Howard Union of Teachers v. State

Decision Date05 July 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-195-M,82-195-M
Citation478 A.2d 563
Parties18 Ed. Law Rep. 929 HOWARD UNION OF TEACHERS et al. v. STATE of Rhode Island. P.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

This matter is before us on a petition for certiorari from a decision of the Board of Regents for Education denying the request of the petitioner for higher placement on the teachers' salary schedule pursuant to G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 16-7-29.

The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is the sole bargaining agent for teachers who are certified by the Rhode Island Department of Education to teach in state institutions and public schools in Rhode Island. The petitioner brought this action on behalf of several teachers, 1 alleging that they were inappropriately placed on the salary schedule at the time they were hired.

Six of the original teachers had prior teaching experience in various state schools in Rhode Island. The remaining teachers had prior teaching experience in public schools outside the state and/or private schools both in and outside Rhode Island.

The petitioner submitted a request for adjustment of salaries to the State of Rhode Island pursuant to § 16-7-29, which was denied. Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the commissioner of education. The commissioner concluded that

§ 16-7-29 requires a community to recognize prior teaching service in the public schools in the cities and towns of this state outside that community as well as in that community in placing a teacher on its salary schedule. * * * [P]ursuant to the provisions of § 16-12-8, * * * the State is required to recognize prior teaching service in the public schools in the cities and towns of this state in placing a teacher in a State school on its salary schedule."

The commissioner, however, did not conclude that credit must be given for private-school and out-of-state public-school teaching experience. The petitioner subsequently appealed to the Board of Regents on behalf of those teachers whose prior experience consisted of teaching in private schools and public schools outside Rhode Island. The Board of Regents affirmed the commissioner's decision.

This court is confronted with the following issues pursuant to our issuance of the writ: (1) whether § 16-7-29 includes prior teaching experience in both private schools and out-of-state public schools in determining the placement of a teacher on the salary schedule; and (2) whether in construing § 16-7-29 the terms "experience" and "training" must be given their statutory definition rather than their ordinary meaning.

I

The petitioner contends that in construing § 16-7-29, we must look not only to § 16-16-1 but also to other provisions of chapter 16, particularly §§ 16-16-6 and -6.1.

It is the function and duty of this court to construe statutes. Bassett v. DeRentis, R.I., 446 A.2d 763, 764 (1982). In construing a statute, we adhere to the basic proposition of establishing and effectuating the intent of the Legislature. Gott v. Norberg, R.I., 417 A.2d 1352, 1356 (1980). This is accomplished from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute. Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 247, 397 A.2d 889, 892 (1979). Additionally, we must give to the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, unless a contrary interpretation is apparent. Brier Manufacturing Co. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 317, 322, 377 A.2d 345, 348 (1977).

General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 16-7-29 provides in relevant part:

"[E]very community shall have established and put into full effect by appropriate action of its school committee a salary schedule recognizing years of service, experience, and training * * * for all certified personnel regularly employed in the public schools * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Section 16-7-29 falls within chapter 7 of title 16 of the General Laws, entitled "Foundation Level School Support." Section 16-7-16 of this chapter mandates the definition of terms applicable to §§ 16-7-15 through 16-7-34.

The terms "certified personnel," "regularly employed" and "service" are defined in § 16-7-16, as amended by P.L.1983, ch. 134, § 1 as follows:

"(g) 'Certified personnel' shall mean all persons who are required to hold certificates issued by or under the authority of the state board of education;

"(h) 'Regularly employed' and 'service' as applied to certified personnel shall have the same meaning as defined in chapter 16 of this title."

Looking to the definition of terms for chapter 16, the terms "teacher," "service," "prior service," and "total service" are defined in § 16-16-1, as amended by P.L.1983, ch. 217, § 1 as follows:

"(2) 'Teacher' shall mean a person required to hold a certificate of qualification issued by or under the authority of the board of education and who is engaged in teaching as his principal occupation and is regularly employed as a teacher in the public schools of any city or town in the state, or any formalized, commissioner approved, cooperative service arrangement.

"(4) 'Service' shall mean service as a teacher as described in subdivision (2) of this section.

"(5) 'Prior service' shall mean service as a teacher rendered prior to the first day of July, 1949, certified on his prior service certificate and allowable as prior service under the provisions of this chapter.

"(6) 'Total service' shall mean prior service as defined in subdivision (5) of this section, plus service rendered as a member of the system on or after the first day of July, 1949."

Section 16-7-29 mandates that a community recognize years of service, experience, and training. The statute does not expressly indicate, however, whether this recognition includes experience in private schools and out-of-state public schools in determining a teacher's initial placement on the salary schedule. Because what is included is not expressly stated, it is incumbent upon us to determine the intent of the Legislature. In ascertaining this intent, we must give the words their statutory meaning.

The definition of terms for § 16-7-29 states the precise meaning of some of the statutory language. These definitions provide that the word "service * * * shall have the same meaning as defined in chapter 16." (Emphasis added.) In construing the word "service," we look to the definition of terms provided in the chapter rather than to the other more particularized provisions of chapter 16. Giving the words "as defined in chapter 16" their plain and...

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