Howard v. Lawton
| Citation | 175 N.E.2d 556,22 Ill.2d 331 |
| Decision Date | 14 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 35953,35953 |
| Parties | L. W. HOWARD et al., Appellants, v. Samuel T. LAWTON et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Gardner, Carton, Douglas, Roemer & Chilgren, Chicago (James A. Velde, Joseph P. Carr, and Ware Adams, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
John C. Melaniphy, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Sydney R. Drebin, Robert J. Collins, and Allen Hartman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
This is an action for administrative review of a decision of the zoning board of appeals of the city of Chicago upholding the refusal of the city's zoning administrator to grant a building permit and denying an application for installation of 'piggyback' facilities in the Rockwell Street yard as a special use. The superior court of Cook County affirmed the board's decision and upheld the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance.
Defendants question our jurisdiction on direct appeal. They contend that plaintiffs did not properly raise the issue of violation of the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the Federal and State constitutions. This seems to be predicated on the theory that where the record is made on a review of the propriety of the administrative body's decision, the validity of the zoning ordinance under which the administrative proceeding is brought is not subject to attack.
First, it is suggested that the validity of the zoning ordinance cannot be raised in the same count seeking administrative review of the board's decision because they are repugnant to each other and are separate causes of action. As a corollary to this suggestion, it is contended that raising the question of validity is the equivalent of a declaratory judgment action and that notice should have been given to owners of property within 250 feet of the subject yard under section 73-4(e) of the Revised Cities and Villages Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 24, par. 73-4(e).) It was the construction of the ordinance by the administrative board which resulted in the alleged constitutional violations and was an integral part of review of the board's action, therefore it did not have to be pleaded in a separate count. The trial court took jurisdiction under the Administrative Review Act and the proceedings, including notice, were conducted under that act and were not subject to the rules applying to an independent declaratory judgment action.
Second, it is contended that constitutional issues cannot be raised in a complaint for administrative review. We have recognized the contrary practice, (see Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310,) and for good reason. To hold otherwise would result in piecemeal litigation by first requiring review of an administrative body's decision and then entertaining another action to test constitutionality brought on by such decision.
Defendants next argue that there is no evidence in the record pertaining to the validity of the ordinance as to the subject property. They seem to infer that a diferent type of proof is required to support the charge of invalidity. This does not necessarily follow. The scope of review by a court of original jurisdiction under section 11 of the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 274), extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the record. If the whole record discloses, as here, that there is a fairly debatable question whether the zoning ordinance upon which the administrative decision is based is arbitrary and unreasonable and without substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, it is proper for the court to consider and pass upon its validity when that issue has been raised in the complaint.
We are of the opinion that direct appeal lies to this court on constitutional grounds, although under our view the issues may be resolved without deciding the constitutional questions raised. We pass upon constitutional issues only where the cause cannot be decided on other grounds. Osborn v. Village of River Forest, 21 Ill.2d 246, 171 N.E.2d 579; People ex rel. Romano v. Krantz, 13 Ill.2d 363, 150 N.E.2d 627.
Before passing to the substantive issues we consider the remaining contention that the constitutional objections are premature because of plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their remedy at the local level, that is, seeking an amendment from the city council. Defendants rely upon the rule laid down in Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill.2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270, in support of their theory. The Bright doctrine does not apply here because the Chicago zoning ordinance provides that all decisions of the board of appeals shall be final administrative determinations reviewable by a court, while under the Evanston ordinance all final decisions on variations were vested solely in the city council. The Bright case was a declaratory judgment action, not administrative review. As we have heretofore noted, the trial court's review extends to all issues raised in an administrative review proceeding, and it was therefore unnecessary for plaintiffs to seek further relief at the local level.
This action arises out of the proposal of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company (C. & O.) to provide facilities for 'piggyback' service at the Rockwell Street yard in Chicago. Piggyback service is the long hauling of trailers on special flat cars by rail, two trailers to a car. They are hauled to and from a railway terminus by motor truck tractors. The facilities proposed at this yard include: a blacktop road 30 feet wide on the north edge of the yard from Kedzie to California, a paved loading movement area, a paved parking area, two 60-foot ramps and center platform, lights, two tracks to be connected with the yard track system (with two additional to be provided if business warrants), and a 12 by 16-foot building to be used as an office and sanitary facilities for a checker who would collect bills of lading.
The area in which the yard is located was zoned under the 1923 and 1942...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons
...raised by way of a cause of action created by state law, namely, the Illinois Administrative Review Law. See Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill.2d 331, 333, 175 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1961) (constitutional claims may be raised in a complaint for administrative review). As we have explained, however, " [e]v......
-
Graff v. City of Chicago
...before the court, including de novo review of any constitutional issues." Holstein, 803 F.Supp. at 210, citing Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill.2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1961). [T]he court determines from the record alone whether there is any evidence fairly tending to support the order reviewed......
-
Lawrence v. Board of Elec. Com'Rs of City of Chic., 07 C 566.
...Paper Grading Co. v. Howard T. Fisher & Assocs., Inc., 1 Ill.2d 37, 44, 115 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1953). Further, in Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill.2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961), the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that state constitutional issues can be raised "in a complaint for administrative revi......
-
Towers v. City of Chicago
...contained in the record, including a de novo review of any constitutional issues. Holstein, 29 F.3d at 1148 (citing Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill.2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961)). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff seeking administrative review on constitutional grounds must raise those issues at the......