Howard v. Duncan

• Decision Date: 25 April 1933
• Docket Number: Case Number: 21369
• Citation: 163 Okla. 142,1933 OK 256,21 P.2d 489
• Parties: HOWARD v. DUNCAN
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1933 OK 256

21 P.2d 489

163 Okla. 142

HOWARD v. DUNCAN

Case Number: 21369

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: April 25, 1933

Syllabus

¶0 1. Master and Servant--Workmen's Compensation--Findings and Award not Subject to Collateral Attack.

Where a claim for compensation is filed with the State Industrial Commission alleging facts showing that the accidental personal injury arose out of and in the course of an employment coming under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and a hearing is held by the Commission, after due and proper notice is given to all parties in interest or such parties appear at said hearing, and a finding of fact is made and an award for compensation is rendered by the Commission, and such findings and award become final, thereafter, the findings and award cannot be collaterally attacked in any other court.

2. Same--District Court Held Without Jurisdiction of Action for Damages.

Record examined, and held, that the district court of Lincoln county, Okla., was without jurisdiction to render judgment for damages in this case in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.

Appeal from District Court, Lincoln County; Hal Johnson, Judge.

Action by Lena Duncan, by her next friend and natural guardian, Jess A. Duncan, against Dewey Howard, doing business as the Stroud Steam Laundry. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, with directions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

Cheek & McRill, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Jordan, for defendant in error.

SWINDALL, J.

¶1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Lincoln county, Okla., wherein plaintiff therein, Lena Duncan, recovered money damages against the defendant therein, Dewey Howard, for injuries sustained by plaintiff, resulting in the loss of use of her hand while working as a mangle press operator in defendant's steam laundry.

¶2 Following the injury, and prior to the action in the district court, Lena Duncan filed a claim for compensation with the State Industrial Commission, wherein she showed that she suffered an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with Dewey Howard, in a hazardous employment within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. She stated her age as 18 years. The Commission heard evidence and found these facts, with the exception of age specifically, and made an award to claimant. The following day the Commission granted claimant's application for lump sum settlement, and within a few weeks receipt was filed showing payment to her of $ 1,440. Four and one-half months later the present action was started in the district court.

¶3 The plaintiff predicated her right to recovery in the district court upon the proposition that the employment was prohibited by statute, section 7209, C. O. S. 1921 (10834, O. S. 1931), in that at the time she was employed, and at the time of the injury in question, she was not 16 years of age, and the kind of work she was employed to do pertained to the operation of a dangerous steam operated machine and required her to remain standing constantly. Defendant presented in bar the former proceedings between the parties had before the State Industrial Commission, wherein that Commission took jurisdiction of the cause and rendered an award in plaintiff's favor.

¶4 The parties concede, in effect, that if those proceedings were valid, plaintiff's present action is barred. Section 7286, C. O. S. 1921 (13352, O. S. 1931).

¶5 Defendant in error contends that since she was not in fact 16 years of age, the State Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction under the decision of this court in Rock Island Coal Mining Co. v. Gilliam, 89 Okla. 49, 213 P. 833, and that, therefore, its "orders and awards rendered outside the scope of its conferred jurisdiction are nullities, and therefore such order is not binding upon the plaintiff in this case."

¶6 The question, then, is, whether the State Industrial Commission had jurisdiction of this cause and rendered a valid and binding award.

"Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential in every case; a condition precedent, in a way, to the acquisition of authority over the parties. * * * Jurisdiction of the subject-matter has reference to the nature of the cause of action or the relief sought. It does not mean simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs and over which the authority of the court extends. It is conferred by the sovereign. * * * Such jurisdiction exists, then, in any case in which it appears that the matter in litigation is one over which the general power of the court extends and that such power was regularly called into action. * * *" Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) vol. 1, sec. 337.

¶7 More definitely, it exists when the court has power to proceed in a case of the character presented, or, power to grant the relief sought in a proper cause.

¶8 A court acquires power to proceed in a particular case by an application of a party showing the general nature of the case and requesting relief of the kind the court has power to grant. Ordinarily, jurisdiction is invoked by pleadings filed by the parties. It then becomes the duty of the court, having service, to proceed to a determination of the cause. Schroeder v. Merchants & Mech. Ins. Co., 104 Ill. 71; Miller v. Thompson, 209 Ala. 469, 96 So. 481; Crow v. Van Ness (Tex. Civ. App.) 232 S.W. 539. How far the pleadings must go toward showing the facts essential to jurisdiction in the particular case is not uniformly settled, and may differ among different proceedings, but it is perfectly clear that in no court of general jurisdiction must every essential jurisdictional fact be alleged in order to sustain a judgment rendered. Nor must all such facts be at any place asserted or determined. Welch v. Focht, 67 Okla. 275, 171 P. 730, L.R.A. 1918D, 1163; Horstman v. Bowermaster, 90 Okla. 262, 217 P. 167; Cowan v. Hubbard, 50 Okla. 671, 151 P. 678, L.R.A. 1918C, 958; Hathaway v. Hoffman, 53 Okla. 72, 153 P. 184; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 43 U.S. 319, 11 L. Ed. 283; Ex parte Tobias Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L. Ed. 650; Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 165, 7 L. Ed. 381; Skillern's Executors v. May's Executors, 6 Cranch 267, 3 L. Ed. 220; Jarrell v. Laurel Coal & Land Co. (W. Va.) L.R.A. 1916E, 316, and note. In Grignon's Lessees v. Astor, supra, the court said:

"It is enough that there is something of record which shows the subject-matter before the court, and their action upon it, that their judicial power arose and was exercised by a definitive order, sentence, or decree."

¶9 In Horstman v. Bowermaster, supra, this court said:

"The allegations of the answer * * * were sufficient to challenge a judicial inquiry as to the validity of the contract, and to challenge the attention of the court to the relief sought."

¶10 This principle is so recognized that it appears in the form of a rule that on collateral attack, where the record is silent on a jurisdictional fact, it will be presumed conclusively that the court investigated and found that it had jurisdiction.

"It is the well established general rule that when a domestic judgment of a court of superior and general jurisdiction, acting within the ordinary scope of that jurisdiction, is assailed collaterally, every presumption is made in favor, not only of the proceedings, but of the court's jurisdiction, both as regards the subject-matter and of the parties, unless the contrary affirmatively appears on the face of the record itself." 15 R. C. L., Judgments, p. 880.

¶11 Such a presumption is no less than a substantive rule of law. The presumption may be utterly false. But, where the court renders a decision passing on the merits, all jurisdictional facts, collateral to the merits or otherwise, will be resolved in favor of the court's jurisdiction. Jurisdictional facts not raised are assumed. The very filing of a petition by a plaintiff seeking relief that a court has power to grant is an assertion of jurisdictional facts, and the filing of an answer not raising them is an admission. Our law places the burden of trial on the parties. If those facts do not appear to the contrary, they are concluded by a decision on the merits. Vanfleet's Collateral Attack, p. 671.

¶12 Allegations, not facts, give a court jurisdiction. Vanfleet's Collateral Attack, sec. 60, p. 73, states:

"Jurisdiction always depends upon the allegations and never upon the facts. When a party appears before a judicial tribunal and alleges that a certain right is denied him, and the law has given the tribunal the power to enforce that right--his adversary being notified--it must proceed to determine the truth or falsity of his allegations. The truth of the allegations does not constitute jurisdiction. The tribunal must have jurisdiction before it can take any adverse step. Its jurisdiction, necessarily, has to be determined from the allegations, assuming them to be true. This point is so important. * * *"

¶13 In a famous English case on this point, Reg. v. Bolton, 1 Ad. & El. N.S. 66 (72), 41 E.C.L. 439 (442), Lord Chief Justice Denman said:

"But, where a charge has been well laid before a magistrate, on its face bringing itself within his jurisdiction, he is bound to commence the inquiry. * * * The question of jurisdiction does not depend upon the truth or falsehood of the charge, but upon its nature; it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry."

¶14 In Stuart v. Allen, 16 Cal. 473 (501), 76 Am. Dec. 551, the California court said:

"So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, it is immaterial whether the statements of the petition are true or not; the jurisdiction rests upon the averments of the petition, not upon proof of them."

¶15 Matters averred, even if not true, do not deprive the court of jurisdiction unless it is shown they are not true. When the jurisdictional defect...