Howell v. Shores
| Decision Date | 20 December 1948 |
| Docket Number | 4-8670 |
| Citation | 215 S.W.2d 730,214 Ark. 301 |
| Parties | Howell v. Shores |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; J. O. Kincannon, Judge.
Affirmed.
Ralph Robinson and Howell & Howell, for appellant.
Heartsill Ragon and Paul E. Gutensohn, for appellee.
The appellee, Harley Shores, while employed as an "Extra-Gang" laborer by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, was, on December 19, 1943, severely injured as a result of being struck by a piece of ice thrown or otherwise dislodged from a passing troop train. The appellant, D. H. Howell, a practicing attorney of Van Buren Arkansas, was employed by the appellee to file suit against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company to recover compensation for the injuries thus sustained.
The appellant and appellee entered into what appellant terms "the usual personal injury contract whereby (Howell) was to receive 50 per cent of the amount recovered for his services in prosecuting said lawsuit." After some preliminary investigation and during the trial of this suit in the Circuit Court of Crawford County, it developed that the train from which the ice was thrown or dislodged was a troop train in charge of a troop train commander over which the railroad company exercised no authority, thus suggesting two potential defendants: The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and the United States Government.
Notwithstanding this development of facts, judgment was recovered for the appellee against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company in the sum of $ 4,000. On appeal to this Court the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case dismissed. 209 Ark. 539, 191 S.W.2d 580.
Thereafter in pursuance of appellee's instructions, the appellant procured the passage of a special act of Congress for the relief of the appellee in which the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized and directed to pay to the appellee the sum of $ 4,000, said Act being styled and numbered "Private Law 95 of the 80th Congress of the United States, being an Act for the relief of Harley Shores." After providing for the payment of the $ 4,000 aforesaid, said Act further provided:
The voucher in payment of the $ 4,000 authorized by the Act of Congress was mailed to the appellee in care of the appellant who accompanied the appellee to the bank for the purpose of cashing said voucher after both had endorsed the same. Appellee deposited $ 1,900 to his own credit and returned to appellant's office with $ 2,100 where appellee paid appellant a fee of $ 400 as provided in said Act, appellant giving appellee his receipt therefor. A conversation then ensued relative to the services rendered by appellant in prosecuting the case against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.
At appellant's direction, appellee paid appellant an additional fee of $ 1,600, taking another receipt from appellant for this additional fee. Some four or five days later appellee returned to appellant's office complaining that appellant had "mistreated" him in that the first $ 400 was all that appellant was "to get" and that unless appellant made some adjustment appellee was going to prosecute appellant. After an exchange of words, appellant's son and law partner, Travis Howell, interceded, saying in substance that if appellee carried out his threat "it would not be good for our law firm to get mixed up in something like this, to have it before the people would be a reflection on our firm . . . it would be too much to go through a lawsuit with the government." As a result of this controversy, appellant paid appellee $ 500 in cash, took up and destroyed the receipt for $ 1,600. This left appellant with an aggregate fee of $ 1,500.
A few days later appellee addressed appellant by letter making further demand for an additional $ 500. On November 6, 1947, appellant filed suit against the appellee in the Crawford Circuit Court alleging and setting forth in his complaint his services rendered in behalf of appellee and praying judgment "in the sum of $ 2,000, or in such sums as the court may find the value of his services rendered to be, together with all his costs therein laid out and expended," and on the same date caused a "Writ of Garnishment" to be issued garnishing the $ 1,900 deposited by the appellee to his own credit in the Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Van Buren from the proceeds of the government voucher.
Appellee filed his answer and cross-complaint setting forth what had transpired between the parties and payments made to appellant, alleging that the $ 1,500 attorney's fee theretofore paid by him to appellant was beyond the legal limit allowed and allowable by the Act of Congress and praying judgment against the appellant for the $ 1,100 paid in excess of the $ 400 allowed by the Act of Congress and that the garnishment proceedings be immediately quashed.
Appellant then filed an amendment to his complaint alleging that the original "Personal Injury Contract" whereby the plaintiff (Howell) was to receive 50 per cent of the amount recovered for his services . . . "had been abrogated at the time it was determined that the block of ice which struck appellee was thrown or otherwise dislodged from a troop train; that it might be necessary to seek relief from the United States government; that a new oral contract was entered into under the terms of which appellee was to pay appellant a 'reasonable' fee for his services in prosecuting the suit against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and praying judgment against the appellee and the garnishee in the sum of $ 500."
On the tenth day of March, 1948, this cause came on to be heard in the Crawford Circuit Court and at the conclusion of the evidence introduced by appellant and upon motion of the appellee, the trial court instructed and the jury found:
And from this judgment comes this appeal.
Appellant offered testimony of other attorneys as to the value of the services rendered. But this is not important for a determination of this case for reasons hereinafter...
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