Howell v. U.S.
| Citation | 932 F.2d 915 |
| Decision Date | 06 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-8149,90-8149 |
| Parties | Robert E. HOWELL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Karel A.M. ZEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Ted N. SCHOBERT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Lunelle G. MIDDLEBROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Bonnie LYVERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Taylor E. LITTLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Charles BOLAND, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Danielle Marie HUTCHESON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Kay B. LANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Teresa S. SAUNDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Chester A. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Cornelia V. BROGAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Alice GORDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Corina YIN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. J. Crayton PRUITT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
J. Russell Phillips, Greene, Buckley, Jones & McQueen, Atlanta, Ga., for Cornelia V. Brogan, Edward A. Holmes, Jr. and Alice Gordon.
Nicholas C. Moraitakis, Gorby, Reeves, Moraitakis & Whiteman, P.C., Atlanta, Ga., for Corina Yin.
Ralph C. McBride, Marietta, Ga., for Ted N. Schobert and Dorothy M. Schobert.
John Allen Howard, Atlanta, Ga., for all plaintiffs-appellants.
Andrew M. Scherffius, Atlanta, Ga., for Chester A. Williams.
William C. Lanham, Atlanta, Ga., for J. Pruitt, et al.
David M. Wiegand, Federal Aviation Admin., James C. Wilson, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Torts Branch, Civil Div., Washington, D.C., and Nina L. Hunt, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and PECKHAM *, Senior District Judge.
This consolidated appeal arises from an airplane crash in which plaintiff-appellants' decedents were killed. Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence on the part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Concluding that the FAA owed no duty to plaintiffs' decedents, the district court granted summary judgment for the United States against all plaintiffs. We agree that the FAA owed no duty to plaintiffs' decedents under the circumstances of this case and, therefore, affirm.
The plane that crashed was owned and operated by Air Carrier Express Services, Inc. (ACES) but was apparently also piloted by personnel of another airline, Midnite Express. Two days before the accident, a Midnite Express pilot was scheduled to use the plane for a "check ride"--an annual ride each pilot must take in the company of an FAA inspector to ensure his or her continued competency to fly. See 14 C.F.R. Sec. 135.293(b). When the FAA inspector arrived for the planned check ride, however, he was told by Midnite Express personnel (and he later personally observed) that the plane's fuel was contaminated. The Midnite Express director of maintenance had already placed a handwritten sign on the instrument panel stating the plane was grounded, at least for Midnite Express personnel, due to contaminated fuel. After discussing the situation with the maintenance director and two Midnite Express pilots, the FAA inspector cancelled the check ride and left without taking further action.
Later that afternoon the Midnite Express maintenance director told the president of ACES about the fuel contamination, warning him that the plane was not airworthy and outlining what needed to be done to make it safe. The president of ACES apparently chose to ignore the problem, however, and flew the plane later that same day. Two days later the plane crashed, killing seventeen people.
A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation revealed that the crash resulted from a loss of power caused by the ingestion of contaminated fuel. The contamination itself was probably caused by improper fueling procedures contrary to those specified in FAA regulations and the carrier's operating manual: ACES had a practice of using a portable unfiltered pump to fuel aircraft, and the record shows that such an unfiltered pump was used to fuel this plane immediately before the crash.
Plaintiffs contend that the FAA inspector, upon seeing the contaminated fuel two days before the crash, should have taken further action (such as, grounding the plane, issuing an official notice, or initiating an investigation into the cause of the contamination) and that his failure to do so breached a legal duty owed to the future passengers of the ill-fated plane. But the district court concluded that the FAA inspector owed no legal duty to the passengers and, thus, held that the inspector's failure to act could not constitute negligence as a matter of law. 1
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable for the negligent conduct of its employees "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674; see also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). The FTCA was not intended to create new causes of action; nor was it intended as a means to enforce federal statutory duties. See Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir.1983). 2 Instead, Congress's chief intent in drafting the FTCA was simply to provide redress for ordinary torts recognized by state law. See id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28, 73 S.Ct. 956, 964, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953)). So, whether the United States is liable for the FAA inspector's failure to act depends on whether a similarly situated private employer would be liable for such an omission under the law of Georgia, the place where the allegedly negligent act or omission occurred. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b).
Appellants contend that the FAA inspector should have grounded the plane, issued a notice, or initiated an investigation; and that his failure to do so breached various duties established by federal statutes and internal FAA orders. Would a private party be liable for such a failure under Georgia law?
A private party would not, of course, be regulating air flight, and his behavior would not be governed by the statutes and FAA orders on which appellants rely. Thus, it might be arguable that the United States could not be liable under the FTCA for negligence in performing "uniquely governmental" functions--such as regulation of flight--because there is no identical private activity for purposes of comparison. This position was long ago rejected by the Supreme Court, however. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). The comparison of activities need not be exact. Instead, we look to the closest state law analogue: the "good samaritan" doctrine. See id. at 64-65, 76 S.Ct. at 124; Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1367. 3 As described by the Indian Towing court, this doctrine provides that one who undertakes to warn of danger, and thereby induces reliance, must perform his undertaken task in a careful manner. 350 U.S. at 64-65, 76 S.Ct. at 124.
Georgia has adopted the most common version of "good samaritan" doctrine, as set forth at Sec. 324A of the Second Restatement of Torts:
Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking. One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
See Huggins v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 245 Ga. 248, 264 S.E.2d 191 (1980). This section 324A analysis has been utilized in Georgia cases to evaluate liability of private parties for negligent safety inspection. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith, 253 Ga. 588, 322 S.E.2d 269 (1984); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Clark, 154 Ga.App. 183, 267 S.E.2d 797 (1980).
For purposes of discussion we assume the existence of all elements of "good samaritan" liability except the last three alternative requirements 4 and focus our attention on those: Did the FAA inspector's acts or omissions increase the risk of harm to future passengers, purport to perform a duty owed by the airlines to future passengers, or induce reliance by future passengers?
The FAA inspector's failure to ground the plane, issue a notice, or initiate an investigation did not increase the risk of harm under Georgia law. See Argonaut, 267 S.E.2d at 799. In Argonaut the Georgia Court of Appeals said that, for purposes of the section 324A "good samaritan" doctrine, a risk is only increased "when a nonhazardous condition is made hazardous through the negligence of a person who changed its condition or caused it to be changed." Id. The FAA inspector caused no such change in the condition of this plane or its fuel.
Nor can we say the FAA or its inspector undertook to perform a duty owed by the airline to its passengers. Whatever the FAA does or does not do, the Federal Aviation Regulations assign the chief responsibility for ensuring the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Holcombe v. United States, Civil Action No. SA-18-CV-555-XR
...of prison inmates); Dorking Genetics v. United States , 76 F.3d 1261, 1262 (2d Cir. 1996) (cattle inspections); Howell v. United States , 932 F.2d 915, 916 (11th Cir. 1991) (airline safety regulations).Notwithstanding these conceptual difficulties, the Supreme Court long ago made clear that......
-
Bragg v. United States
...United States, 49 F.3d 607 (C.A.10 1995) (mine inspections); Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (C.A.6 1994) (same); Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915 (C.A.11 1991) (inspection of airplanes). These cases all properly apply the logic of Indian Towing. Private individuals, who do not ope......
-
Zelaya v. United States
...of prison inmates); Dorking Genetics v. United States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1262 (2d Cir.1996) (cattle inspections); Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 916 (11th Cir.1991) (airline safety regulations). Notwithstanding these conceptual difficulties, the Supreme Court long ago made clear that th......
-
In re Marjory Stoneman Douglas High Sch. Shooting FTCA Litig.
...States , 49 F.3d 607 (C.A. 10 1995) (mine inspections); Myers v. United States , 17 F.3d 890 (C.A. 6 1994) (same); Howell v. United States , 932 F.2d 915 (C.A. 11 1991) (inspection of airplanes). These cases all properly apply the logic of Indian Towing . Private individuals, who do not ope......
-
Government Discretion Advised (even if It's Unconstitutional): How the Eleventh Circuit Has Expanded the United States's Immunity from Tort Suits
...150, 153 (1963). 31. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478.32. Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001).33. Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1991).34. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006); see Evergreen Marine, Ltd v. United States, 789 F. App'x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2019).35. 2......