Springer v. Norton
| Decision Date | 27 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 16,16 |
| Citation | 32 Conn.Supp. 560,345 A.2d 590 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Beverly SPRINGER v. Nicholas NORTION, Welfare Commissioner. |
Donald L. Becker, South Norwalk, for appellant (plaintiff).
Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Nagy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing an appeal from the decision of the defendant commissioner discontinuing public assistance benefits to the plaintiff.
On or about February 21, 1974, the plaintiff, a recipient of public assistance under the federal aid to families with dependent children program (AFDC), was notified by the welfare department that her monthly assistance grant would be discontinued effective March 15, 1974, due to the presence of her husband, the children's father, in the home. That discontinuance arose out of a complaint by her landlord that the rent was overdue and that the plaintiff's husband was in the home and the landlord's statement, which later was proved false, that the lease for the apartment had been signed by both the plaintiff and her husband. The plaintiff made a timely request for a fair hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 17-2a. That hearing took place on May 6, 1974, at which time the plaintiff and her representative presented evidence to substantiate her claim. On June 13, 1974, the fair hearing officer sustained the welfare department's discontinuance of the plaintiff's assistance on the grounds that her husband was in the home and that, therefore, her children were not deprived of parental care and guidance. Under AFDC, a federal program, the presence of both parents in the home would make the plaintiff and her children ineligible for benefits.
General Statutes § 17-2b(b) provides in pertinent part that '(u)pon appeal . . . from the decision made after hearing . . . (t)he findings of the commissioner or his designated hearing officer as to the facts, if supported by substantial and competent evidence, shall be conclusive.' (Italics supplied.) The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the findings of the fair hearing officer were supported by substantial and competent evidence. A careful analysis of the evidence before the fair hearing officer brings us to the conclusion that her findings are not supported by the evidence before her.
The plaintiff appeared personally at the hearing accompanied by a representative from Norwalk Legal Services and a witness. The plaintiff submitted affidavits by herself, her husband, and the witness, all stating that the Springers had been separated for one year and that the plaintiff's husband occasionally visited her home to see the children. The husband's affidavit also stated that he lived at 31 Ilaac Street Norwalk. At the fair hearing, the plaintiff and her witness corroborated those statements under oath. In addition, the plaintiff testified that her husband liked to roam and would frequently move from place to place although he continued to use her address to receive mail. The plaintiff's representative testified that the plaintiff had filed with her office for a divorce. There was some inconsistent testimony from the plaintiff and her representative regarding the most recent visit of the plaintiff's husband to the home.
It is important to note that the commissioner's sole witness at the hearing was a case worker who gave an oral report of the evidence relied on by the commissioner in discontinuing the plaintiff's AFDC assistance. The record does not reveal whether the case worker had personal knowledge of the evidence presented in the report. His report included (1) a remark by the plaintiff's landlord to an unidentified worker at the welfare department that Mr. Springer was living in the plaintiff's home and that he had signed the lease along with the plaintiff; 1 (2) a wage report of the income maintenance unit of the welfare department which indicated that Mr. Springer had given the plaintiff's address as his own to an employer for whom he worked briefly in late January, 1974, and had claimed his six children as dependants for withholding tax purposes; (3) a memo from the resource a supervisor to the special investigations unit which had been working on the case but had not yet completed its report. 2 That memo related a conversation between the resource supervisor and the landlord at the 31 Isaac Street address which Mr. Springer claimed as his own. The landlord reportedly stated that Mr. Springer had not lived at that address for one year. Neither the plaintiff's landlord, nor the income maintenance unit worker, nor the resource supervisor, nor anyone from the special investigations unit, nor the landlord at Mr. Springer's purported address testified at the fair hearing, although those persons could have been used as corroborative witnesses.
Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 322, 307 A.2d 155, 162, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S.Ct. 903, 34 L.Ed.2d 699; see also New Canaan v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 160 Conn. 285, 289, 278 A.2d 761; L. Suzio Construction Co. v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 148 Conn. 135, 138, 168 A.2d 553; Hoyt-Bedford co. v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 147 Conn. 142, 147, 157 A.2d 762. It must afford a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can reasonably be inferred. Peters v. Shapiro, 5 Conn. Cir. 603, 606, 260 A.2d 133.
A review of the record in this case shows that the memorandum of the hearing officer falls short of the statutory standard in two ways. The findings of fact do not substantiate the conclusion reached in the memorandum, and they themselves are not founded on a competent evidentiary base.
The record indicates that the bulk of the commissioner's evidence in support of...
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