Howe v. MMG Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 17 June 2014 |
Docket Number | Docket No. Yor–13–529. |
Citation | 95 A.3d 79,2014 ME 78 |
Parties | Janet HOWE, et al. v. MMG INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patrick S. Bedard, Esq., Bedard & Bobrow, P.C. (orally), Eliot, for appellants Janet Howe et al.
Matthew T. Mehalic, Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC (orally), Portland, for appellee MMG Insurance Company.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
[¶ 1] Janet Howe and Rajesh Mandekar (collectively Howe) appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court (York County, O'Neil, J.) declaring that MMG Insurance Company (MMG) has no duty to defend in a suit filed against them by the River Knoll Farms Condominium Association (Association). MMG argues, and the trial court agreed, that a policy issued to Howe by MMG does not provide coverage because the Association's suit seeks only equitable relief. Howe asserts that the suit also seeks money damages, which would potentially be covered by the MMG policy. Because we conclude that the facts that might be proved at trial potentially fall within the coverage provided by Howe's policy, MMG has a duty to defend Howe. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment.
[¶ 2] Howe owns one of four condominiums in the River Knoll Farms Condominium in Kittery. In April 2013, the Association sued Howe, alleging, in the counts at issue here, (1) nuisance, (2) negligence, and (3) a violation of 7 M.R.S. § 3952 (2013) (Keeping a Dangerous Dog). All three counts arose primarily from the conduct of Howe's dog.
[¶ 3] MMG, which had issued a homeowner's policy to Howe, declined to defend her in the litigation on the ground that the Association's complaint alleged that Howe's dog was a nuisance, not that it caused any “bodily injury” or “property damage,” and therefore the complaint sought only equitable relief not covered by the policy. In July 2013 Howe filed a complaint against MMG in the Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment requiring MMG to defend her as required by the policy. After MMG answered with a general denial, Howe moved for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(c).1 Following a hearing, the court entered a judgment for MMG, finding that (1) the nuisance count of the Association's complaint sought only injunctive relief not covered by Howe's policy; (2) the negligence count made no claim that Howe's dog caused bodily injury or property damage, and therefore failed to allege the elements of the tort; and (3) no private right of action is provided by 7 M.R.S. § 3952.
[¶ 4] This appeal followed.
[¶ 5] We review a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings de novo. Mitchell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2011 ME 133, ¶ 8, 36 A.3d 876. The MMG policy is likewise interpreted de novo, and “any ambiguity in the policy regarding [MMG's] duty to defend is resolved against [MMG].” Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.
[¶ 6] An insurer's duty to defend is broad. We recently reiterated that the duty Cox v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 2013 ME 8, ¶ 9, 59 A.3d 1280 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Furthermore, Mitchell, 2011 ME 133, ¶ 10, 36 A.3d 876 (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 7] The complaint here generally alleges that Howe is Count I specifically asserts that Howe's actions Howe asserts in her brief that it might be shown at trial that the dog “had scratched, bitten, and otherwise damaged” Association property, thus establishing a claim for property damage. Count I requests injunctive relief, but also requests “damages, interest, penalties, costs, and [attorney] fees.”
[¶ 8] The negligence claim (Count III) likewise centers on the conduct of Howe's dog. The complaint's general allegations include an assertion that the dog “is vicious, threatening, and has bitten people,” and that Howe “failed to control the dog.” The allegation that the dog has “bitten people”—possibly fellow unit owners, because the statutory count (Count V) alleges that “unit owners have been assaulted” by the dog—outlines a claim of bodily injury for which Howe might be answerable to the Association, depending on the facts developed as the case proceeds. See33 M.R.S. § 1603–102(4) (2013) ( ). Like the nuisance claim, the negligence count seeks as relief “damages, plus reasonable [attorney] fees, costs and interest.”
[¶ 9] We do not express any opinion as to whether the Association's claims...
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