Howard v. Ladner

• Citation: 116 F. Supp. 783
• Decision Date: 16 October 1953
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1974.
• Parties: HOWARD et al. v. LADNER et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

116 F. Supp. 783

HOWARD et al. v. LADNER et al.

Civ. No. 1974.

United States District Court, S. D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

October 16, 1953.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Will Young, Joe H. Daniel and Curtis E. Coker (of Young & Daniel), Jackson, Miss., Leon A. Ransom, Perry W. Howard and Julian R. Dugas, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Lester E. Wills, Meridian, Miss., James A. White, Durant, Miss., Nelson E. Taylor, Greenwood, Miss., John Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Before RIVES, Circuit Judge, and MIZE and THOMAS, District Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs seek an injunction restraining the Secretary of State for the State of Mississippi from the enforcement and execution of a State statute, or a part thereof, upon the ground that, as construed and applied by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hoskins v. Howard, 214 Miss. 481, 59 So.2d 263, said statute, or part thereof, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.¹ The statute in question is now known as Chapter 458, Mississippi Laws of 1950, or as Sections 3107-01 to 3107-09 inclusive of the Mississippi Code of 1942, as amended; and in pertinent part is copied in the footnote.²

The suit is brought by the plaintiffs as officers and members of the "Republican Party of Mississippi" on behalf of themselves and of all the members of said Party against the defendant, Ladner, as Secretary of State for the State of Mississippi and against the other defendants individually and as officers and representatives of the "Mississippi Republican Party". The complaint prays also for a judgment declaring said statute unconstitutional, at least in part, and for an injunction against the defendants other than the Secretary of State restraining them and others similarly situated from claiming to be the sole "Republican" political party in said State.

Jurisdiction of a federal district court is invoked on the ground that the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $3,000 and arises under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.³ Another ground suggested for federal jurisdiction is to redress the alleged deprivation under color of a State law or statute of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3).⁴ A three-judge district court to hear and determine the action is requested under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281.⁵

The complaint alleges that: "The amount in controversy, involving a property right to a political name and title, and the right to existence as such under the said name, exceeds in value the sum of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs."

These allegations are admitted by the defendant Secretary of State, but are denied by the other defendants. While the rights involved are political and transcend mere property rights, they include the latter also. It has long been settled that for jurisdictional purposes the value of social and political rights is capable of pecuniary calculation. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485, 23 S.Ct. 639, 48 L.Ed. 909. Even clubs and associations may acquire property rights in the use of a name. 4 Am.Jur., Associations and Clubs, Sec. 37. In a true class action the test of jurisdiction in an injunction suit is the amount or value of the aggregate interests of the members of the class on whose behalf the suit is brought. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111; Annotation 30 A.L.R.2d 663. Plaintiff's evidence, which was not contradicted, established that the cost of reorganizing their party or of supplying it with another name would greatly exceed the sum of $3,000.

Even then, the question would remain, "What's in a name?" With political party labels, certainly in the South, it does not hold true that a party by any other name would smell as sweet to thousands of voters. Attachment to political labels has become proverbial. We find that the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs and that federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S. C.A. § 1331.

The right to vote in elections of members of Congress is a privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 21 S.Ct. 17, 45 L.Ed. 84; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368. That privilege extends to the right to vote in party primary elections, United States v. Classic, supra; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, and hence to be free from unreasonable restrictions in acting under the party name. State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 128 N.W. 1041, 35 L.R.A.,N.S., 353. The right to the equal protection of the laws is also secured by the Constitution of the United States. We think that federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3) irrespective of the amount involved. Clearly, a Three-judge District Court is required under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 et seq.

All parties defendant join in moving for summary judgment on the ground that the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hoskins v. Howard, supra, is entitled to full faith and credit in this Court and is res judicata of all questions and matters raised by the plaintiffs in this case. They insist further that from that judgment the plaintiffs here (who were the appellees in the Mississippi Supreme Court) had a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2),⁶ but that instead they petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari in said cause, which petition was denied on the 5th day of January, 1953, "for the reason that application therefor was not made within the time provided by law. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c)". 344 U.S. 915, 73 S.Ct. 334. The defendants further insist that the plaintiffs are now estopped because in their untimely petition for certiorari they adopted a position inconsistent with their claims in the present litigation.

A restatement of some of the facts is essential to a clear understanding of this case:

The "Republican Party of Mississippi", of which the plaintiffs are the officers and state executives, was organized in 1872, and has been recognized and accepted by the National Convention of the Republican Party as its representative in the State of Mississippi. A schism developed and in 1928 the defendants (other than the Secretary of State) or their predecessors organized the "Independent Republican Party of Mississippi", which has since that time consistently polled a larger vote than the older Party. The name of the "Independent Republican Party of Mississippi" was changed from and after the Presidential election of November 2, 1948 to "Mississippi Republican Party".

The Act in question became effective immediately upon its approval by the Governor of Mississippi, which occurred on the 7th day of April, 1950. On that same date the defendants other than the Secretary of State filed with the defendant Ladner as Secretary of State an application for the registration of the "Mississippi Republican Party" under the provisions of said Act. The application, as amended on April 10, 1950, was approved and the registration granted on April 11, 1950. Thereafter, on April 29, 1950, twenty-two days after the approval of the Act, plaintiffs applied for registration of the "Republican Party of Mississippi". The Secretary of State sought the advice of the Attorney General of Mississippi, and, acting upon the Attorney General's opinion,⁷ declined to register said political party under the name of the "Republican Party of Mississippi".

Plaintiffs then brought suit in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, against defendants, who were the same as the defendants in the present action or their predecessors in office. The complaint filed in the State Court was in two counts, comprising some sixty-one record pages. The first count claimed that, by reason of the attempted change of name of the defendants' party in November, 1948, from the Independent Republican Party to Mississippi Republican Party, it was not entitled to registration under the latter name and sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to cancel the registration of defendants and to register plaintiffs as the Republican Party of Mississippi. The second count of plaintiffs' complaint in the State Court averred that, if the plaintiffs were mistaken in the relief demanded in the first count, then the Act as interpreted, applied and enforced was violative of the rights of the plaintiffs under the Constitution of the State of Mississippi and under the Constitution of the United States, referring among other provisions to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The only prayer for relief in the second count was contained in its concluding paragraph as follows:

"Wherefore, the plaintiffs say that if they are not entitled to the relief prayed for in the first count of this declaration, said act of the legislature is void and of no effect and the plaintiffs pray that the court will enter a judgment so declaring said act to be unconstitutional."⁸

Upon the trial, the State Circuit Judge expressed his opinion that the proper form of remedy was a petition in the nature of certiorari to the Secretary of State, and permitted the proceeding to be amended to incorporate such a petition. After a full hearing, the State Circuit Court ordered that the registration of the party represented by the defendants be cancelled and that the party represented by the plaintiffs be registered as the Republican Party of Mississippi. The Circuit Judge expressed fully the reasons for his ruling. A contrary construction or application of the statute would, he thought, render it unconstitutional.⁹

From that judgment the defendants appealed to the...