Howard v. City of Atlanta

• Decision Date: 16 July 1940
• Docket Number: 13274.
• Citation: 10 S.E.2d 190,190 Ga. 730
• Parties: HOWARD et al. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

10 S.E.2d 190

190 Ga. 730

HOWARD et al. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.

No. 13274.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 16, 1940

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1940.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The Uniform Airports Act of 1933 (Ga.Laws 1933, p. 102) authorizes municipalities of this State to condemn land beyond their limits, for the establishment or expansion of airports and landing fields.

2. Under the provisions of that act one municipality may condemn land within the geographical limits of another municipality.

3. The petition for injunction stated no cause of action, and the court did not err in dismissing it on general demurrer.

Geo P. Whitman and Shelton, Pharr & Long, all of Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

J C. Savage, C. S. Winn, J. C. Murphy, Edwin L. Sterne, and F. A. Hooper, Jr., all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

REID Chief Justice.

1. We are called upon by the present record to determine whether the City of Atlanta in expanding an airport which it now owns and operates has the authority to condemn property situated beyond its geographical limits and within the limits of the City of College Park.

The City of Atlanta served condemnation notices on the owners of certain property situated as above indicated, and they jointly sought an injunction. The judge sustained a general demurrer to the petition and the plaintiffs excepted.

In the Uniform Airports Act of 1933, section 1 (Ga.L.1933, p. 102; Code, § 11-201), 'Municipalities, counties, and other political subdivisions' of the State were given authority 'separately or jointly, to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease, control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate and police airports and landing fields for the use of aircraft, either within or without the geographical limits of such municipalities, counties, and other political subdivisions' with the right to use 'for such purpose or purposes any available property that it now or may at any time hereafter be owned or controlled by such municipalities, counties, or other political subdivisions.' Section 3 of the act (Code, § 11-203) provided that 'Private property needed by a county, municipality, or other political subdivision for an airport or landing field or for the expansion of an airport or landing field, may be acquired by grant, purchase, lease, or other means, if such political subdivision is able to agree with the owners of said property on the terms of such acquisition, and otherwise by condemnation in the manner provided by the law under which such political subdivision is authorized to acquire real property for public purposes.'

The first point made by counsel for the plaintiffs is that the act does not in fact confer upon municipalities any right to condemn property outside of their territorial limits. This argument is bottomed on the fact that section 1 of the act which gives municipalities power and authority 'without the geographical limits of such municipalities' refers merely to ownership, operation, etc., of airports and landing fields, and that section 3 which confers the power of condemnation does not contain this broad language. The right of a municipality to own property for a particular purpose, given by express statute, does not authorize the municipality to condemn property for such purpose. See Markham v. Howell, 33 Ga. 508(1); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Union Point, 119 Ga. 809(1, 2), 47 S.E. 183. Accordingly, it is clear that section 1 of the act, standing alone, does not vest in the various municipalities the right to condemn land for airports either within or without the territorial limits of such municipalities. Section 3 deals with condemnation, and provides in substance that municipalities may condemn property needed by them 'for an airport or landing field or for the expansion of an airport or landing field.' Two principles are suggested as requiring a decision that this section does not confer authority on a municipality to condemn land for the purpose specified without its territorial limits. The first is that, as a general rule, a municipal corporation cannot, without express or implied authority granted in its charter, exercise its corporate powers beyond the limits of the municipal boundaries. Loyd v. City of Columbus, 90 Ga. 20(1), 15 S.E. 818; Langley v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 590(1-3), 45 S.E. 486, 98 Am.St.Rep. 133; Hall v. Town of Calhoun, 140 Ga. 611, 79 S.E. 533; City of Quitman v. Jelks & McLeod, 139 Ga. 238(1-3), 77 S.E. 76; City Council of Augusta v. Owens, 111 Ga. 464(6), 36 S.E. 830; Town of Mansfield v. Cofer, 145 Ga. 459(1), 89 S.E. 410; Mayor, etc., of City of Gainesville v. Dunlap, 147 Ga. 344(2), 94 S.E. 247; Mayor, etc., of Montezuma v. Law, 1 Ga.App. 579, 57 S.E. 1025; Newton v. City of Moultrie, 39 Ga.App. 702, 148 S.E. 299. The other is that statutes conferring the power of eminent domain must be given a strict construction; 'and when the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.' 18 Am.Juris. 650, § 26, Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 119 Ga. 354, 356, 46 S.E. 422, 100 Am.St.Rep. 174; Hopkins v. Florida Central & Peninsular R. Co., 97 Ga. 107, 25 S.E. 452.

An examination of the decisions which announce the first stated principle shows that whether or not a municipality can in fact exercise a given power beyond its territorial limits in the absence of express language to such effect depends, at last, upon the nature of the subject matter to which the power relates and whether a full and complete exercise of the power reasonably requires action beyond the territorial limits of the municipality. 'The general doctrine that a municipal corporation can only exercise its powers within its corporate limits is founded on the fact that generally no authority is given by charter to act beyond such limits, and hence the corporate authorities are restricted in that regard by the general rule that they can exercise only such powers as are granted by express words. The general rule is, however, subject to the qualification that a municipal corporation may also do those things which are fairly or necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted.' Dillon on Municipal Corporations, p. 1627 note. Thus in Langley v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S.E. 486, 98 Am.St.Rep. 133, it was said that an express grant of authority to a city to construct sewers and drains should be held to include the power to construct them beyond the corporate limits, where it is found by the authorities to be reasonably necessary in order to establish a complete and useful system of sewerage. The court took cognizance that it would be impracticable and most undesirable to require a municipality to confine such works within its limits. Loyd v. City of Columbus, supra, which constituted a ruling to the contrary, was criticized and doubted by the court. In Hall v. Town of Calhoun, supra, the court held that the City of Calhoun had authority under the terms of its charter to establish and construct a system of water works, and that under this grant it could, where necessary, obtain by contract a source of water beyond its limits. The court said that Loyd v. City of Columbus, supra, 'will not be extended.' [140 Ga. 611, 79 S.E. 534.] It is a matter of common knowledge that an airport requires an extensive tract of land, and it is evident that in the majority of cases it would be most impracticable and undesirable to set aside so much land within the confines of a municipality for such purpose. From this and other considerations that might be mentioned, it is at least not entirely clear that the grant of power to municipalities to condemn land for the purpose of establishing and expanding airports, as contained in section 3, even though strictly construed would not in and of itself be sufficient authority for a municipality to condemn land beyond its limits where it is reasonsbly necessary. Especially is this true in regard to the expansion of an airport owned and operated by a municipality such as the City of Atlanta beyond its territorial limits, under authority theretofore granted to it by the General Assembly. It is not necessary, however, that we go to this extent in the present case. Section 3 should not be considered disassociated from the other provisions of the act of which it is an integral part. It is elementary that all of the provisions of an enactment should be considered in determining the meaning of any part. Cairo Banking Co. v. Ponder, 131 Ga. 708(1), 63 S.E. 218; City of Macon v. Georgia Power Co., 171 Ga. 40, 155 S.E. 34. In section 1 of the act the various municipalities are empowered to establish and expand, etc., airports 'within or without the geographical limits of such municipalities.' There can be no better evidence than this that the General Assembly recognized that it might be necessary and expedient for municipalities in order to establish or expand existing airports to go beyond their respective boundaries. Having thus recognized the probable necessity for such in section 3 it was provided in substance that a municipality could condemn property needed 'for an airport or landing field or for the expansion of an airport or landing field.' Therefore it seems clear that the grand of power to condemn in section 3 is as broad as the power to establish and expand, etc., provided for in section 1.

2. A further point made by counsel for the plaintiffs is that this grant of power to municipalities to condemn property 'within and without the georgraphical limits of such municipalities' should not be held to authorize one municipality to condemn land within the...