Howland Coal & Iron Works v. Brown
| Decision Date | 13 April 1878 |
| Citation | 76 Ky. 681 |
| Parties | Howland Coal and Iron Works, & c. v. Brown. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM BOYD CRIMINAL COURT.
E. F DULIN AND O. A. WEHLE FOR APPELLANT.
1. Section 14 of " An act to establish a criminal court for the sixteenth judicial district," approved March 10 1876, conferring jurisdiction, on said criminal court, of actions by equitable proceedings, is unconstitutional because such jurisdiction has no natural connection with, and is foreign to the subject expressed in the title of the act. (Art. 2, sec. 37, Constitution of Ky.; Chiles & Thomas v Monroe, 4 Met. 75; O'Donaghue v. Akin, 2 Duv. 478; Jones v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 394; Rushing v. Sebree, 12 Bush, 199.)
2. If the criminal court had jurisdiction, it erred in refusing to transfer to the United States Circuit Court on the petition of Taussig. (Act of Congress of March 3, 1875; Acts of 1874-5, p. 470.)
3. As no judgment was asked against the corporation and Taussig, the court erred in rendering a personal judgment against them.
A. DUVALL FOR APPELLEE.
The court below properly refused to transfer to the United States Circuit Court. (Cape Girardeau & State Line R. R. v. Winston, et al., opinion by Judge Dillon, January, 1877, reported in Cen. Law Jour. of February 7, 1877).
The appellee brought the suit in equity in the Boyd Criminal Court against the Howland Coal and Iron Works, a domestic corporation, and James Taussig and Samuel Schwenk, alleging in substance that he held the note of the defendant corporation for the sum of $3,004.72, which was due and unpaid. He also alleged that the note was given in part consideration of land conveyed to the corporation; and that in consideration that he would release his lien on the land Taussig and Schwenk executed to him a guaranty that the note should be promptly paid, and he prayed judgment against them for the amount of the note, but did not demand a personal judgment against the corporation.
He further alleged that the corporation had issued its bonds for $140,000, secured by a mortgage on real estate situated in Boyd County; that the corporation was insolvent, and Taussig and Schwenk were non-residents; that they each owned large amounts of stock and mortgage-bonds of the corporation which he attempted to attach by serving an attachment on the company. He likewise alleged that the corporation had pledged with Taussig and Schwenk $4,300 of its mortgage-bonds to indemnify them against loss on account of the guaranty, and sought to subject those bonds to sale to satisfy the note.
The corporation and Taussig demurred to the jurisdiction of the court; and, their demurrers being overruled, filed answers. They averred, among other things, that the appellee in his deed conveying the land for which the note sued on was given, covenanted that he had good title to the land, and that the same was unencumbered except as to some purchase-money due to Scott and Montague; that at the time of the execution of the deed a portion of the land was encumbered for a large amount by a mortgage made by Jas. M. Rice to the " " Mutual Life Insurance Company" of Kentucky; that Rice was appellee's vendor, and that in a suit in Campbell County the mortgage had been enforced and the land adjudged to be sold. But they did not allege the amount adjudged against the land, nor offer any evidence to show what it was.
In his reply appellee in effect admitted the execution of the mortgage by Rice on a part of the land, but made an ineffectual effort to show that the mortgage was invalid, and also to show that his right was superior to that of Rice, and that therefore Rice's mortgage is no encumbrance. And he finally alleged that the judgment had been paid except the sum of $450.
December 14, 1876, Taussig's answer was filed, and February 12, 1877, he filed his petition praying the removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Kentucky district, on the ground that at the institution of the suit, and ever since, he was and had been a non-resident of the state of Kentucky; and that he had reason to believe, and did believe, that from prejudice and local influence he would not be able to obtain justice in the state courts. He gave the necessary bond, but his motion was overruled, to which he excepted.
On final hearing the court rendered a personal judgment against Taussig and the corporation for the amount of the note, and also requiring Taussig to produce in court the mortgage-bonds of the corporation pledged to him and Schwenk as indemnity against their liability on the guaranty.
There being no sufficient identification of the stock and bonds of the corporation sought to be attached as the property of Taussig and Schwenk, that branch of the case was referred to the master and continued. From those judgments this appeal is prosecuted by the corporation and Taussig.
The first question presented for decision arises out of the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to its jurisdiction of the action; and the decision of that question must depend upon the constitutionality of so much of the 14th section of the act establishing the court as attempts to confer on it jurisdiction of suits in equity. The act is entitled, " An act to create a criminal court in the 16th judicial district." (Acts 1876, vol. 1, page 48.) So much of the 14th section as is material to the question reads as follows: " The criminal court hereby created shall have jurisdiction of all actions that may be brought by equitable proceedings in circuit courts in this commonwealth."
" No law enacted by the general assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." (Sec. 37, art. 2, Constitution.) This provision has been repeatedly construed by this court. The rule established is, that none of the provisions of a statute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have a natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. ( Phillips v. Bridge Co., 2 Met. 222; L. & O. T. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. 168; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Met. 150; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. 569; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447.)
Counsel for the appellant concede that, if the title to the act had read " an act to create an equity...
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