Houston v. Lafayette County, Miss.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-7750,93-7750
• Citation: 56 F.3d 606
• Parties: Beatrice HOUSTON, Annie Ruth Manning, Mary Ann Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LAFAYETTE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 606

56 F.3d 606

Beatrice HOUSTON, Annie Ruth Manning, Mary Ann Williams Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LAFAYETTE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-7750.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 16, 1995.

Robert B. McDuff, Jackson, MS, Ellis Turnage, Morris, Turnage & Associates, Cleveland, MS, for appellants.

David O'Donnell, H. Scot Spragins, Hickman, Goza & Gore, Oxford, MS, for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

ON SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion May 4, 1995, 5 Cir., 51 F.3d 547)

Before KING, EMILIO M. GARZA and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Treating the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc as a Petition for Panel Rehearing, the Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel nor Judge in regular active service of the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (FRAP and Local Rule 35), the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED. However, in the interest of clarity, we withdraw our prior opinion, Houston v. Lafayette County, 51 F.3d 547 (5th Cir.1995), and substitute the following:

Residents of Lafayette County, Mississippi, appeal from the district court's dismissal of their vote dilution challenge, under Sec. 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 (1988), to the redistricting plan for county supervisor elections as submitted by the County to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance. The district court found that the plaintiff residents had failed to prove that the black population was geographically compact, that black voters exhibited political cohesion, and that white voters voted in bloc to defeat minority candidates. We vacate the district court's judgment and remand for clarification.

I

County supervisors in Lafayette County are elected from five single-member election districts. Black residents constitute approximately one-quarter of the voting-age population and currently reside throughout the five districts. No black resident has ever been elected to the office of county supervisor. Black residents have been elected to sub-county positions such as constable and board of education member.

At trial, plaintiff residents used expert testimony and reports to prove their vote-dilution case. Plaintiffs' expert, Victoria Caridas, testified that black residents in Lafayette County could be placed in a majority-minority district, that is, a district where minority residents constituted a majority of the eligible voters. To demonstrate the feasibility of such placement, she submitted two alternative plans that would achieve a 54-56% black voting-age majority in one district.

Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Allan Lichtman testified that black residents of Lafayette County exhibit political cohesion and that white residents of Lafayette County vote as a bloc to defeat minority candidates. In support of these conclusions, Dr. Lichtman testified that he used two statistical methods to analyze Lafayette County election data: bivariate ecological regression and extreme case analysis. ¹ Dr. Lichtman analyzed fourteen primary elections using ecological regression and five primary elections using extreme case analysis.

The County's expert, Dr. Ronald Weber, also performed ecological regression and extreme case analysis on Lafayette County election data, although he did not analyze the same elections as Dr. Lichtman had. Based on his analysis, Dr. Weber concluded that racial polarization--that is, that black residents vote for black candidates and white residents vote for white candidates--does not occur in Lafayette County.

The district court found that the plaintiff residents had not shown that black residents were sufficiently geographically compact to allow formation of a majority-minority district. ² The court also found that black residents did not exhibit political cohesion and that white residents did not vote as a bloc to defeat minority candidates. Alternatively, the district court found that, even if the plaintiff residents had proved geographical compactness, black political cohesion, and white bloc voting, they had failed nonetheless to prove that the totality of the circumstances showed that the County's plan diluted minority voting strength. Plaintiff residents appeal the district court's decision, challenging each of the above findings.

II

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color...." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2764, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) ("The essence of a Sec. 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.").

In order to prove a Sec. 2 violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate three preconditions:

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.... Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.... Third, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it--in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed ...--usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67. Although Gingles concerned at-large election districts, these preconditions also apply to challenges to single-member districting schemes. Growe v. Emison, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 1084, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (extending Gingles preconditions to single-member district cases). If a plaintiff demonstrates the Gingles preconditions the district court determines whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff has proven the existence of vote dilution under the challenged plan. In doing so, the district court applies factors identified by the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Sec. 2. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. at 2759. ³

We review the district court's findings with respect to the Gingles preconditions and the totality of the circumstances factors for clear error. See Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1118 (5th Cir.1991) (Westwego III ) (reviewing findings in Sec. 2 case for clear error); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3213, 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989). "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)).

A

Plaintiff residents contend that the district court clearly erred in concluding that the black population of Lafayette County was not sufficiently geographically compact to allow the formation of a majority-minority district. They argue that our decision in Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.1994), mandates reversal.

Plaintiff residents challenge the district court's reasoning that "[t]he potential for increased minority influence that a majority composition of blacks within one district may afford is necessarily offset by the significantly diminished power of those left behind in the overwhelmingly white supervisor districts." We agree with the plaintiff's contention. As we stated in Clark:

[T]he district court's suggestion that the formation of plaintiffs' proposed district would dilute the voting strength of black citizens in the remaining districts does not support its conclusion that the black population in [the county] is not sufficiently geographically compact. Whenever a majority-black district is created to remedy a Sec. 2 violation, the number of black voters in the other districts must necessarily be reduced. Indeed, without this phenomenon, no majority-black districts would ever be created. Because the record in this case reflects no loss of influence that is not found in every Sec. 2 case, the district court erred in finding that the loss of influence supported its conclusion that the black population in [the county] was not sufficiently geographically compact.

Clark, 21 F.3d at 95; see also Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244 ("The fact that there are members of the minority group outside the minority district is immaterial.... Just because not all of the minorities in [the city] are in the district does not mean that Gingles' first part is not satisfied."). Accordingly, the district court's reasoning cannot support its finding that the black population is not geographically compact.

In Clark, as in this case, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' proffered districting plan as being too oddly shaped. Compactness, however, is not as narrow a standard as the district court construed it to be. "The first Gingles precondition does not require some aesthetic ideal of compactness, but simply that the black population be sufficiently compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Id. at 95. Moreover, the question is not whether the plaintiff residents' proposed district was oddly shaped, but whether the proposal demonstrated that a geographically compact district could be drawn. See id. ("[P]laintiffs' proposed district is not...