's points of error seven through twelve are overruled.
By points of error sixteen through twenty-four, 2 the Housing Authority challenges the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Housing Authority waived its right to possession of the premises occupied by Massey. By points of error twenty-five through thirty-three, the Housing Authority challenges (1) the trial court's finding that a new landlord-tenant relationship was created between the two litigants and (2) the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of fact related to the new tenancy. We address these points together.
In reviewing legal sufficiency points, we must consider only the evidence and inferences that support the findings and disregard all evidence and...
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