Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1954
• Docket Number: No. 15007.,15007.
• Citation: 215 F.2d 690
• Parties: Simon L. HOWARD, Sr., Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY CO., a Corporation, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an Unincorporated Association, and C. O. Carnahan, General Chairman, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

215 F.2d 690 (1954)

Simon L. HOWARD, Sr., Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY CO., a Corporation, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an Unincorporated Association, and C. O. Carnahan, General Chairman, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Appellees.

No. 15007.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

September 14, 1954.

Rehearing Denied October 8, 1954.

Victor Packman, St. Louis, Mo. (Henry D. Espy, St. Louis, Mo., and Joseph C. Waddy, Washington, D. C., with him on the brief), for appellant.

A. J. Baumann, St. Louis, Mo. (James L. Homire and C. H. Skinker, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., with him on the brief), for appellee St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.

Charles R. Judge, St. Louis, Mo. (Dubail & Judge, St. Louis, Mo., with him on the brief), for appellees Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and C. O. Carnahan, General Chairman.

Before SANBORN, JOHNSEN and COLLET, Circuit Judges.

JOHNSEN, Circuit Judge.

We held in Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 191 F.2d 442, 449, that an agreement exacted from the Railway by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, requiring the carrier to get rid of its "train porters", who were Negroes, and to replace them with "brakemen", who were white men, was entitled to be enjoined from being used or given effect, except as "a consolidation of the positions and crafts of brakeman and train porter and of the membership of the two crafts," with protection to be afforded the accrued job-and-seniority rights of the train porters in the merger, and with representation to be made of them in their assimilated status by the Brotherhood as the previously chosen bargaining representative of the dominant white-brakemen membership of the craft. The train porters were willing that the exacted agreement be allowed to have this effect, which we regarded as the only valid legal effect of which it was at all capable, and which effect we deemed it proper to accord it as a matter of law, in view of the train porters' consent thereto and of the insistence of the Brotherhood and the Railway that a contract legally could be made to abolish the position and craft as such.

Thus, we reversed a judgment of the District Court, Howard v. Thompson, 72 F.Supp. 695, which had denied the train porters injunctive relief against the exacted agreement and the action taken by the Railway thereunder — that court having taken the view that the right of the train porters to do the work in which they had been engaged was a question for the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and that their claim to be entitled to constitute members of the brakemen's craft was a question for the National Mediation Board. We directed the District Court to enter an order "enjoining the Railway and the Brotherhood from using the agreement for any other purpose and from giving it any other effect" than that which has just been set out above herein. See 191 F.2d at page 449.

The Brotherhood petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the writ was granted. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 342 U.S. 940, 72 S. Ct. 551, 96 L.Ed. 699. On hearing and and submission on the merits, the Supreme Court wrote an opinion, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed. 1283, holding that the use made by the Brotherhood of its position and power, as a bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., to effect a racial discrimination, was a breach of its statutory duty and so unlawful.

The Court said: "While different in some respects, the basic pattern of racial discrimination in this case is much the same as that we had to consider in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173. * * * As previously noted, these train porters are threatened with loss of their jobs because they are not white and for no other reason. * * * The Federal Act * * * prohibits bargaining agents it authorizes from using their position and power to destroy colored workers' jobs in order to bestow them on white workers. * * * The claims here cannot be resolved by interpretation of a bargaining agreement so as to give jurisdiction to the Adjustment Board * * *. This dispute involves the validity of the contract, not its meaning. Nor does the dispute hinge on the proper craft classification of the porters so as to call for settlement by the National Mediation Board * * *. For the contention here with which we agree is that the racial discrimination practiced is unlawful, whether colored employees are classified as `train porters,' `brakemen,' or something else." 343 U.S. at pages 772, 773, 774, 72 S.Ct. at page 1024.

To this, the Court added the following conclusion and direction: "We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court had jurisdiction to protect these workers from the racial discrimination practiced against them. On remand, the District Court should permanently enjoin the Railroad and the Brotherhood from use of the contract or any other similar discriminatory bargaining device to oust the train porters from their jobs. In fashioning its decree the District Court is left free to consider what provisions are necessary to afford these employees full protection from future discriminatory practices of the Brotherhood. However, in drawing its decree, the District Court must bear in mind that disputed questions of reclassification of the craft of `train porters' are committed by the Railway Labor Act to the National Mediation Board." 343 U.S. at pages 774 and 775, 72 S.Ct. at page 1026.

The formal order, which the opinion directed to be entered of record, and which the mandate contained in practically the...