Howard v. State
| Decision Date | 19 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 10A01-0011-CR-395.,10A01-0011-CR-395. |
| Citation | 755 N.E.2d 242 |
| Parties | Mark A. HOWARD, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jeffrey D. Stonebraker, Jeffersonville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Mark A. Howard challenges his conviction for Battery, a Class A misdemeanor,1 on two separate grounds. First, he alleges that the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Discharge because 659 days elapsed between the filing of the charges against him and the date of his trial. Second, Howard asserts that the trial court also erred in refusing to give his tendered instruction on self-defense. Because we find that the trial court properly denied Howard's Motion for Discharge and Howard's testimony did not support the giving of an instruction on self-defense, we affirm.
On September 2, 1998, Howard went to the home of Karen L. Zinser to retrieve some of his personal belongings and to return a cellular phone that belonged to Zinser. Howard and Zinser had previously lived together in the residence, along with Zinser's daughter, Candace Corrigan and Corrigan's daughter. When Howard arrived at the residence, all of his belongings were awaiting him outside of the home. He loaded his belongings into his car, but not wanting to leave the cellular phone outside where it could be stolen or damaged, he proceeded to knock on the door. Eventually, Corrigan opened the door, left it ajar, and walked away from the entrance. Howard took this to be an invitation into the home. Further, Howard testified that there was no objection made to his entry.
Additionally, Howard offered testimony that Corrigan initiated the physical altercation that formed the basis of his arrest and conviction for battery after the two of them exchanged words. Specifically, Howard alleged that Corrigan slapped him in the face with her open hand. Thereafter, Howard lost his temper and pushed Corrigan onto the couch and restrained Corrigan. After he released her, Howard claims that Corrigan slipped and fell into a glass coffee table, which resulted in her suffering a laceration to the head, as she headed into the kitchen area. Howard admits that he followed Corrigan into the kitchen, where he again restrained her after she reached for a knife. Meanwhile, Zinser phoned 9-1-1. Howard then released Corrigan and left the residence. We note that Corrigan, however, testified to a very different rendition of events.2
Howard was arrested shortly after leaving the Zinser residence. He posted bond and was released the following day. On September 9, 1998, the State filed formal criminal charges against Howard for residential entry and battery. Although Howard failed to appear at his initial appearance on September 15, 1998, counsel appeared on his behalf and informed the trial court that Howard was in the custody of the Kentucky authorities. The trial court issued a warrant for Howard's failure to appear.
On July 23, 1999, the State lodged a detainer based on its charges against Howard. The Kentucky authorities released Howard in September 1999. On September 3, 1999, Howard voluntarily appeared for an initial hearing in exchange for the State's promise to withdraw the detainer and warrant pending against him. Additionally, Howard appeared for pretrial conferences on November 10, 1999, February 3, 2000, and May 5, 2000. Both the November and February pretrial conferences resulted in continuances, while at the May pretrial conference Howard's case was set for trial on June 29, 2000.
Prior to his June 29 trial and again during trial, Howard moved the trial court for a discharge. The trial court denied Howard's motion on both occasions. Howard's case was tried to a jury. Howard defended against the charges by claiming self-defense. However, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-defense. The jury convicted Howard of Battery, a Class A misdemeanor. This appeal ensued.
Indiana Criminal Rule 4 provides for the discharge of defendants when the State delays in bringing a defendant to trial. In essence, Criminal Rule 4 is Indiana's codification of a defendant's speedy trial rights. Criminal Rule 4(C) provides the basis for Howard's appeal. Specifically, Criminal Rule 4(C) reads:
cert. denied 527 U.S. 1035, 119 S.Ct. 2393, 144 L.Ed.2d 793 (1999) (). In fact, our supreme court in Smith declared:
While it may be reasonable to impose the time limit of Criminal Rule 4 ... when a criminal defendant is within the exclusive control of the State of Indiana, for purposes of certainty and ease of administration of the rule, it becomes irrational to extend its application to a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction which has an interest in retaining the defendant in its custody, either for trial or to serve a sentence.
Smith, 368 N.E.2d at 1156. Thus, in cases involving the speedy trial rights of defendants incarcerated in foreign jurisdictions we apply the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)3 rather than Indiana Criminal Rule 4. Brown, 497 N.E.2d at 1050.
The IAD is designed to secure a speedy trial for prisoners who are already incarcerated in one state and have outstanding charges against them in other states. Pallett v. State, 269 Ind. 396, 381 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1978). Consequently, the IAD applies only to persons who have already been convicted and are serving time in prison, not those awaiting trial and sentencing. Id. Article 3(a) of the IAD provides:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint....
Ind.Code § 35-33-10-4 (emphasis added). The instant case presents an interesting interplay between Criminal Rule 4 and the IAD for analysis.
Howard was arrested on September 2, 1998. The State filed formal criminal charges against him on September 9, 1998. Therefore, for purposes of Criminal Rule 4, the clock began to tick on September 9, 1998. At his initial hearing on September 15, 1998, counsel for Howard informed the State that Howard was incarcerated in Kentucky. At this point, Howard was not in the exclusive control of the State of Indiana. As a result, we find that Criminal Rule 4 was inapplicable for Howard's period of incarceration in Kentucky. Smith, 368 N.E.2d at 1156.
On July 23, 1999, the State lodged a detainer against Howard under the IAD for the charges pending against him in Indiana.4 Howard, however, never requested a final disposition of those charges. We find that the 180 day period in which a defendant must be brought to trial under the IAD was never triggered.
Finally, of significance is the date on which Howard returned to Indiana, September 3, 1999. Because we conclude that Howard was within Indiana's exclusive control at this time, we apply Criminal Rule 4. Howard's trial took place on June 29, 2000, 300 days after his return to Indiana. Accordingly, we find that the State afforded Howard a trial on his charges within the one year time limitation of Criminal Rule 4(C) and the trial court did not err in denying Howard's Motion for Discharge.
Howard contends that Sweeney dictates a different result. In particular, Howard asserts that Sweeney requires the ten month delay between his informing the State of his whereabouts in Kentucky and the State lodging a detainer should be charged to the State under Criminal Rule 4(C). However, we find that Howard misinterprets Sweeney.
Our supreme court merely carved out a very limited exception to the Smith line of cases in Sweeney, thereby leaving intact its earlier decisions in Smith, Heflin, and Brown. Specifically, our supreme court concluded that while generally Criminal Rule 4 will not apply to defendants incarcerated in foreign jurisdictions, it is proper to apply Criminal Rule 4 to such defendants in the single instance where the State brings a defendant into Indiana...
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