Howe v. Watson
| Decision Date | 22 May 1901 |
| Parties | HOWE v. WATSON et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Wm W. McClench and Chas. W. Bosworth, for plaintiff.
Edmund P. Kendrick, for defendant E. C. Watson.
Danl. E. Webster, for defendants C. M. Carris and others.
Edward H. Lathrop, for defendants Maria Milliken and others.
This was originally an action at law to recover damages for the breach of a contract alleged to have been made between the plaintiff and the defendant's intestate, by the terms of which the latter agreed to leave at her death all her property to the plaintiff. It was subsequently changed into an action in equity, and the heirs at law of the intestate were joined with the original defendant as parties defendant. The bill alleges, in substance, the contract as set out in the declaration in the action at law, and prays that the real estate left by the deceased may be decreed as belonging to the plaintiff, and may be conveyed to her by some proper deed, and that the administrator may be ordered to pay over to her the personal property which may remain in his possession after all claims against the estate are satisfied. Various answers were filed, and, the pleadings being completed, the case was sent to a special master to report to the court the facts and such evidence as either party might request. Upon the filing of the report, the defendants excepted to the finding that the letter of April 16, 1894, from the deceased to the plaintiff, upon which the plaintiff relies as showing the alleged contract, was authorized by the deceased, and to the finding that at the time the letter was written the deceased had sufficient capacity for making a valid will or contract the ground of the objection to each finding being that it was not warranted by the evidence. Upon the hearing upon these exceptions, they were overruled by consent, the report was affirmed, and a decree to that effect was duly entered. Thereupon the presiding justice reserved the case for this court 'upon the pleadings and master's report.'
It seems to have been the understanding of the parties that although the exceptions to the master's report were overruled by consent, and the report was confirmed, still the reservation means that the evidence reported by the master is a part of the report, and that the objections made to the report by the exceptions are still open to the defendant; and counsel upon each side have presented to us the case upon that understanding, and have argued, among other things, the points raised by the exceptions. Without deciding that such is the effect of the reservation, we have, under the circumstances, examined the evidence to see whether the findings to which the exceptions relate should stand.
The evidence relating to the finding that the letter was authorized by the deceased is clear and direct, and the only question can be as to her mental capacity. The evidence relating to the finding that, at the time the letter was written, the deceased had sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will or valid contract, is conflicting. The witness Mary E. Chapman, who wrote the letter, testified that she was in the habit of visiting the deceased perhaps once or twice a week during the spring of 1894; that the latter was her father's cousin; that the witness had frequently talked with her about sending for the plaintiff; and that at the time the letter was written the intestate was dressed, and sitting up in a chair, was able to walk about the house, 'was smart, and seemed pretty well'; that she appeared in her right mind; that 'her mind was just as clear as it could be,--as it had ever been'; that she dictated to the witness 'every word and every line' of the letter, and that the witness wrote under her dictation; that the witness read to her the letter after it was thus written, and that the deceased approved it, and directed her to sign her own name and the name of the witness, and to mail it. It is true that the physicians who attended her during the time within which this letter was written testified that the mental faculties of the deceased were impaired to a great extent, in which in some degree they were corroborated by the nurse who waited upon her. Still we cannot say upon the evidence that the master, who heard the witnesses, was wrong in his finding as to the mental capacity of the deceased. These findings of the master must therefore stand.
The plaintiff says that the deceased offered to give all the property she should leave at her decease to the plaintiff, if she and her daughter would come and stay with the deceased during the remainder of her life; that the plaintiff accepted the offer, and, with her daughter, came and stayed with the deceased as long as she lived. The first question is whether the contract is proved. The evidence of the offer upon which the plaintiff relies is not parol, but is found in the letter of April 16, 1894, which is as follows:
It is well to consider the circumstances existing at the time the letter was written, and the relations the parties bore to each other. The plaintiff, Ellen, and the intestate, Nancy were sisters, aged 70 and 85 years, respectively. Both had been married, and both were widows. Ellen, when 9 years of age, went to live with Nancy and her husband as their daughter, until she was married. At the time the letter was written, Nancy was living in her house in Springfield, in this state. A part of it was let to a tenant, and a part occupied by her. She was cared for by a hired nurse. She was apprehensive that both the nurse and the tenant might leave. She was infirm with age and disease, and she had no issue living. The most of her near relatives were far away from her, and there does not appear to have been in her vicinity any one upon whom she could call. She was evidently convinced that she could reasonably expect but little more of life, and that even that must be attended with pain and infirmity. She was liable at any time to be without a tenant or a nurse. Besides the house in which she lived, which was worth about $4,000, she had personal property amounting to about $2,000. She expected to leave something, but 'her expenses were large,' as she thought, and she could not tell how much would be left at her death. In this gloomy and lonely situation, this venerable and infirm woman is thinking of her sister Ellen, who in years gone by had been long a member of her household as a daughter, and in these last days she longs for her companionship. She knows that this sister and daughter are living in Florida in very modest circumstances, but she is determined to have them come to her if possible, and she writes the letter. The first sentence shows that she is discouraged about her own health, and states her reason for writing the letter. In the next sentence she asks if Ellen and the daughter will come and stay with her 'as long as I live.' She is proposing an arrangement which shall last during her life, and the proposition is addressed to a favorite sister. It is a proposition requiring, in substance, that the sister, who is 70 years of age, shall break up her own home in a distant state. It is not difficult to see by the urgency of the appeal the eagerness with which the proposition is made, and the anxiety that it shall be accepted. To induce her sister to come, she writes, 'My expenses are large, but all that I leave shall be yours.' This is not the language of a woman to the man she is about to marry, expressing, with the extravagance somewhat characteristic of such communications, the writer's intention that her property shall be shared and enjoyed in...
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