Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Stevenson

• Decision Date: 25 June 1930
• Docket Number: No. 1383-5556.,1383-5556.
• Citation: 29 S.W.2d 995
• Parties: HOUSTON & T. C. RY. CO. v. STEVENSON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 995

29 S.W.2d 995

HOUSTON & T. C. RY. CO. v. STEVENSON.

No. 1383-5556.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

June 25, 1930.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Third Supreme Judicial District.

Action by A. E. Stevenson against the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals [19 S.W.(2d) 207], and defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, of Houston, and Garrett, Brownlee & Goldsmith, of Austin, for plaintiff in error.

E. R. York, Harris & Harris, S. L. Staples, and Cofer & Cofer, all of Austin, for defendant in error.

SHARP, J.

A. E. Stevenson instituted this suit in the district court of Travis county against the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company for damages to his automobile and for personal injuries resulting from a collision between defendant's train and his automobile on a public road near Austin in Travis county. The case was submitted to the jury upon special issues. Based upon the findings of the jury to the special issues submitted, the trial court entered a judgment for the defendant. The case was appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme judicial district, and was reversed and remanded by that court. We refer to the opinion of that court for a more complete statement of the nature and result of the suit. 19 S.W.(2d) 207. A writ of error was granted.

We refer to the parties in this suit as plaintiff and defendant, as they were designated in the trial court.

By proper assignment of error the defendant contends that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in its decision in holding that article 799 of the Penal Code is void, in that it is so uncertain and indefinite as to its meaning that it violates article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of this state, and article 6 of the Penal Code, and therefore invalid, and that plaintiff, by operating his automobile without such brakes as required by said article, was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and that the finding of the jury that at the time and on the occasion in question he was operating his automobile without adequate brakes in good working order, and that such act was the proximate cause of the collision, was not sufficient to charge him with contributory negligence.

Article 799 of the Penal Code reads as follows: "Any person who operates upon a public highway a motor vehicle not provided with adequate brakes kept in good working order, or any person having control or charge of a motor vehicle who shall allow such vehicle to stand in any public street or highway unattended without first effectively setting the brakes and stopping the motor thereon, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars."

The defendant alleged that plaintiff at the time of the collision was operating his automobile without any emergency brake, and that the service brakes were so worn out and defective as to be entirely useless, and he was unable to control his car, and in so operating his car he was guilty of negligence proximately causing the collision. The testimony tended to show that the automobile had no emergency brake at all, and that the service brakes were so worn as to be useless.

The court submitted to the jury the following special issues:

"Question No. 17: Was the plaintiff when approaching said railroad crossing operating his automobile without adequate brakes in good working order? Answer this question `yes' or `no.'" To which the jury answered: "Yes."

"Question No. 18: If you answer `yes' to Question No. 17, then answer this question: Was the fact (if it was a fact) that plaintiff was operating his automobile without adequate brakes in good working order at the time of the accident the proximate cause of or did it proximately contribute to cause the collision between plaintiff's automobile and defendant's train? Answer this question `yes' or `no.'" To which the jury answered: "Yes."

We think that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that article 799, supra, is invalid. We are not convinced with the soundness of the reasons advanced for declaring the law invalid. The provision of the Penal Code in question was adopted by the Legislature in 1917, and evidently was a law to promote safety of travel on the highways. The subject-matter was clearly within the power of the Legislature, and the law is plain and unambiguous. The language embraced within the law is simple, and is commonly used in connection with such matters in controversy. The paramount purpose of the law was for the safety of the public from injury and loss of life through the operation of motor vehicles upon the highways of this country. Modern conditions require some such protection.

Let us review some of the authorities bearing upon this question and see if the validity of the statute in controversy does not find sanction and support in reason and in the able and well-reasoned opinions of the various courts upon similar laws, involving analagous principles.

The case of Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Enderle (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W. 276, 277 (writ of error denied), involved the construction of article 6713, Revised Statutes 1911, forbidding common carriers to use locomotives or cars not provided with sufficient and secure grabirons, handholds, and foot stirrups, and it was contended in that case, as here, that the act involved was invalid because it was so indefinite as to make it impossible from the language of the statute to ascertain the legislative intent of what would constitute compliance with the provisions of the statute. The Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion held:

"The article in question reads as follows:

"`It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in commerce as aforesaid, to use in moving intrastate traffic within said state any locomotive, tender, cars, or similar vehicle which is not provided with sufficient and secure grabirons, handholds and foot stirrups.'

"While the language is somewhat tautological and not specially marked with elegance, it seems to be plain and simple, and capable of being understood by any one who desires to understand it. The statute does not purport to provide the size, material, number, or style of the appliances mentioned, but it merely provides for such appliances as are `sufficient and secure,' such, for instance, as will not give way and precipitate the servants of the corporation to the earth, as happened in this case. The law has often been enforced in this state, and railroad companies have not heretofore evinced any doubt as to the meaning and intent of the simple language in which the statute is couched. The statute was enacted to protect those who were called upon to use the appliances named, and it was not incumbent upon the Legislature to state that by the words `sufficient and secure' it was meant that the appliances would not be safe unless they were strong enough to sustain the weight of the passenger or employee who might use them.

"Appellant insists that by the word, `sufficient,' used in the statute it was intended to prescribe the number of appliances that should be used, but if that be true we fail to see what satisfaction appellant can obtain from that construction, because the appliances were to be both `sufficient and secure,' and under the facts the handhold was certainly not secure, no matter how many of them may have been on the car. We are of opinion, however, that the word, `sufficient' is used in the sense of adequacy and adaptation to the end desired. It means fitness to answer the purpose for which it was intended. It is not synonymous with `secure,' which, as used in the statute, means safe. We can readily understand that a handhold might be perfectly secure and yet not be sufficient for the purposes for which it is used. The words used in the statute are plain, and no difficulty can be experienced in meeting the simple requirements of the statute. Language as general as that used in the statute under consideration has often been held valid. Berry v. State [Tex. Civ. App.] 135 S. W. 631; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 106 S. W. 925; Katzman v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 124, 130 S. W. 990, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519, 140 Am. St. Rep. 359; People v. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995; State v. Railway, 177 Ind. 553, 96 N. E. 340 [Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1284].

"It must be kept in mind that this is a civil action, and that the rule of strict construction of the statute does not apply as in construing penal statutes. Even in construing that class of statutes, reason, conservatism, and common sense should be exercised and no statute lightly set aside and the sovereign will of the people thereby defeated. Every law enacted by the Legislature should be respected and never annulled by a court when the legislative will is expressed with reasonable certainty."

The case of State of Texas v. I. & G. N. Ry. Co., 107 Tex. 349, 179 S. W. 867, 869, involved the construction of articles 6581 and 6582, R. S. 1911, requiring railways to construct sheds for the shelter of its employees engaged in repairing cars, but exempting from its operation points where it is necessary to make "light repairs," and it was held by our Supreme Court that the law is not so indefinite in its application as to be inoperative and void for uncertainty. It was held that the term is one commonly used and as clear as could be used without attempting the difficult, if not impossible, task of making a catalogue of all repairs which might be considered light. Justice Yantis in rendering the opinion in that case, reviewed the opinion of Chief Justice Phillips in the case of State of Texas v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 106 Tex. 20, 154 S. W. 1159, construing the "Water Closet Law" passed by the Thirty-First Legislature (c. 96), and says:

"What constitutes `light repairs' in any stated line of industry should find little difficulty among those engaged in that particular line of employment. We t...