Howsare v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk Cnty.
| Docket Number | 21-1946 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Citation | 986 N.W.2d 114 |
| Parties | Kirk HOWSARE and Austin Howsare, Petitioners, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY, Respondent. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Dean Stowers (argued) of Stowers & Nelsen PLC, West Des Moines, for petitioners.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
A magistrate issued arrest warrants for Kirk and Austin Howsare on charges of simple misdemeanor assault, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2(6) (2021). The warrants related to an incident occurring on August 13, 2021, where the defendants allegedly assaulted a woman during a business meeting by "intentionally following [her] into an elevator[,] shouting profanity and telling her she could not leave, [and] forcing [her] to redirect her exit because [she] had not provided the defendant[s] with paperwork said to be part of the business meeting." The arrest warrants provided, "No bond until initial appearance as No Contact Order is requested."
The Howsares were arrested on the afternoon of November 2 and detained in the Polk County Jail overnight. The following morning, the Howsares made their initial appearances before a district associate judge, were served with no-contact orders, posted $100 cash bond, and were released. The total time of their respective detentions did not exceed twenty-four hours.
Unhappy with what they believed to be unnecessary and unwarranted temporary detentions, the Howsares moved to dismiss their cases on the ground that the no-bond arrest warrants, arrests, and subsequent detentions were unlawful. The district court denied the motions, and we granted the Howsares’ joint petition for writ of certiorari.
"Certiorari is appropriate when a lower court or tribunal has exceeded its authority or otherwise acted illegally." State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 828 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 2013) ; see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401. "Illegality exists ... when the court has not properly applied the law." Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998). "Absent a constitutional argument, ‘we review a district court's decisions related to bail for an abuse of discretion.’ " State v. Letscher , 888 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Briggs , 666 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 2003) ). Constitutional challenges related to bail are reviewed de novo. Id.
The Howsares make several challenges to their arrests and detentions. They first contend their arrests and detentions violated their constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures as protected by the Federal and State Constitutions. They contend the no-bond arrest warrants and detentions until their initial appearances violated their state constitutional right to bail. They argue even if their arrests and detentions were constitutional, the magistrate did not have the authority to issue no-bond arrest warrants. Finally, they argue their detentions were unlawful because there was unnecessary delay in bringing them before a judge for initial appearances.
The defendants first contend their arrests and detentions until their initial appearances violated the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable seizures. As relevant here, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the ... persons or things to be seized." The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25, 27–28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 653, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The text of "[t]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is materially indistinguishable from article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution." State v. Wright , 961 N.W.2d 396, 404 n.3 (Iowa 2021).
The Howsares’ respective arrests and detentions do not violate the federal or state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures. "[A] claim challenging pretrial detention [falls] within the scope of the Fourth Amendment." Manuel v. City of Joliet , 580 U.S. 357, 364–65, 137 S.Ct. 911, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017). "[P]retrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case." Id. at 366–67, 137 S.Ct. 911. "[A] pretrial restraint on liberty is unlawful unless a judge (or grand jury) first makes a reliable finding of probable cause." Id. at 365, 137 S.Ct. 911.
Here, there was such a finding. The Polk County Attorney's Office filed complaints against the Howsares. The complaints alleged the Howsares committed an assault in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2(6). The complaints were supported by the sworn statement of a peace officer setting forth the facts and circumstances of the alleged offense. The complaints were presented to a magistrate, who found probable cause that an offense had been committed and that the defendants had committed it. The magistrate then issued the arrest warrants. The Howsares do not challenge the preliminary complaints, sworn statements, or probable cause determinations. Because the Howsares were arrested after an unchallenged finding of probable cause, their federal and state unconstitutional seizure claims fail as a matter of law. See id. at 367, 137 S.Ct. 911 ().
The Howsares argue the endorsement on the warrants delaying bond until their initial appearances violated their right to bail under article 1, section 12 of the Iowa Constitution. Article 1, section 12 provides that "[a]ll persons shall, before conviction, be bailable, by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences where the proof is evident, or the presumption great." Iowa Const. art. I, § 12. The history leading up to our founding shows "[o]ur framers chose to provide a limited right to bail in the Iowa Constitution." Briggs , 666 N.W.2d at 582. For example, this court has previously concluded the right to be bailable "by sufficient sureties" did not preclude the requirement of cash bond. Id. at 582–83. We explained "unfettered access" to bail "would be contrary to the language of our constitution and, indeed, the long history of the bail system's development and operation." Id.
Similarly, in this case, the constitutional right to "be bailable" does not require immediate, unfettered access to bail. Article 1, section 12 provides only that all persons shall be bailable "before conviction." Iowa Const. art. I, § 12. Beyond that, the text of the constitution does not set forth a particular time by which an arrestee shall be bailable. And, contrary to the Howsares’ contention, the text of the constitution certainly does not provide for or even suggest a constitutional right to be bailable before initial appearance. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the Howsares concede that the Iowa Code actually requires that persons arrested for certain offenses be held without bail prior to initial appearance. Thus, while it is certainly true that an arrestee has "a liberty interest in a prompt appearance before the [c]ourt for a first appearance and bail determination," James v. Valdez , No. Civ. 13-424 JCH/GBW, 2015 WL 13665445, at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 16, 2015), there is no general constitutional "right to release prior to first appearance," Thourtman v. Junior , 338 So.3d 207, 211 n.7 (Fla. 2022) (per curiam). See also Westerman v. Cary , 125 Wash.2d 277, 892 P.2d 1067, 1075 (1994) (en banc) (). The district court did not err in denying the Howsares challenge under article 1, section 12.
The Howsares statutory argument fares no better. The relevant statutes grant the magistrate issuing the warrant discretionary authority to impose conditions of release, including a condition that an arrestee must make an initial appearance and be served with a no-contact order. Iowa Code chapter 804 governs the issuance of warrants. Section 804.1 provides that, upon a finding of probable cause, "the magistrate shall, except as otherwise provided, issue a warrant for the arrest" of an alleged offender. Iowa Code § 804.1. If the offense is bailable, the magistrate must make an endorsement on the warrant setting forth the amount of bail or "other conditions of release." Id. § 804.3. As relevant here, the magistrate may impose other conditions of release when "the magistrate determines in the exercise of the magistrate's discretion" that unconditional release "will jeopardize the personal safety of another person or persons." Id. § 811.2(1)(a ). This discretionary authority allows the magistrate to "[i]mpose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ... the safety of another person or persons including a condition requiring ... that the defendant have no contact with the victim or other persons specified by the court." Id. § 811.2(1)(a )(5).
Despite the plain language of the statute, the Howsares deny the magistrate had any such discretion. They contend chapter 664A implicitly disallows a magistrate from delaying bond until initial appearance. Chapter 664A governs the issuance and enforcement of no-contact orders in criminal cases with an alleged victim. Section 664A.3(1) requires a no-contact order be issued at the time of initial appearance when a person is arrested for certain public offenses. Iowa Code § 664A.3(1). And Iowa Code section 664A.3(2) provides that ...
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