Houston Oil Co. v. Village Mills Co.

• Decision Date: 10 May 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 208-3301.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 241 S.W. 122
• Parties: HOUSTON OIL CO. OF TEXAS v. VILLAGE MILLS CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

241 S.W. 122

HOUSTON OIL CO. OF TEXAS v. VILLAGE MILLS CO.

(No. 208-3301.)^*

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

May 10, 1922.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Ninth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by the Houston Oil Company of Texas against the Village Mills Company and others, in trespass to try title, and, from a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant Village Mills Company appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed and remanded the case, and on rehearing certified the case to the Supreme Court (186 S. W. 785). Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and judgment of the district court affirmed.

H. O. Head, of Sherman, and Kennerly, Williams, Lee & Hill and Fred L. Williams, all of Houston, for plaintiff in error.

W. D. Gordon, E. E. Easterling, H. M. Whitaker, and Thos. J. Baten, all of Beaumont, for defendant in error.

POWELL, J.

The nature and result of this case have been admirably stated by the Court of Civil Appeals in the following language:

"This was an action of trespass to try title, instituted by Houston Oil Company of Texas against the Village Mills Company, in which the D. C. Montgomery league of land in Hardin county was involved. The appellant, by cross-action, brought in the Maryland Trust Company, alleging that it was asserting some sort of lien or claim on the land by reason of a deed of trust executed for its benefit by the Houston Oil Company. In addition to this plea of not guilty, the appellant also answered that it had matured title under the three, five, and ten year statutes of limitation. The Houston Oil Company also alleged in its petition that, in addition to holding the fee-simple title to the land, it had acquired a good and perfect title under the three, five, and ten year statutes of limitation. After the evidence for both sides had been submitted, the court gave a peremptory instruction to the jury to render a verdict for appellees, which was done, and the judgment entered accordingly, from which the appellant has perfected an appeal.

"Appellee Houston Oil Company's title is deraigned as follows: Mexican government to D. C. Montgomery, one league of land August 29, 1835; D. C. Montgomery to Samuel Moore, warranty deed June 5, 1838; Samuel Moore, by attorney, to Mary E. Brown, August 10, 1849; Mary Brown Frazier and husband to T. J. Word, deed dated January 19, 1855; T. J. Word to George F. Moore, December 8, 1858; George F. Moore to Susan B. Moore, December 7, 1860; T. J. Word to Susan B. Moore, partition deed July 5, 1866; Susan B. Moore and George F. Moore to John P. Irvin, August 4, 1881; John P. Irvin to Texas Pine Land Association, December 11, 1891; Texas Pine Land Association, by its trustees, to Houston Oil Company of Texas, special warranty deed dated July 31, 1901, and also by deed of date December 5, 1914.

"Appellant filed an affidavit of forgery against the deed from D. C. Montgomery to Samuel Moore, of date June 5, 1838. Appellant's record title shows that it claims to have the fee in the league of land under the following instruments: Mexican government to D. C. Montgomery, August 29, 1835; D. C. Montgomery to Arthur Henry, deed January 27, 1836; Arthur Henry to Samuel Beresford, February 27, 1845; heirs of Samuel Beresford to W. W. Clippinger power of attorney February 19, 1901; heirs of Samuel Beresford, by attorney, to Brackin and Hooks, by deed dated March 28, 1914; Hooks and Brackin to Village Mills Company, April 7, 1914.

"The records and briefs are voluminous, and many assignments of error are presented, but the judgment of the lower court must be sustained, unless three contentions urged by the appellant can be successfully maintained, viz.:

"First. That the judgment of the United States Circuit Court at Beaumont in November, 1903, against the Beresfords, appellant's predecessors in title, was not valid and binding; that judgment having been interposed by appellees as an estoppel in this suit against the appellant's assertion of title to the land in question.

"Second. That the record in the case required a submission to the jury of the question of forgery of the deed from Montgomery to Moore, against which an affidavit of forgery had been filed.

"Third. That neither the three, five, or ten years statutes of limitation were established by the uncontroverted testimony in favor of appellees and those through and under whom they claim.

"We will therefore consider these questions in the order in which they are stated, rather than follow the numerical assignment of them as found in the briefs."

Upon consideration of the foregoing three major questions, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the cause for a new trial. Its reasons in each instance will appear later as we proceed with our opinion. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals will be found in 186 S. W. 785-805.

The Houston Oil Company, upon proper application therefor, was granted a writ of error by the Supreme Court, and the case is before us for review and recommendation. We shall discuss the questions involved in the order adopted by the Court of Civil Appeals.

The judgment of the federal court, omitting the description of the land, which shall be considered at length by us, reads as follows "In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas, at Beaumont.

"Richard Beresford et al. v. Texas Pine Land Association et al. C. L. No. 94.

"November Term, November 26, 1903.

"Be it remembered that on this the 23d day of November, A. D. 1903, the above styled and numbered cause came on for trial, plaintiffs having previously dismissed their suit against Clarendon Harris and O. N. Nabors, whereupon the plaintiffs and the defendants all announced ready for trial, and a jury of twelve good and lawful men, consisting of Sevan J. Blanchette and eleven others, were impaneled and sworn according to law, who, after hearing the pleadings of the plaintiffs and the defendants, the evidence, the argument and the charge of the court, right away returned into court the following verdict, to wit:

"`Richard Beresford et al. v. Texas Pine Land Association et al. C. L. 94. In the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In the above cause, we, the jury, find a verdict for the defendant for the land and premises sued for.

                                 "`Sevan J. Blanchette, Foreman.'
                

"It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that Mrs. C. M. Beresford, surviving widow of Richard Beresford, who died since the institution of this suit, Elizabeth Beresford, Samuel Beresford, J. Dale Beresford, Elizabeth Merderk, Sarah Radcliff, Dollie Cox, Augustus Bosche, William B. Ulrey, Gean E. Beresford, Lizzie Furst and her husband, Harry Furst, Eliza J. Beresford, Lillie B. Thompson, Edward Thompson, Jessie P. Hackett, and Charles D. Hackett, suing the defendants for the following described tract of land, to wit, * * * take nothing by their suit against the defendants, the Texas Pine Land Association and Thomas L. Nelson, Horatio R. Fletcher, and Francis Peabody, as trustees, and that said defendants and each of them go hence without day.

"It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said defendant, the Texas Pine Land Association, prior to the institution of this suit, was the owner in fee simple of the lands and premises sued for.

"It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendants the Texas Pine Land Association and its trustees above named do have and recover of and from the plaintiffs in this cause all costs by them incurred by the defendants herein named, and the sureties on their cost bond, to wit, Edwin E. Stevens and W. W. Clippinger.

"It is further ordered and adjudged that the officials of the court do have their execution or executions against the plaintiffs and the defendants, respectively, for all unpaid costs by them incurred for which execution may issue."

Certified copy of above judgment was recorded in the deed records of Hardin county on January 24, 1906.

The petitions in above suit alleged the residence of all the plaintiffs in states other than Texas, and further alleged that three of the trustees of the defendant Pine Land Association resided in Massachusetts, and the other trustee in Texas.

Was above judgment valid and binding, so as to conclude the Village Mills Company from claiming this league of land? The latter company makes numerous attacks upon it, seriously contending that it is not bound by it, and, even if it was, the Houston Oil Company cannot claim any benefit under the judgment. We shall consider these various attacks upon this judgment in their turn, as presented by the Village Mills Company.

In the first place, defendant in error contends that the federal court was without jurisdiction to try this case, and submits, in that connection, the following proposition:

"When the record affirmatively discloses the fact that the court has no jurisdiction of the controversy, the judgment is a mere nullity, and can be collaterally impeached by any person interested, whenever and wherever it is brought in question. Hence, where the jurisdiction of the federal court depends upon the citizenship of the party, such citizenship, or the facts which in legal intendment constitute it, should be distinctly and positively averred in the pleadings. A joint-stock association, being a mere partnership, cannot be a citizen of a state within the meaning of the statutes of the United States. Therefore the federal court could not have jurisdiction of a suit brought by citizens of the state of Ohio against the Texas Pine Land Association, alleged to have its principal office in Harris county, Tex."

The proposition by defendant in error just above quoted is met by four counter propositions submitted by plaintiff in error. We shall discuss two of them only, for they are the ones upon which the Court of Civil Appeals...