Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. McCarty

• Decision Date: 21 January 1901
• Citation: 60 S.W. 429
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: HOUSTON & T. C. R. CO. v. McCARTY.

60 S.W. 429

HOUSTON & T. C. R. CO. v. McCARTY.

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 21, 1901.

Certified question from court of civil appeals of First supreme judicial district.

Action by Charles McCarty against the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed to the court of civil appeals, which certified a question of law to the supreme court.

For opinion of court of civil appeals in former appeal, see 54 S. W. 421.

Baker, Botts, Baker & Lovett and Frank Andrews, for appellant. Jacob C. Baldwin and J. V. Meek (R. E. Hannay, of counsel), for appellee.

GAINES, C. J.

This case comes to us upon a certified question. The certificate is as follows:

"Appellee, while a passenger upon one of appellant's passenger trains, was injured in a wreck caused by the actionable negligence of appellant. He was promptly taken to appellant's infirmary at Houston, that his injuries might be dressed and cared for. While there appellant's claim agent began to negotiate with him for the settlement of his claim against the company. At that time appellee appeared to have sustained no other injury except a dislocation of his ankle, and it was shown by the evidence that no other injuries were considered by the parties to the settlement, and no other injuries entered into and in fact formed any part of the consideration for the settlement, except the loss of the watch, which was included in the settlement at a valuation of $30. Neither the appellant's agents nor appellee knew or suspected injury to any other part of appellee's person, and appellee exercised reasonable care to ascertain if he was otherwise injured. The sum accepted in settlement was grossly inadequate and out of proportion to the injuries to other portions of his body, which, though at that time unknown, were shortly thereafter discovered to exist, and appellee could not have been induced to settle for the sum named in the release had he been aware of his real condition. When the amount was agreed upon, appellee executed a release in writing, which was prepared by the company's agent for his signature. Said release is in the following language: `Know all men by these presents, that I, Charles McCarty, of the town of Welborn, Texas, for and in consideration of the sum of four hundred and thirty dollars to me in hand paid by the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company, of the state of Texas, have remised, released, and forever discharged, and by these presents do, for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, remise, release, and forever discharge, the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company of and from all and all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, claims and demands whatsoever which I had or have now, or which I or my heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns can, shall, or may have, by reason of any damage or personal injury sustained by me in the wreck of the south-bound passenger train, No. 4, of said Houston & Texas Central Railroad at Fairbanks yesterday morning at five o'clock, on which train I was a passenger, and on my way from Welborn to Houston, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on this, the twenty-eighth day of April, 1897. [Signed] Chas. McCarty. [L. S.] Witness: J. R. Stuart, E. L. Adams.' Shortly after the execution of this release, appellee discovered that he had sustained injuries to his spine and bowels, which were of a much graver and more permanent nature than the injuries settled for, and which would practically destroy his usefulness for the remainder of his life. Whereupon he brought this suit to set aside the release and recover for the additional injuries. The grounds upon which he sought to set it aside were that both he and appellant's agents were mistaken in supposing he had sustained no other injuries than a dislocated ankle; that no other injury save that to the ankle was considered or entered in any way into the settlement; that he could not have been induced to settle, had he known of these other and graver injuries; and that, believing and having reason to believe that he had no other claim against the company, he was induced to receipt them in full in the general terms used in the release. The question of primary liability on the part of appellant, and the issue of mistake as affecting the validity of the release, in so far as it purported to be a bar to recovery for the unconsidered injuries, were submitted to a jury, and the trial resulted in a verdict for appellee; the recovery being confined by the charge of the court to only such damages as appellee had sustained by reason of the unconsidered injuries; no damages being allowed for the injury to the ankle, which the court hold had been settled for in full, as evidenced by the release.

"The question presented, and which we respectfully certify, is as follows: Can the release in question be set aside, except in so far as it evidences a discharge for injuries to the ankle, on parol proof that the parties thereto were mistaken in supposing that the injury to the ankle was the only injury which appellee had sustained; it also being made to appear by parol that, notwithstanding the language of the writing, no other injury was in the minds of the parties, and that if the other injuries had been known the release would not have been executed?"

In Gilliam v. Alford, 69 Tex. 267, 6 S. W. 757, the court, speaking through the late Chief Justice Stayton, and quoting from Pomeroy's Equity, announced the rule in regard to voluntary settlements as follows: "The rule in such cases is that `voluntary settlements are so favored, that if a doubt or dispute exists between parties with respect to their rights, and all have the same knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge concerning the circumstances involving those rights, and there is no fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or other misleading incident, a compromise into which they have voluntarily entered must stand and be enforced, although the final issue may be different from that which was anticipated, and although the disposition made by the parties in...