Hoy v. Hoy, Record No. 1447-98-1.

Decision Date02 February 1999
Docket NumberRecord No. 1447-98-1.
Citation510 S.E.2d 253,29 Va. App. 115
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals
PartiesRuth P. HOY, n/k/a Ruth E. Pearce v. Franklin W. HOY, Jr.

(Richard W. Hudgins, on brief), Newport News, for appellant.

(Vicki Beard, on brief), for appellee.

Present: BRAY and ANNUNZIATA, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Ruth E. Pearce (Pearce) appeals the decision of the circuit court denying her motion to reinstate and for entry of a proposed qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") awarding her $84,000 from the retirement plan of Franklin W. Hoy, Jr. (Hoy). Pearce contends that, because the judgment was for unpaid spousal support, she was entitled under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C §§ 1001 et seq., to seek a QDRO allowing her to recover her judgment from Hoy's pension plan. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

Under the provisions of ERISA, "benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Certain limited exceptions are carved to the anti-alienation provisions for a "qualified domestic relations order." See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). Among the requirements for a QDRO are that the order be

(ii) ... any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) which —
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community property law).

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

The parties were divorced in 1973, prior to the adoption of Code § 20-107.3. In the final decree of divorce, Pearce was awarded $600 in monthly spousal support. Pearce was not awarded any interest in Hoy's retirement plan, which the record indicates did not exist at the time of the divorce. In 1985, Pearce received a judgment in the amount of $84,000 for spousal support arrearages. In 1997, Pearce filed a motion seeking to reinstate the matter for entry of a QDRO allowing garnishment of Hoy's pension plan as a source for payment of the spousal support arrearages judgment.

Pearce's motion for entry of a QDRO to allow her to have an interest in Hoy's pension is an attempt to reopen and modify the court's final decree of divorce. That is not allowed under Virginia law. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 25 Va.App. 752, 757, 492 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1997). Rule 1:1 prohibits modification of "all final judgments, orders, and decrees" twenty-one days after the date of entry. Code § 20-107.3(K)(4) grants the court continuing jurisdiction to make "any additional orders necessary to effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to this section," and allows courts to

[m]odify any order entered in a case filed on or after July 1, 1982, intended to affect or divide any pension, profit-sharing or deferred compensation plan ... only for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the order as a qualified domestic relations order or to revise or conform its terms so as to effectuate the expressed intent of the order.

Code § 20-107.3(K)(4). However, the parties' final decree of divorce was entered prior to the effective date of Code § 20-107.3(K). By its express terms, the section does not apply to orders entered prior to July 1, 1982.

Moreover, "Code § 20-107.3(K)(4) does not empower trial courts to make substantive modifications ... in the final divorce decree...." Caudle v. Caudle, 18 Va.App. 795, 796, 447 S.E.2d 247, 248-49 (1994). When entering a QDRO, the court may not "modify a final divorce decree simply to adjust its terms in light of the...

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8 cases
  • Dalton v. Dalton
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 29, 2018
    ...court had no authority to enter an order altering or modifying the original disposition of property."); cf. Hoy v. Hoy , 29 Va.App. 115, 510 S.E.2d 253 (1999) (per curiam) ("Under Virginia domestic relations law, Pearce may not recast her claim as a judgment creditor, albeit one that seeks ......
  • Drexler v. Bruce
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • March 28, 2013
    ...funds that were awarded solely to the obligor spouse under the decree). ¶ 11On this issue, we decline to follow Hoy v. Hoy, 510 S.E.2d 253, 254-55 (Va. Ct. App. 1999), which held that using a QDRO to collect unpaid spousal support from the obligor spouse’s retirement funds constituted an im......
  • Nkopchieu v. Minlend
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2011
    ...that the circuit court committed reversible error when it found that it was constrained by this Court's decision in Hoy v. Hoy, 29 Va.App. 115, 510 S.E.2d 253 (1999). The record on appeal establishes that father has completely ignored and frustrated the trial court's child support orders—an......
  • Armstrong v. Com., Record No. 1767-97-4.
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • February 2, 1999
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Qualified Retirement Benefits
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Divorce Taxation Content
    • April 30, 2022
    ...Notwithstanding for Collection of Arrearage in Spousal Support A subsequent QDRO was held to be impermissible in Hoy v. Hoy , 29 Va. App. 115, 510 S.E.2d 253 (1999). The appellate court held that the wife’s motion for entry of a QDRO to allow her to have an interest in the husband’s pension......

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