Howard v. Seidler

Decision Date04 December 1996
Docket NumberNo. 94,94
Citation116 Ohio App.3d 800,689 N.E.2d 572
PartiesHOWARD, Admr., Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. SEIDLER, Appellee; Dattilo et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants. * C.A.70. Seventh District, Mahoning County
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

James L. Messenger, Youngstown, Bernard D. Marcus and Scott D. Livingston, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellant and cross-appellee.

John C. Pfau, Youngstown, for appellee Laura C. Seidler.

Charles L. Richards, Warren, for appellee and cross-appellant David Dattilo.

William M. Oldham, Akron, for appellee and cross-appellant James Hall.

DONOFRIO, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Debra H. Howard, administrator of the estate of her son, Vencinn I. Howard, appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in this wrongful death and survivor action.

On October 17, 1990, Vencinn I. Howard, then eleven years of age, was struck by a car and killed. The evidence at trial established that, on the evening in question, Vencinn had attended a football game at Fitch High School stadium in Austintown, Ohio. Shortly after 8:00 p.m., Vencinn began walking toward the Westchester apartments, located off Idaho Road, where he lived.

On his way home, Vencinn met and talked with a girl, Shayna Jenkins, outside Watson Elementary School. As Vencinn was talking with Shayna, a number of older, white teenagers appeared and began taunting Vencinn and Shayna with racial and sexual slurs. At some point, one or more of the teenagers began chasing Vencinn, who was black. Vencinn subsequently ran out into the middle of Idaho Road and was struck by a car being driven by defendant-appellee Laura Seidler. Vencinn died approximately one hour later due to massive internal injuries.

Appellant subsequently filed a wrongful death and survival action against appellee Seidler and against the seven teenagers who had allegedly been involved in chasing Vencinn. Prior to trial, appellant received $101,000 in settlement with defendant Michael A. Morgan and $9,000 in settlement with defendant April Demler. Appellant later elected not to proceed against defendants Wayne King and Heather Reese.

A jury trial began on January 25, 1994 on appellant's claims against appellee Seidler and against defendants-appellees/cross-appellants David Dattilo, James L. Hall, and Richard Sheppard.

Prior to opening statements, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of the police report of the accident. The next day, counsel for appellant and counsel for appellee Seidler went on the record and agreed that references to insurance on the police report would be deleted. At that time, the court indicated that appellant's oral motion in limine was granted. However, the record at page 27 of the transcript does not in any way reflect the grounds of appellant's oral motion in limine or with what the motion in limine was concerned.

During opening statements, counsel for appellee Seidler made reference to the police report and stated that there was no suggestion in the report that Seidler's speed was unreasonable or excessive and that there was no indication in the report that Seidler had contributed to causing the accident.

After the start of trial, the parties met out of the presence of the jury and argued as to the exact terms of appellant's oral motion in limine. Appellant's counsel argued that, in his oral motion in limine, he had intended to request that all references to any citations or lack of citations in the police report be excluded at trial. According to appellant's counsel, this included any reference at all to conclusions made by the police officers. Conversely, counsel for appellees argued that while they had agreed not to make mention of the fact that there were no citations issued, there had been no stipulation on conclusions made by the police. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that all conclusions in the report were admissible.

At trial, appellant alleged that Seidler had negligently failed to keep a proper lookout and had failed to obey the speed limit. Seidler's principal defense was that even if she had been negligent, the accident was unavoidable. To rebut this defense and prove that the accident was avoidable, appellant presented the testimony of a lighting expert, Walter Kosmatka, and an accident reconstruction expert, Professor David L. Uhrich.

Kosmatka testified that he performed a lighting analysis of the scene in order to determine the distance from Idaho Road where Seidler could have first seen or detected Vencinn. Kosmatka testified that he had originally determined that, based upon his observations of the scene and assuming that Vencinn was wearing a white shirt, Seidler could have first seen Vencinn at least 222 feet, and possibly as far back as 305 feet, away as she drove down Idaho Road. Later on, Kosmatka gave the following testimony:

"Q Okay. And what did your analysis reveal?

"A It revealed that at approximately 305 feet there--the light, the lightness of a light-colored or white-colored shirt could have been seen by an observer.

"Q Three hundred and five feet?

"A That was my initial calculation, yes, 305.

"Q Now, after you have seen the clothing here before testifying, has that initial judgment in any way been revised?

"A Well, I chose to do a second analysis based on the fact that maybe the color was more off-white, and the fact that the blue stripes would have tended to dilute the overall brightness. So I measured the stripes, and I measured the white bands between them. And using a number, a reflectance number for the white of approximately 60 percent, which is the beginning of the gray area, definitely an off-white, and a lesser number of 8 percent for the blue, I calculated an average weighted reflectance now of approximately 40 and a half percent compared to the 70 percent I used initially. If the whole shirt were that color--and, of course, you have to remember it wasn't, but--so this is a limiting case analysis. If that's the only part we would have seen, the distance would have been reduced to slightly over 220 feet, which is about two-thirds of the original 305 feet. Still a significant distance, 70 yards.

"Q And does this assume the fact that Vencinn Howard was running toward the automobile at the time?

"A As a matter of fact, it doesn't. It assumes a stationary static object. The numbers that all this was based on were derived from tests that were done with actual observers. And in all cases the object was static.

"Q Would it make a difference, sir, if the object was moving and arms were pumping as opposed to a static object?

"A I think it's fairly well accepted that movement, if you will, attracts attention, specifically when it's in more in the near periphery of the eye. * * *

" * * *

"Q Mr. Kosmatka, given your analysis of this matter and your investigation and the tests that you performed, together with all the documents that you have reviewed and studied, do you have an opinion based upon reasonable scientific certainty as to what distance away from Vencinn Howard at the time of impact the defendant, Laura Seidler, could have seen him?

"MR. PFAU: Objection.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"A Yes.

"Q And what is that opinion?

"A My opinion is that she could have seen Vencinn Howard at at [sic] least 222 feet, and possibly as far as 305 feet."

On cross-examination, Kosmatka gave the following testimony:

"Q * * * You reduced as a result of the document, the garment not being all white and being somewhat different than all white as we have gone through earlier that the possibility of seeing Vencinn by Laura Seidler on this evening would have been reduced from approximately 305 feet to 222 feet; correct?

"A Yes.

"Q And are those figures exact? I mean, can we say it's exactly 222 feet? There's some variance there?

"A This is based on the average of several observers, and that's right, it's the most probable. I certainly couldn't call it exact. It's the most probable distance.

" * * *

"Q Mr. Kosmatka, when did you form your first opinion of 305 feet?

"A I would--I just would be guessing to say it was just around the time I wrote this.

"Q Around October?

"A Yes.

"Q Or '93?

"A Yes.

"Q And I'm confused. When did you change it to 220?

"A As I indicated earlier, I saw the clothing this morning, and it was apparent that I should revisit this to see what kind of impact it had. So I did it this morning.

"Q So the 220 opinion was formed this morning?

"A Yes.

"Q After you saw this clothing?

"A Yes.

"Q Where did you get the idea that this youngster was wearing a white sweatshirt? Who told you that?

"A I believe it came from the family? I'm not sure.

"Q Okay. Well, anyway, what you saw this morning was enough for you to change your opinion by 30 percent; wasn't it?

"A Yes."

Based upon Kosmatka's testimony as to the range of detection distance, appellant then asked Professor Uhrich to give an opinion as to whether the accident could have been avoided had Seidler merely taken her foot off the accelerator for an instant when she could have first seen Vencinn. Upon objection by Seidler's counsel, the trial court prevented Uhrich from using Kosmatka's maximum detection distance of 305 feet:

"Q Okay. Now can you also walk us through your analysis with respect to the longer detection distance that Mr. Kosmatka had in his first report?

"MR. PFAU: I'm going to object to that. There's no foundation for the longer detection distance. Kosmatka has already indicated 305 feet was not the detection distance.

"MR. LIVINGSTON: I believe the testimony yesterday was that it was a range between 222 to 305 feet.

" * * *

"Q Can you walk us through the analysis of where Vencinn would have been had the driver seen Vencinn at the 305-foot detection distance and then coasted after seeing him?

"A Yes.

"THE COURT: And your objection is that there is no evidence as to the further distance?

"MR. PFAU: Yes, that Mr. Kosmatka testified that it was 222 feet, not 305.

"MR....

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