Hoyt-Bedford Co. v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations
| Decision Date | 19 January 1960 |
| Docket Number | HOYT-BEDFORD |
| Citation | 157 A.2d 762,147 Conn. 142 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | COMPANY v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Mildred Weil, Stamford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Alphonse C. Jachimczyk, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Albert L. Coles, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).
Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.
On June 5, 1957, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 191, A.F.L.-C.I.O., hereinafter called the union, complained to the state board of labor relations, hereinafter called the board, that The Hoyt-Bedford Company, hereinafter called the company, had engaged and was engaging in unfair labor practices as defined in what is now General Statutes, § 31-105. After a hearing, the board, on December 23, 1957, found that the company had discharged three of its employees and refused to reinstate them because they had joined a union and had engaged in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, that the company discouraged membership in a union by discriminating against union members in employment and tenure, that it required its employees as a condition of employment or reinstatement in employment to refrain from joining a union and that the company refused to bargain collectively with the union as the exclusive representative of its employees. The board issued an order that the company cease and desist from these practices, that upon request it bargain with the union as the exclusive representative of its employees, and that it offer to the three employees discharged immediate reemployment without prejudice and reimburse them for any loss in wages which they might have suffered. The company appealed to the Superior Court, which sustained the board, and from that judgment the company has appealed to this court.
The following facts, recited by the board in its summary of the evidence, are substantially undisputed: The company owns and operates apartment buildings at 122-126 Hoyt Street in Stamford. These were built and financed pursuant to specifications and regulations of the federal housing administration, hereinafter called the F.H.A., and at the time herein referred to were less than three years old. The rents charged were in the middle rental range for apartments in that area. Approval of the F.H.A. was required for any increased. The company had been operating these apartments at a loss ever since they were built, although an increase in rents had been approved in September, 1956. It employed seven persons to do the maintenance and cleaning work. On December 26, 1956, as the result of an election held on December 18, 1956, the board certified the union as the exclusive representative for these workers for collective bargaining purposes. On January 8, 1957, representatives of the union and the company met and collective bargaining negotiations began. The union submitted a comprehensive agreement and the company's representative told the union's representative that any increase in wages or other benefits would have to be subject to the approval of an increase in rents by the F.H.A. The company informed the F.H.A. of the negotiations and the higher cost of maintenance which the proposed wage increases would entail. It asked for the approval of a rent increase to offset this higher cost. The F.H.A. advised the company by letter that if it signed a contract with the union it could apply for an increase in rents and the matter of approval would then be determined. While the board's summary of the evidence does not expressly so state, the same letter contained an inquiry by the F.H.A. whether an increase in rests would put the company in a poor competitive position in the rental market. The company replied that since the increase in September, 1956, there had been considerable resistance to the rents by prospective tenants and that any further increase made necessary by the union contract might put the company in the position of competing with newer and more elaborate apartments recently completed in Stamford. Further bargaining sessions were held on February 14 and 28 and April 29. On the latter date the parties had tentatively agreed to a $5 a week increase and the payment of 7 cents an hour for a welfare fund, for each employee, and that a request for a rent increase would be submitted to the F.H.A. when a complete contract was agreed upon.
From the very beginning of the construction of the buildings, the company had...
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