Housing Authority v. Melvin
| Decision Date | 08 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 4459,4459 |
| Citation | 533 A.2d 1231,12 Conn.App. 711 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | HOUSING AUTHORITY v. Mary MELVIN. |
Richard McCarthy, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).
John F. Merchant, with whom, on the brief, was Jerome J. Rosenblum, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and STOUGHTON and FOTI, JJ.
The defendant tenant appeals in this summary process action from an execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant claims that the court erred (1) in granting the plaintiff's application for execution of judgment without scheduling a hearing pursuant to Practice Book § 387A, 1 and (2) in denying the defendant's motion for a hearing on the plaintiff's application for execution of judgment. We find no error.
The facts are not in dispute. In May, 1984, the defendant entered into a one year lease, which was automatically renewable, for an apartment managed by the plaintiff. The rental agreement required monthly payments of $132 which was subject to an annual adjustment approved by the agency for housing and urban development (HUD). 2 The defendant became delinquent in her rent payments and, on March 6, 1985, entered into a stipulated agreement that called for a judgment of possession of the unit in favor of the plaintiff with a stay of execution through December 31, 1985. The stipulated agreement required her to pay $132 per month for use and occupancy "subject to HUD-approved adjustments." The defendant was also required to make monthly payments of $53 to remunerate the plaintiff for a $1591 rent arrearage. On May 13, 1985, the defendant was notified that, pursuant to the HUD-approved rent adjustment, her use and occupancy fee would increase by $28 per month beginning July 1, 1985. The defendant failed to pay the increased amount; rather, she submitted checks in the amount due prior to the adjustment. On July 26, 1985, the plaintiff notified the defendant that it intended to seek her immediate eviction for failure to pay the increased amount, and applied for a summary process execution of judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 387A.
The defendant moved for a hearing on the plaintiff's application for a summary process judgment, which the court denied. The defendant's objection to the court's consideration of the plaintiff's application without a hearing was overruled.
The defendant contends that a hearing was required on the plaintiff's application for judgment because the use and occupancy fee that resulted from the HUD-approved adjustment was not a "sum certain" as that term is used in Practice Book § 387A. The defendant claims that the court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff without holding a hearing. We disagree.
The defendant's original lease established rent contingent on an annual adjustment approved by HUD. An administrative appeal process was established for contesting these adjustments. 3 Thus, when the defendant entered into the stipulated agreement, she was made well aware of the process by which rents could be increased or decreased and the process for contesting those adjustments. 4 The defendant now claims that the adjusted amount was not a "sum certain" because it was not an exact dollar amount, but was an amount based on an independent agency's determination.
A "sum certain" is merely a term of art for a sum which is "capable of reduction to certainty." Anderson v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 264, 56 A.2d 650 (1947). In contract actions, the price must be capable of being ascertained from the contract. "By this is not meant that the exact amount in figures must be stated in the agreement; however, where that is not the case, the price must, by the terms of the agreement, be capable of being definitely ascertained." 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 82.
A sum certain which can be determined from the face of the agreement is distinguished from implied obligations which call on the trier of fact to determine a reasonable price. H.B. Toms Tree Surgery, Inc. v. Brant, 187 Conn. 343, 346, 446 A.2d 1 (1982). In this case, the stipulated agreement represented a contract obligation of the defendant to pay for use and occupancy; that amount was capable of being ascertained with certainty subsequent to the HUD-approved adjustment.
The trial court's conclusion that the stipulated agreement represented a "sum certain" merely gave effect to the intentions of the parties expressed in the agreement. White Oak Corporation v. Department of Revenue Services, 198 Conn. 413, 422, 503 A.2d 582 (1986). Thus, the court's conclusion that Practice Book § 387A does not require a hearing on the plaintiff's application for execution of judgment was supported by the subordinate facts.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other Judges concurred.
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