Howard ex rel. Estate of Howard v. Bayes

• Decision Date: 05 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 7:02-204-DCR.,CIV.A. 7:02-204-DCR.
• Citation: 378 F.Supp.2d 753
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
• Parties: Heral HOWARD, as the Administrator of the Estate of Tammy HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. Paul BAYES, individually and in his official capacity; Pat Montgomery, individually and in his official capacity; and Magoffin County Fiscal Court, Defendants.

378 F.Supp.2d 753

Heral HOWARD, as the Administrator of the Estate of Tammy HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. Paul BAYES, individually and in his official capacity; Pat Montgomery, individually and in his official capacity; and Magoffin County Fiscal Court, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 7:02-204-DCR.

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Pikeville Division.

January 5, 2005.

Ned B. Pillersdorf, Joseph R. Lane, Pillersdorf, Derossett & Lane Prestonsburg, KY, for plaintiff.

Jonathan C. Shaw, Michael J. Schmitt, Porter, Schmitt, Jones & Banks, Paintsville, KY, for defendants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REEVES, District Judge.

This matter is pending for consideration of the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Record No. 29] For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the Defendants' motion.¹

I. Background

On April 29, 2002, in response to a 911 call, two ambulances from Magoffin County, as well as Magoffin Deputy Sheriff Paul Bayes, were called to Tammy Howard's residence for a possible drug overdose. It is unclear who called for help because Howard was apparently unaware that anyone had called 911. (Bayes Depo. at 18; Lykins Stmt. at 3 (attached to Maynard Depo.)) Also at the residence was Gerald Williams, who was apparently Howard's boyfriend.

Howard was very drunk and refused medical attention. Towards the end of Deputy Bayes' investigation, Magoffin Deputy Sheriff Carl Adams arrived on the scene. Both Bayes and Adams contend that Howard had no visible injuries. (Bayes Depo. at 18; Adams Testimony at 1311.) However, paramedics Charles Tackett and Paul Puckett noticed a small "mark" under one of Howard's eyes, but they claim that the mark was not fresh and that there was no indication of any recent altercation. (Tackett Aff. at 1; Puckett Aff. at 1.) Paramedic Carlos Lykins also noticed a "fading" bruise that appeared to be several days old. (Lykins Stmt. at 3.)

Tackett and Puckett further noted: (1) that Howard did not allege abuse; (2) that it did not appear that Howard and Williams had been fighting; and (3) that Howard appeared happy. (Tackett Aff. at 1; Puckett Aff. at 1.) Bayes and Adams also testified that Howard did not allege any abuse. (Bayes Depo. at 18; Adams Testimony at 1312.) Lykins, however, was suspicious that Williams and Howard had "got into it" at some point in the past and claims that he suggested to Bayes that he separate the two. (Lykins Stmt. at 6-7.) In their report, Tackett and Puckett simply noted that they had responded to a possible overdose call, that Howard had been drinking, that she was oriented to person, place, and time, and that she refused medical treatment. (Run Report.)

Paramedics were again dispatched to Howard's residence on April 30th, the following day. She had been beaten and was unconscious. Howard later died from her injuries. Her boyfriend, Gerald Williams, was convicted for her murder on March 3, 2004 in Magoffin Circuit Court. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison.

On May 24, 2002, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants, alleging that they violated Tammy Howard's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, acting under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² Specifically, he claims that the Defendants violated several Kentucky statutes pertaining to police officer conduct in relation to domestic violence incidents.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is not "genuine" unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. That is, the determination must be "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.2002). Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-movant must go beyond the assertions made in the pleadings and come forward with specific evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The nonmoving party cannot rely upon the assertions in its pleadings; rather, that party must come forward with probative evidence, such as sworn affidavits, to support its claims. Celotex, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

However, the trial court does not have a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of any genuine issue of material fact. In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654 (6th Cir.2001). The nonmoving party has an affirmative obligation to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create genuine issues of material fact. Id. In determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must review all the facts and the inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. Legal Analysis

Plaintiff makes two separate claims. First, he asserts that Bayes violated several mandatory regulations pertaining to domestic violence cases. Second, he claims that Montgomery failed to insure that Bayes was properly trained.

A. Domestic Violence Regulations

Plaintiff claims that Bayes violated the provisions of K.R.S. §§ 403.715, 403.785, and 431.005. Bayes, however, contends that he is protected by the doctrine of official immunity for his actions. The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 521-22 (Ky.2001). The doctrine "shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583, 2004 WL 2847251, at *3 (2004). As the Sixth Circuit recently put it, "State officials are protected by qualified immunity that shields them from civil damages as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir.2004). Whether qualified immunity applies to an official's actions is a question of law. Id. at 575.

Plaintiffs contend that Bayes conduct was not discretionary and was, in fact, ministerial, in that his conduct was proscribed by several Kentucky statutes.

1. Discretionary or Ministerial Duties

a. K.R.S. § 431.005(2)(a)

K.R.S. § 431.005(2)(a) provides that:

Any peace officer may arrest a person without warrant when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person has intentionally or wantonly caused physical injury to a family member or member of an unmarried couple.

K.R.S. § 431.005(2)(a) (emphasis added). This statute clearly leaves the discretion to arrest with the police officer.

Plaintiff cites the deposition testimony of Detective David Maynard, who investigated Howard's death and interviewed some of those who responded to the April 29th 911 call. Detective Maynard testified that police officers are under an obligation to arrest people suspected of domestic violence. (Maynard Depo. at 15-16.) The plain language of K.R.S. § 431.005(2)(a), however, states that an officer may arrest suspected domestic violence perpetrators without a warrant. Moreover, the officer must make the discretionary determination that he has probable cause to arrest.³

b. K.R.S. § 403.785(2)

K.R.S. § 403.785(2) provides that:

When a law enforcement officer has reason to suspect that a family member, member of an unmarried couple, or household member has been the victim of domestic violence and abuse, the officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, including but not limited to:

(a) Remaining at the location of the domestic violence and abuse so long as the officer reasonably suspects there is danger to the physical safety of individuals present without the presence of a law enforcement officer;

(b) Assisting the victim of domestic violence and abuse in obtaining medical treatment, including transporting the victim to the nearest medical facility capable of providing the necessary treatment; and

(c) Advising the victim immediately of the rights available to them, including the provisions of KRS 403.715 to 403.785.

K.R.S. § 403.785(2). Although this statute provides that the officer "shall use all reasonable means," to prevent abuse, the statute only applies if the officer has reason to suspect abuse and only requires that the officer use "reasonable means" to prevent further abuse.

As the Yanero Court held, discretionary functions are those that "involve the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment." Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522 (citation omitted). Further, as the Sixth Circuit and the Kentucky Supreme Court have recognized,

[t]he essence of a discretionary power is that the person or persons exercising it may choose which of several courses will be...