Houston Nat. Exchange Bank v. School Dist. No. 25

• Decision Date: 03 April 1916
• Docket Number: (No. 7235.)
• Citation: 185 S.W. 589
• Parties: HOUSTON NAT. EXCHANGE BANK et al. v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 25, HARRIS COUNTY.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

185 S.W. 589

HOUSTON NAT. EXCHANGE BANK et al. v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 25, HARRIS COUNTY.

(No. 7235.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

April 3, 1916.

Appeal from District Court, Harris County; J. D. Harvey, Judge.

Suit by Ed. F. Pickering and others, composing the Board of School Trustees of Common School District No. 25 of Harris County, against the Houston National Exchange Bank and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, the named defendant and another appeal. Affirmed.

Sewall Myer and Fisher, Campbell & Amerman, all of Houston, for appellant H. L. Washburn. Otto Taub, of Houston, for appellant Houston Nat. Exchange Bank. Jno. C. Williams, of Houston, for appellee.

LANE, J.

Ed. F. Pickering, J. W. Culpepper, and James Foster, composing the board of school trustees of common school district No. 25, Harris county, Tex., hereinafter called "school district," brought this suit against the Houston National Exchange Bank, hereinafter called "bank," Harry L. Washburn, auditor of Harris county, and others whose names are unnecessary for the purposes of this opinion. The real purpose of the suit was: First, to restrain H. L. Washburn, as county auditor, from in any manner interfering with the affairs of said school district No. 25, and from further claiming and asserting any authority to act as auditor of said school district; second, to restrain said bank from paying warrants audited and signed by said Washburn as auditor; and, third, to compel said bank, as depositary of the funds of said school district, to pay all warrants legally drawn against the funds of said school district, without requiring same to be approved or audited by said county auditor, H. L. Washburn.

It is provided by article 1467 of the Revised Civil Statutes, known as the "Auditor's Act," that:

"It shall be the duty of the auditor to have a general oversight of all the books and records of all the officers of the county, district or state, who are now, or who may hereafter be, authorized or required by law to receive or collect any money, funds, fees or other property for the use of or belonging to the county."

It is conceded by all parties to the suit that the only question presented for decision is: Are the funds of said school district, "funds for the use of, or belonging to, the county," as that term is used in the act of the Legislature creating and defining the duties of county auditors, as above set out?

The trial court determined the issue presented in favor of the plaintiff and granted the relief prayed for, and from the judgment rendered H. L. Washburn, auditor, and said depositary, bank, have appealed.

As the only question to be decided is, What did the Legislature mean by the use of the words, "money, funds, fees or other property for the use of, or belonging to the county," found in that section of the auditor's act above quoted? it becomes necessary to examine not only the several sections of said act, but also the law constituting the whole machinery of the law governing the public school affairs of this state so as to reach an intelligent conclusion. It would be an unprofitable waste of time to enter into a lengthy discussion as to whether school funds are county funds or state funds. The important inquiry is: What money, funds, fees, and other property the Legislature intended to place under the oversight of the county auditor? The controlling inquiry is: What was the intention of the lawmaking power? To ascertain the intention of the lawmaking power is the end and aim of all rules of statutory construction, and, when ascertained, to give to it effect, when not inconsistent with the organic law of this state, is the duty of all courts. To gather that intention, the courts are not confined exclusively to the consideration of the immediate statute in question, but may look to other legislation in pari materia. If we do so in this case, we find that the same Legislature that passed the auditor's act, approved April 22, 1905 (Acts 29th Leg. c. 161), had just seven days prior thereto passed a general law covering in every detail the legal machinery governing the public free schools of this state which, in every instance where school funds and property are mentioned, expressly gives the supervision of such funds and property to certain school officers named therein; such as trustees, superintendents, etc. This school law was approved April 15, 1905, just seven days prior to the approval of said auditor's law; both passed by the same Legislature at the same session. Surely in the light of the fact that this school law, which covers or is meant to control and govern such important matters as our public free schools, was passed and approved only seven days prior to the passage and approval of the auditor's law, under discussion, it cannot be concluded or reasonably contended that it was the intention of the Legislature to repeal or nullify any provisions of said recently passed school law by the passage of said auditor's law. On the contrary, the intention of the Legislature evidently was that such power or authority, where it had been granted to the school officers, should remain there. If the county auditor has such control over the school funds, by virtue of the auditor's law, as contended by appellant, many of the vital provisions of the public free school law would be nullified, and the usefulness of the entire machinery of the law concerning and governing public free schools would be seriously impaired, if not effectually destroyed. Such result could not have been the intent or purpose of the Legislature which passed both of the laws under discussion. To hold that such was the intention of the lawmakers would convict them of inexcusable folly.

Our Supreme Court, in the case of Webb County v. School Trustees, 95 Tex. 131, 65 S. W. 878, held that all school funds are state funds, and that the counties in the state, in holding such funds, hold them as trustees, and that the free schools are the beneficiaries; that, when the commissioners' court has seen that the available school funds are paid to the county treasurer for maintenance of the schools for the current year, it has discharged the county from further liability for the same; that thereafter the county school superintendent has control thereof, subject only to the supervision and direction of the state superintendent, and they are no longer subject to the control of said commissioners' court; that the county superintendent of public instruction was a state officer, and that, the state having assumed the functions of maintaining public free schools for the education of the children throughout its domain, the counties were recognized with reference to that business merely as subdivisions of territory, and some of their officers as proper agents for the administration of affairs relating to the public free schools; that such officers, with respect to such affairs, act for the state and not for the county; that this is true even as to officers who in other respects are county officers in fact as well as in name. The court, in rendering its opinion in said case, says:

"Our organic law, in the article devoted to the subject of public education, contains this emphatic declaration: `A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the state to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.' Constitution, art. 7, § 1. This devolves the duty of establishing and maintaining public free schools upon the Legislature, and shows that the function of such establishment and maintenance was to be performed by state agencies. Sections 2 and 5 of the same article provide that certain funds and property, including one-half of the unappropriated public domain, shall constitute a public free school fund. Section 5 also declares, in effect, that the annual income derived from the permanent fund, together with the tax provided for in section 3, shall constitute the `available school fund' of the state, by which is meant the fund which may be appropriated annually to the maintenance of the schools."

Quoting then from section 6 of said article of the Constitution with reference to lands granted the several counties of the state for educational purposes, the court calls attention to that provision which says that said lands, or the proceeds thereof when sold, shall be held by said counties alone as a trust for the benefit of the public schools therein, and says that the several funds so provided for the respective counties were to supplement the portion of the general available fund of the state which should be set apart to the respective counties and to be appropriated solely for the support of the schools established by the state.

The soundness of the opinion just quoted, as well as what we have already said, will hardly be seriously questioned if we consider the law approved April 15, 1905 (Acts 29th Leg. c. 124), for the management and control of the affairs of the public free schools of the state, in connection with the auditor's law, now under discussion, approved April 22, 1905, relating to auditing the finances of the county. Article 2824 gives the school trustees of the common school district absolute control over all the affairs of the district, "subject to the rules and regulations of the county and state superintendents." Article 2822 provides that the...