Howard v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (In re Conservatorship of Howard)
| Decision Date | 02 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | H044250 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re the Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of DANIEL BRODIE HOWARD. DAVID HOWARD, as Conservator, etc., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Respondent. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1-11-PR-168560)
Appellant and conservator David Howard (Howard) appeals from an October 2016 order of the probate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court (probate court) denying conservatee Daniel Brodie Howard's motion to assess attorney fees against respondent Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (Hartford).
Conservatee is Howard's brother, and he moved the probate court to assess attorney fees against Hartford under Labor Code sections 3856 and 38601 and Quinn v. State of California (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162 (Quinn) in connection with civil litigation arising from an automobile accident that left conservatee severely injured and unable tocare for himself. The civil litigation had been resolved by settlement and a voluntary dismissal a year and a half earlier. Hartford was the insurer of conservatee's employer for workers' compensation at the time of the accident, had paid out workers' compensation benefits, and had joined the civil litigation by filing a complaint in intervention.
On appeal, Howard claims the probate court erred by ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear conservatee's motion. Howard asserts further that the settlement agreements in the civil action and subsequent approval of the compromise by the probate court do not preclude conservatee from obtaining the relief he sought. Lastly, Howard contends that he was the "active litigant" who created the settlement fund from which Hartford received recompence and, thus, he is entitled to recover from Hartford its "fair share" of the litigation expenses to recoup the attorney fees and costs he had paid to his counsel on conservatee's behalf.
For the reasons explained below, we decide the probate court lacked jurisdiction over conservatee's motion and affirm its order.
On February 16, 2011, conservatee suffered major injuries in an automobile accident with another driver, Margaret Ruhl. At the time of the accident, conservatee was driving his Toyota Camry and acting within the scope of his employment with Agra Tech, Inc. Hartford was Agra Tech, Inc.'s workers' compensation insurance carrier.
On March 17, 2011, the probate court appointed Howard as temporary conservator of conservatee's person and estate. At that time, conservatee was hospitalized and in a coma.
On March 22, 2011, The Boccardo Law Firm, Inc. (Boccardo) filed a tort action against Ruhl on behalf of conservatee, by and through Howard (Santa Clara County caseNo. 1-11-CV-197027 (civil action)).2 Howard subsequently amended his complaint to include defendants Toyota Motor Corporation and its related entities (Toyota) and the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans).3 Conservatee also filed a workers' compensation claim with the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB).
On March 15, 2012, Hartford filed a complaint in intervention against the defendants in the civil action seeking to recover the workers' compensation benefits it had paid as a result of conservatee's accident and injuries. In September 2012, a judge of the WCAB found conservatee to be totally and permanently disabled and awarded permanent disability, medical care for life, and attorney fees.4
On October 30, 2013, conservatee, Hartford, and Toyota signed a mediation agreement that called for Toyota to pay a specified sum to conservatee. The agreement stated that conservatee would "indemnify and hold harmless the Toyota defendants . . . from any liability whatsoever to any persons or entities arising out of the subject accident, including, but not limited to, any claims by any person or entity claiming to be entitled to any portion of this settlement." In January 2014, Howard petitioned the probate court for an order approving a compromise of the disputed claim. On January 28, 2014, the probate court signed an order approving the compromise of the disputed claim against Ruhl and Toyota and directed payments from the settlement proceeds to Boccardo (for attorney fees and expenses), Hartford (for medical and like expenses it had paid), and conservatee (for the balance of the settlement). The probate court also entered an order (pursuant to Howard's request) sealing the settlement amount and proposed payments to Boccardo, Hartford, and conservatee set forth in the order approving the compromise.
Shortly thereafter, Hartford moved to modify the probate court's January 29, 2014 order based on "surprise and an ongoing accounting issue between" conservatee and Hartford. The alleged surprise related to the attorney fees and costs stated in the probate court's order. Hartford asserted those amounts were not in accord with a handwritten statement regarding the division of the settlement proceeds between conservatee and Hartford that had been signed by conservatee's counsel and Hartford at the October 2013 mediation.
At a hearing on Hartford's motion held on March 27, 2014, conservatee's counsel said Hartford knew the total settlement amount agreed to at the mediation and contended the only issue in dispute involved the amount Hartford would receive as a credit againstits obligation to pay future workers' compensation benefits pursuant to the WCAB proceeding. After the probate court stated its tentative ruling was to grant Hartford's motion and authorize the defendants to pay the gross settlement amount to conservatee's counsel, conservatee's counsel argued the effect of the tentative ruling was to set aside the "Hartford settlement." The probate court then modified its tentative ruling and set aside its January 29, 2014 order under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.
On April 24 and 25, 2014, conservatee, Toyota, Ruhl, and Hartford executed a joint stipulation seeking an order approving a "Global Settlement and Compromise of Disputed Claim." On May 5, 2014, the probate court signed the proposed order approving the "global settlement of the Toyota defendants and the Ruhl defendants" as set forth in the joint stipulation and the January 2014 petition to approve the compromise of disputed claim. The order directed Toyota and Ruhl to pay the settlement proceeds to Boccardo (conservatee's and Howard's counsel) "pending a final accounting between" conservatee and Hartford. It also directed conservatee and Hartford to supply requests for dismissal to Toyota and Ruhl and "comply with the other terms of their respective settlements." Finally, the order said, "Once the final accounting is determined, [conservatee] and [Hartford] will seek Court approval only with respect to the distribution between [conservatee] and [Hartford] of the total settlement funds deposited" with Boccardo.
On May 12, 2014, conservatee filed a motion in the civil action to set a trial between Hartford, Toyota, and Ruhl. In June 2014, Toyota and Ruhl served motions in the civil action to enforce the "global settlement." Conservatee opposed the motion, asserting that he In a ruling dated July 31, 2014, the superior court granted the motion to enforce the global settlement.
On August 29, 2014, Howard filed an "amended" petition to approve a compromise of disputed claim (amended petition). On September 4 and 8, 2014, conservatee ("as indemnitor of Toyota Motor Corporation and Margaret Ruhl") and Hartford signed a "conditional settlement agreement" titled "Settlement of Complaint-in-Intervention."5 (Some capitalization omitted.)
On September 16, 2014, the probate court held a hearing on Howard's amended petition to approve the compromise of the disputed claim. Counsel for conservatee and Howard (Boccardo), counsel for Hartford, and counsel for Toyota appeared at the hearing. Without objection from the parties, the probate court signed an order approving the compromise of the disputed claim. As in the previously vacated order approving the compromise, the probate court's order directed payment from the settlement proceeds to Boccardo, Hartford, and conservatee. The next day, September 17, 2014, Hartford requested and obtained a dismissal in the superior court of its complaint in intervention, with prejudice.
On October 1 and 2, 2014, Howard and his counsel (Boccardo) and Hartford and its counsel signed a "Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release." Although the agreement was signed by Hartford, it states it "is made and entered into . . . by and between Toyota . . . on the one hand, and Plaintiff Daniel B. Howard, by and through his Conservator, David Brodie Howard, individually." Conservatee and Howard are identified as the releasors, and Toyota and its entities are the releasees. The agreement states that "the parties agree that Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. is not a releasee." (Capitalization omitted.) The term "action" is defined as "[i]nvolve[ing] the legalproceeding that was filed in the Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No.: 111CV197027" (i.e., the civil action) and "includes the Complaint in Intervention" filed by Hartford. The agreement provides that its implementation "will fully and finally resolve all claims for injuries or damages by the releasors against the releasees." (Capitalization omitted.) In consideration for the...
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