Houtz v. Board of Commissioners of Uinta County

• Decision Date: 09 December 1902
• Citation: 11 Wyo. 152,70 P. 840
• Parties: HOUTZ v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF UINTA COUNTY
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

70 P. 840

11 Wyo. 152

HOUTZ v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF UINTA COUNTY

Supreme Court of Wyoming

December 9, 1902

ERROR to the District Court, Uinta County, HON. DAVID H. CRAIG Judge.

John S Houtz instituted this action to recover from the Board of the County Commissioners of the County of Uinta the sum of $ 1,689, which amount it was alleged had been exacted by way of fines and costs from Hyrum Severson, Andrew Hudson and E. P Houtz, assignors of plaintiff, under a void judgment of one N. B. Anderson, a justice of the peace of said county, and by said justice paid into the treasury of the county. The cause was tried to the District Court without a jury, and that court found generally for the defendant, and rendered judgment accordingly. The plaintiff thereupon brought proceedings in error. The material facts are stated in the opinion.

Affirmed.

L. R Rogers, J. H. Ryckman and M. E. Wilson, for plaintiff in error.

1. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the money sued for in this case was obtained by the county in a proceeding which was not merely irregular, but was irregular and absolutely void.

A justice of the peace in the State of Wyoming is without jurisdiction to try and determine any public offense in which the punishment prescribed by law exceeds a fine of $ 100 and imprisonment for six months in the county jail. (R. S., Sec. 5204.)

A judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to determine the matter in issue is necessarily and incurably void. (1 Freeman on Judgments, Secs. 117, 120; 1 Black on Judgments, Secs. 170, 171, 218; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 328.)

The Justice of the Peace Court is one of inferior limited jurisdiction and nothing is ever presumed in favor such jurisdiction.

2. The money sued for was paid by the plaintiff under compulsion. The evidence will show that the money was paid to prevent the imprisonment of the parties charged with crime. The pretended arrest was not only groundless, but unlawful. That money paid to avoid or to obtain release from such an arrest is paid under duress and may be recovered back. (See Keener on Quasi Contracts, Sec. 5, p. 438, and authorities there cited.) That the county is liable. (See Kelly v. Rhoades, 63 P. 935; S. C., 51 P. 593.)

Some courts, for instance Board Commissioners Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St., 110, have held that the Board of County Commissioners are not liable in their quasi corporate capacity to an action for damages for injury resulting to a private party by their wrongful act. This case has no application where the property of another has been either wilfully or negligently appropriated to the use and benefit of the county. It was said in May v. The County of Logan, 30 F. 250, 259, "In such cases the benefit secured cannot be retained and enjoyed by setting up the wrongful act in obtaining it. To allow this would violate the plainest dictates of justice and common honesty."

Also in March v. Fulton County, 10 Wall., 576, 684, Justice Field, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: "We do not mean to intimate that liabilities may not be incurred by counties independent of the statute. Undoubtedly they may be. The obligation to do justice rests upon all persons, natural and artificial, and if a county obtains the money or property of others without authority, the law, independent of any statute, will compel restitution or compensation." (See also 7 Ency. Law (2d Ed.), 953; R. S., Chap. 7, Sec. 4174.)

3. The money sued for has been paid over by the collecting officer and has been received to the use of the defendant.

4. The plaintiff has elected to proceed against the county and not against its officers. Such election, however, is a matter of defense and need not be alleged and proved. (Ware v. Percival, 14 Am. Rep., 565.)

These conditions being found to concur, the cause of action in favor of the plaintiff is well grounded unless a presentment and demand of the money from the county is a condition precedent to the action.

Is presentment necessary? (Bartholomew Co. v. Ford, 27 Ind. 717; Village of Glencoe v. County Com. (Minn.), 41 N.W. 239; Cooley on Taxation, 815, and cases cited.)

Upon the trial of the cause it was contended by counsel for defendant that a demand was required by the statutes of the State of Wyoming. To support this contention, counsel cited Sections 1062 and 1216.

It is the contention of the plaintiff in error that the provisions of the statutes cited have no application in this case. The accounts, claims and demands referred to in those provisions are those which are the results of contracts made by the county acting through its duly authorized agents, and have no application to claims arising out of tort. (Hollingsworth v. Saunders Co., 36 Neb. 41; 54 N. W., 79; County of Douglas v. Taylor, 70 N. W., 27.)

Cases in apparent conflict will be found not in point upon close examination of the statutes which they attempt to construe and interpret. For instance, Powder River Cattle Co. v. Custer Co., 22 P. 383. Claim to recover taxes. Presentment and demand held necessary under the statutes of Montana. Section 4288 expressly mentions the case of an aggrieved taxpayer, and brings him within the statute requiring presentment and demand of the County Commissioners. Fenton v. Salt Lake Co., 11 P. 601; 3 Utah 423. This was a claim unliquidated for damages to property. The statutes of Utah required presentment and demand of every claim, demand or right of action before bringing suit. In Georgia, Mississippi, Texas and all other states where the decisions seem to be in conflict with the plaintiff's contention, the statutes are broader and the commissioner's court is differently organized, having a different and more extensive jurisdiction than in the State of Wyoming.

As a general proposition, the recovery back of taxes and the recovery back of money exacted as a fine by public officers under an unlawful and void criminal proceeding, would be governed by the same principles. (2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., Sec. 940.)

There is, however, this distinction, and it is material to this case. The laws of taxation are enacted for the purpose of raising revenue with which to run the government upon the theory that the person taxed is being benefited and protected by that government. Revenue is the primary object of taxation. It is a necessity to every government, and is a power incident to sovereignty.

Money collected under the criminal law is not primarily for the purpose of revenue. It is an exception for a citizen to violate the criminal law, and the fine imposed for such a violation is by way of punishment, the primary object being to prevent crime and not to raise revenue. All criminal statutes are strictly construed. The presumption is that every man is innocent of crime until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at a fair and impartial trial before the court having jurisdiction of both the person and the subject matter.

A reading of Section 1062 will convince every honest judgment that it has to do only with contracts; that is, either express contracts or contracts implied in fact, and that it has nothing to do with contracts implied in law, or quasi contracts. The "specifications" required by that statute, the "separation of items" and the reference to the "performance of any service" make it conclusive that it has no application to a case arising out of wrong. Section 1063 prescribes a penalty. The penalty for a violation of Section 1062 is not that the "account" shall not be paid; it is not against the creditor; it does not render the allowance of that account void; but it is a penalty against the commissioners who allow the account in violation of Section 1062.

The policy of the law in this, Section 1063, is not to place a burden on the creditor for an unlawful act of the officer. It places that burden where it belongs, on the officers who have violated the law. The language of Section 1216 is to be construed and interpreted in connection with Section 1062. It is incomplete without that section. No rational meaning can be gotten from it unless Section 1062 is considered as a limitation and modification of it. It provides in the commencement: "All claims and demands held by a person or persons, company or corporation, against a county, shall be presented for audit and allowance to the Board of County Commissioners of the proper county as provided by law," etc. Now, here is a direct and specific reference to Section 1062. In no other place in the statutes than in 1062 is there a provision for the presentment of claims to the County Commissioners, and as Section 1062 has reference only to claims arising out of contract, it is our contention that Section 1216 can have no broader application. No fund exists in any county for the settlement of demands arising out of tort. It is a fundamental presumption that every officer will do his duty, and there will be no tort. When there is one however, it is an irregularity, and the compensation which the courts of justice decide the county shall pay for the wrong done must be created as each case arises. The purpose of these statutes is to prevent wrongful conduct on the part of the County Commissioners. It is a matter of common report that in many counties in many states the County Commissioners use their offices for their own unjust and unlawful enrichment. To prevent such conduct and to establish a correct and accurate system of records, statutes similar to those of Wyoming have been enacted in a majority of the states. An examination of these records will give publicity to the acts of the County Commissioners; and every citizen may know and see just where, how and for what the money of his county was expended; if he will...