Howard v. Haven

• Decision Date: 10 June 1955
• Citation: 198 Tenn. 572,281 S.W.2d 480,2 McCanless 572
• Parties: , 198 Tenn. 572 Joe HOWARD et al. v. James H. HAVEN et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 480

281 S.W.2d 480

2 McCanless 572, 198 Tenn. 572

Joe HOWARD et al. v. James H. HAVEN et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 10, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 1955.

H. G. B. King, Chattanooga, for petitioner.

H. M. Humphreys and Chambliss, Chambliss & Brown, Chattanooga, for respondent.

NEIL, Chief Justice.

The complainants, Howard, Clark and Atchley, are engaged in business in Cleveland, Tennessee, under the name of City Electric Service. They filed their original bill in the Chancery Court against the defendants, James H. Haven, a resident of Bradley County, Tennessee, and five other co-defendants, naming them, seeking an injunction to restrain them from interfering with the complainants in their right to perform a contract for the erection of a hospital in Cleveland, Tennessee.

The bill charges that the complainants had entered into a contract with L. A. Warlick Contracting Company whereby they engaged and bound themselves to execute and perform certain electrical work on said hospital. The alleged wrongful acts of the defendants are as follows:

'Complainants aver and charge that the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Earl W. Burnette and Claude Harris as representatives of said Brotherhood and Local 175 thereof, have interfered with the contract which they have with L. A. Warlick Contracting Company, and have by threats, force, intimidation and pressure induced L. A. Warlick Contracting Company to exclude complainants from the hospital job and will continue to do so unless enjoined by an order of this Court. Complainants further aver that they have a contract, are entitled to do the work, and will suffer irreparable damages unless they are permitted to go ahead and complete and contract as they have engaged themselves to do but they are prevented therefrom by the wrongful action of defendants James H. Haven, the Cofer Electric Company, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Claude Harris and Earl W. Burnette.'

The writ of injunction was issued upon fiat of the Chancellor. All defendants were served with process and answers were filed admitting certain charges in the bill and specifically denying others. The answers, however, put in issue the determinative issue as to whether or not the defendants brought about a breach of the contract which the complainants claimed they had with the L. A. Warlick Company.

Following the introduction of evidence upon this issue the complainants dismissed their bill against the L. A. Warlick Company, due to the fact that other defendants, and particularly the Local Labor Union No. 175 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers had threatened to black-list Warlick if the complainants were permitted to fulfill their contract in erecting the said Cleveland Hospital.

The prayer of the bill was for an injunction as aforesaid and for treble damages against the defendants.

The defendants' counsel moved the court to dismiss the bill as to one of the defendants, Cofer Electric Company, on the ground that it 'charges or infers a conspiracy' and no overt act is charged, etc. Following the introduction of proof by the complainants, the defendants asked leave to withdraw their answer and file a plea in abatement, which the Chancellor denied. The case was in progress upon issues which had been submitted to a jury under the direction of the court when the request was made. Under proper instructions of the Chancellor the issues were the following:

(1) Did any of the following defendants unlawfully procure a breach of contract which City Electric had with Warlick:

(a) W. A. Cofer--Yes or No?

(b) Local 175--Yes or No?

(c) Earl W. Burnette--Yes or No?

(2) If your answer to either a, b, or c of Issue 1 is yes, what, if anything, is the amount of damages?

The jury answered the first issue as follows:

(a) W. A. Cofer--No.

(b) Local 175 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical workers--yes.

(c) Earl W. Burnette--No.

On Issue No. 2 as to the amount of damages, the jury assessed $7,330, or 10% of the bid. This judgment was approved by the Chancellor, who then entered judgment under Section 7811 of the Code for three times the amount, or the sum of $21,990.

The defendant moved the court for a new trial upon numerous grounds, which was overruled and an appeal granted to the Court of Appeals, which resulted in the affirmance of the Chancellor.

We granted certiorari and filed the following notation with the record:

'The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.

'Counsel will confine their argument upon the hearing to the question of whether or not this judgment is void on its face by reason of the fact that the verdict of the jury exonerated the agent through whom the local union was acting and there is no evidence that the principal acted otherwise than through said agent in the alleged conduct in bringing about a breach of this contract.'

The foregoing proposition was orally discussed before the Court by counsel for both the petitioner and the respondent. Counsel was also permitted to discuss the testimony relating to the alleged conspiracy to deprive the complainants of their contract.

The factual issue as to whether or not Local 175 of the Electrical Workers procured a breach of the contract which complainants had with the Warlick Company is foreclosed by the concurrent finding of fact by the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals; and also the damages assessed by the jury.

The Court of Appeals in discussing this issue reached the following conclusion:

'It appears to us that the Local Union, through its Business Agent, threatened to put the contractor on the black list and thus threatened him of a general walkout of all his men, not only on the hospital contract but all other jobs which the contractor had, for only one purpose, to force the contractor to breach his contract with these complainants and to give this contract for the wiring of the Bradley County Memorial Hospital to W. A. Cofer or some other Union approved contractor.

'It thus appears that the coercive power of the Union was used to accomplish an act which has been declared illegal in Tennessee, both under the common law and the statutory law, to-wit, the procurement of a breach of contract. See Local Union No. 10, etc. v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946.'

The counsel for the petitioner, Local No. 175, has argued with considerable force the issue that the judgment is inconsistent and illegal, contending that since Burnette as 'business agent' was acquitted of any part in causing a breach of the contract his principal must likewise be absolved of any participation in the wrong. Counsel quotes at length excerpts from the testimony of witnesses to support his argument that Local 175 did not threaten Warlick, i. e. to 'put him on the blacklist'. The question is, who threatened to put him on the black-list, was it Burnette, acting as agent for Local No. 175, or some other named defendant in the cause, or the Union acting upon its own initiative for the purpose of compelling Warlick to cancel the contract? Of course, the petitioner, Local 175, seeks to avoid liability upon the theory that Burnette was charged with being the 'business agent of the Union' and that since he was acquitted the entire case goes out for that reason.

When the case was argued orally before the Court the counsel for the respondents (complainants below) urged upon us that not only Burnette, as business agent for the Union, procured the breach of the contract but that Local 175 was a participant, and its action was established by undisputed facts and circumstances showing that all named defendants were jointly liable as conspirators in the transaction.

We think the Chancellor and Court of Appeals were justified in finding that Local No. 175 was an active participant; that others, who were identified with the Union, were taking part in the controversy, all of which resulted in a forcible breach of the contract. The petitioner, Local No. 175, being a voluntary association, couldn't act except through its membership. Its conduct could be, and was, shown by circumstances indicating that it was a joint conspirator along with other named defendants. If the Chancellor and Court of Appeals believed Warlick, and that his evidence and other corroborating circumstances convicted the petitioner, Local No. 175, the acquittal of Burnette as an active participant would not affect petitioner's liability. Williams was a representative of Local No. 175, as was Burnette. According to Warlick and Sara Ross both men voiced the threat of the Union to black-list him, which would result in shutting down every job he had in Chattanooga and in Cleveland. When we consider what subsequently happened, and the facts and circumstances leading up to it, there is material evidence to show that complainants lost the contract because of the activity of Local No. 175, Burnette, Williams, and Cofer, who took over the contract at a bid of $2,000 above the complainants' bid.

It is not material that Williams was not sued as a joint wrongdoer, as well as other members of the Union; nor is it important that the jury should find against one defendant and in favor of another, since all joint wrongdoers are liable jointly and severally for all damages. Nor can the one against whom the judgment is rendered escape liability on the ground that others were acquitted. The record discloses the most convincing evidence of the fact that Local No. 175 was vitally interested in securing the Warlick contract for Chattanooga contractors who employed only Union workers. We think the weight of the evidence shows that Local No. 175 was the principal conspirator. Its members were the ultimate beneficiaries, regardless of any office they might hold in the Union. Those who suffered as a direct result of the breach of the contract were Warlick who had to pay $2,000 above what he had contracted to pay respondents, and ...