Howell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 14 C 9977
Decision Date | 04 June 2015 |
Docket Number | 14 C 9977 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Parties | ROY L. HOWELL, JR., Plaintiff, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Roy Howell alleges in this suit that BNSF Railway Company fired him in retaliation for reporting an on-the-job-injury he suffered, in violation of Illinois common law. Howell also alleges that BNSF fired him because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ( ), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. Doc. 1. BNSF answered the race discrimination claims, Doc. 13, and moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the common law retaliatory discharge claim, Doc. 14. The motion is granted.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, with all reasonable inferences drawn in Howell's favor, but not its legal conclusions. See Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2014); Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2012). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in Howell's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillipsv. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)). The facts are set forth as favorably to Howell as those materials permit. See Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 770 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2014); Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012).
From November 2008 to May 2013, Howell worked as a hostler truck driver at BNSF's intermodal facilities in Cook County. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 7-9. A hostler truck driver "[d]rives trucks or tractors at vehicle parking or docking area to move, position, or park trucks or trailers." Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 909.663-010 (4th ed. 1991); see Doc. 1 at ¶ 9. In March 2013, Howell was injured in an on-the-job accident. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10-11. He reported the injury to his supervisors, who fired him in May 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
BNSF has moved to dismiss the common law retaliatory discharge claim. Illinois is an at-will employment state, meaning that, as a general rule, "an employer may discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason." Turner v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 374 (Ill. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002) (Illinois law). The Supreme Court of Illinois "has recognized the limited and narrow tort of retaliatory discharge as an exception to the general rule of at-will employment." Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ill. 1998). "To state a valid retaliatory discharge cause of action, an employee must allege that (1) the employer discharged the employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee's activities, and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy." Turner, 911 N.E.2d at 374; seeDarchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2009); Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2009); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877-78 (Ill. 1981).
BNSF argues that Howell has not adequately pleaded the third element, that his "discharge violate[d] a clear mandate of public policy." Doc. 14 at 3-7. "[A] review of Illinois case law reveals that retaliatory discharge actions have been allowed in two settings: where an employee is discharged for filing, or in anticipation of filing, a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act; or where an employee is discharged in retaliation for the reporting of illegal or improper conduct, otherwise known as 'whistleblowing.'" Michael v. Precision Alliance Grp., LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183, 1188 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see Jacobson, 706 N.E.2d at 493 (same); Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2000) (); Irizarry v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 879 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (Ill. App. 2007) (same); Sutherland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 826 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Ill. App. 2005) (). "Other than these two circumstances, however, Illinois courts consistently have refused to expand the tort to encompass a private and individual grievance." Geary v. Telular Corp., 793 N.E.2d 128, 134 (Ill. App. 2003); see Irizarry, 879 N.E.2d at 1012 (same); Wilke v. Salamone, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (Illinois law) (same).
Howell does not allege that he was fired for exercising his rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. Nor could he, because that statute does not cover interstate railroad employees, whose exclusive remedy lies in the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 149 (1917) () (citation omitted); S. Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Ahern, 344 U.S. 367, 374 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ( ); Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); Hines v. Indus. Comm'n, 129 N.E. 175, 176 (Ill. 1920) () (citation omitted); Sutherland, 826 N.E.2d at 1024 () (citation omitted).
Illinois courts have consistently held that workers alleging that they were terminated for asserting rights under FELA, as opposed to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, may not pursue a common law retaliatory discharge claim. See Sutherland, 826 N.E.2d at 1025 ( ); Irizarry, 879 N.E.2d at 1014 (same); see also Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 880 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. App. 2007) ( ). Anyway, Howell does not even allege that he was fired in retaliation for asserting his rights under FELA; to the contrary, he alleges only that he reported his workplace injury. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 12-15, 17-22.
The analysis could stop here, because the above-cited cases are directly on point and explicitly preclude Howell's common law retaliatory discharge claim. But the court notes that, even were it to ignore Sutherland, Irizarry, and Emery, Howell has not adequately pleaded that he was fired for "whistleblowing," a term defined by Illinois courts as "the reporting of illegal or improper conduct." Michael, 21 N.E.3d at 1188; see Robinson v. Alter Barge Line, Inc., 513 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (Illinois law) ("reported dangerous or illegal activities at work"). Reporting his own injury does not qualify as whistleblowing. See Sutherland, 826 N.E.2d at 1027 () (emphasis added). That is because, for purposes of the common law retaliatory discharge tort, "public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively," as opposed to individually. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (emphasis added). As explained by the Supreme Court of Illinois:
Id. at 878-79. Reporting a personal workplace injury falls squarely on the "purely personal" side of the divide, as it neither "affects the citizens of [...
To continue reading
Request your trial