Howard v. State
Decision Date | 22 October 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 676S177,676S177 |
Citation | 265 Ind. 503,355 N.E.2d 833 |
Parties | William HOWARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Daniel Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant, William Howard, appeals his conviction of two counts of rape, Ind. Code § 35-13-4-3 (Burns 1975) and two counts of sodomy, Ind.Code § 35-1-89-1 (Burns 1975). 1 Appellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that appellant was mentally competent to stand trial; and (2) whether the trial court permitted improper prejudicial testimony to be given during cross-examination of a defense witness.
Appellant filed a 'motion for commitment before trial' suggesting his incompetency to stand trial. The trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine appellant and held a hearing on the issue of his competency. At this hearing Dr. William Bourke testified that based upon his examination of appellant he believed that appellant understood the nature of the charges against him but did not possess the capacity to aid in his defense. He elaborated that appellant's refusal to cooperate in the examination led him to believe that appellant could not aid in his defense. Dr. Larry Musselman testified that he was of the opinion that because of appellant's suspiciousness and uncooperativeness, appellant could not aid his attorney in conducting his defense. Neither witness was able to say definitely whether appellant's refusal to cooperate was due to mental disorder or to a wilful decision not to cooperate with the psychiatrists.
Appellant testified that his reluctance to be examined was due to his belief that the examinations were conducted without his attorney's knowledge or approval. He testified that he intended to cooperate with his attorney in the conduct of his defense. Appellant also said that he had no mental problems and did not want to be institutionalized.
The trial court ruled that appellant was competent to stand trial. Appellant contends that the court ignored the psychiatric testimony and found appellant competent based upon his own testimony.
Indiana Code § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1975) provides:
In appointing the psychiatrists to examine appellant, and in holding the hearing, the court complied with the statute. The issue, then, is whether the trial court's determination of competency is supported by sufficient evidence. That determination involves questions of fact, and an appropriate finding by the trial court is reversible on appeal only if clearly erroneous as unsupported by the facts and circumstances before the court together with any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Although we have held that due process requires that a defendant not be forced to stand trial while incompetent, Tinsley v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 577, 298 N.E.2d 429, this holding does not render inapplicable the statutory procedure for determining competency. Tinsley v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 141, 312 N.E.2d 72 (on remand).
The testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrists was in substantial agreement: appellant was aware of the nature of the charges and proceedings but could or would not cooperate in his own defense. The conclusion that appellant would not cooperate with his attorney was based upon his suspicion, evasiveness, and lack of cooperation in his examination by the psychiatrists. Appellant's testimony explaining the reasons for his suspicion and uncooperativeness was sufficient to enable the court to reasonably conclude that appellant was capable of cooperating with his counsel and assisting in his defense. It is proper for the trial court to permit a defendant to testify at his own competency hearing and for the court to consider his demeanor in determining his competency. Vacendak v. State, (1976) Ind., 340 N.E.2d 352. The trial court is not bound by the recommendations of the psychiatric witnesses; otherwise there would be no need for a hearing. Also appellant's argument that an accused may not waive the right not to be tried while...
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...Gosnell v. State (1979), 268 Ind. 429, 376 N.E.2d 471. The trial court was not bound by the experts' testimony. Howard v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 503, 355 N.E.2d 833. There was a great deal of evidence, from a number of disinterested witnesses, that Defendant had been feigning his psychosis ......
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...which relates to his behavior or environment and has some logical relevance to the issue of his sanity.” Howard v. State, 265 Ind. 503, 507, 355 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1976) (citing Stamper v. State, 260 Ind. 211, 216, 294 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973) ). This is not to suggest that relevance of the def......
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