Houston v. Colvin, CASE NO. 7:13-cv-00208-JEO

• Decision Date: 14 February 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 7:13-cv-00208-JEO
• Parties: BRENDA F. HOUSTON, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

BRENDA F. HOUSTON, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

CASE NO. 7:13-cv-00208-JEO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

DONE: February 14, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Brenda F. Houston brings this action, through counsel, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),¹ seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and denying her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). (Doc.² 1). The case has been assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to this court's general order of reference dated January 14, 2013. The cause now comes to be heard on Plaintiff's application for judicial review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(1). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court for disposition of the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a). Upon review of the record and the relevant law, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and for DIB on January 12, 2010, and for SSI on January 8, 2010, both alleging disability beginning December 1, 2009. (R. 156, 158).³ Her claims were denied initially. (R. 95-96). Thereafter, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held on October 19, 2011. (R. 53). At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by an attorney (Id.) Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision fining that Plaintiff was not disabled under the meaning of the Social Security Act for the purposes of her claims. (R. at 47-48). He also found that she had a residual functional capacity ("RFC") for light work in that she could

lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour day; sit approximately 6 hours in an 8hour day; no unprotected heights or dangerous or moving equipment; no ladder, ropes, or scaffolds; no concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat dust, gases, odors, chemicals, etc.; and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs.

(R. 42). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Appeals Council and her request for review was denied on December 12, 2012. (R. 1). Therefore, the ALJ's decision represents the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.) Plaintiff thereafter timely filed this action forjudicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), asserting that the findings of the ALJ are not based upon substantial evidence and the Appeals Council erroneously denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Doc. 1 at 2).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act, this court's role is a narrow one: "Our review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). The court gives deference to factual findings and reviews questions of law de novo. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991). The court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner], rather [it] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotations and other citation omitted). "The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1221 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987)). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would acceptas adequate to support a conclusion." Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Conclusions of law made by the Commissioner are reviewed de novo. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145. "No ... presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner's] conclusions of law." Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Background

Plaintiff is a fifty-six year old with a history of coronary artery disease, hypertension, and obesity. She worked until December 1, 2009, the onset of her medical condition. (R. 180). Prior to that she had been working regularly as a cook since about 1996. (R. 181). In December 2009, she underwent bypass surgery following complaints of chest pain. (R.185).

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 2009. (R. 41). She meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2013. (Id.)

B. The Five-Step Evaluation Process

The regulations require the Commissioner to follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is eligible for a period of disability, DIB, and/or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1)-(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1)-(2); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). "[A]n individual shall be considered to bedisabled for purposes of [determining eligibility for DIB and SSI benefits] if [she] is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The specific steps in the evaluation process are discussed below.

1. Substantial Gainful Employment

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). The regulations define "substantial gainful activity" as "work activity that is both substantial and gainful."⁴ 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572; 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. If the claimant is working and that work is substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled, regardless of the claimant's medical condition or his age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). "Under the firststep, the claimant has the burden to show that []he is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity." Reynolds-Buckley v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 457 F. App'x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 2009, the alleged onset date. (R. 41). This determination is not disputed by the parties.

2. Severe Impairments

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). "[A] 'physical or mental impairment' is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D). The regulations provide: "[I]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). "An impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which hassuch a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience." Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). A complainant may be found disabled based on a combination of impairments even though none of the individual impairments alone are disabling. Walker v. Brown, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; 20 C.F.R. § 416.923. A claimant has the burden to show that he has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App'x at 863.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had certain severe physical impairments as follows: "status post quadruple coronary artery bypass graft and hypertension (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c))." (R. 41).

3. The Listings

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine whether the claimant's impairment meets the durational requirement and whether it is equivalent to any one of the listed impairments, which are impairments that are so severe as to prevent an individual with the described impairment from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d)-(e); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [The Listings]. If the claimant's impairment meets or equals a Listing, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled, regardless of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). The claimant has the burden of proving that his impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App'x at 863. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an...