Hoyt v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 55349,55349
• Citation: 206 N.W.2d 115
• Parties: Phyllis I. HOYT, Administrator of the Estate of Peary Hoyt, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Fred Brown, Appellees. Phyllis I. HOYT, Administrator of the Estate of Peary Edward Hoyt, Deceased, Appellee, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Fred Brown, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 115

206 N.W.2d 115

Phyllis I. HOYT, Administrator of the Estate of Peary Hoyt, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Fred Brown, Appellees.

Phyllis I. HOYT, Administrator of the Estate of Peary Edward Hoyt, Deceased, Appellee, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Fred Brown, Appellant.

No. 55349.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 28, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 1973.

Nyemaster, Goode, McLaughlin, Emery & O'Brien, Des Moines, for appellant-administrator.

Gamble, Riepe, Martin, Webster & Fletcher, Des Moines, and Selby & Updegraff, Newton, for appellees-defendants.

Considered en banc.

LeGRAND, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a fatal railroad crossing accident which occurred on December 24, 1968. A 73-car freight train of Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company struck a car driven by Peary Hoyt, Jr. His adult son, Peary Edward Hoyt, was a passenger in the vehicle. Both were killed. Plaintiff brought wrongful death actions as administrator of each, suing the railroad and Fred Brown, the train's engineer. A jury verdict in favor of the passenger's estate was returned in the amount of $35,000. In the case of Peary Hoyt, Jr. (the driver) the jury found for defendant. The administrator appeals from the adverse verdict in the case of Peary Hoyt, Jr. while the defendants appeal from plaintiff's verdict in the case of Peary Edward Hoyt. We affirm on both appeals.

Fairly summarized, the evidence shows the following facts leading up to the accident. Unless otherwise indicated, our references to Hoyt refer to Peary Hoyt, Jr., the driver of the car.

Hoyt was traveling west on an unpaved road just outside the city of Newton. Defendant's train was proceeding sought. The road was 'slick' and snow-packed. Approaching the crossing, he was going up an incline. There was a cross-buck standard marking the location of the tracks but no mechanical or other signal to indicate the approach of trains. The tracks curve just before reaching the crossing.

The mishap occurred at approximately 6:30 P.M. It was dark. The train's lights were on as were those of the Hoyt car. As the two made their way toward the eventual collision, the terrain over which the operators could observe each other--to Hoyt's right and the engineer's left--was partially covered by a grove of trees, which reduced visibility to some extent.

The train crew--the engineer and the brakeman--testified they saw the Hoyt headlights when the car was 750 feet and they were approximately 1200 feet from the impact. They also said they kept the car in their sight at all times until the collision. Further testimony indicated the whistle and bell on the train were activated at a whistle post about a quarter of a mile from the crossing. Both remained in operation from then on.

The engineer testified his brakes were already partially set and his speed was 50 M.P.H. Not until Hoyt was 100 to 150 feet from the crossing did it become apparent he was not going to stop. The engineer then put the train 'on emergency' but it was too late to avoid a collision.

The front of the train struck the right side of Hoyt's car, inflicting injuries to both occupants from which they died.

In considering the errors assigned, we keep in mind the conclusions the jury must have reached. By finding for the passenger-son's estate, the jury found liability against both defendants; by rejecting the father-driver's claim, they necessarily held him guilty of contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident.

Plaintiff alleges seven errors which raise four issues. They are (1) submitting as a specification of negligence on the issue of contributory negligence Hoyt's failure to stop at the railroad crossing in compliance with section 321.341, The Code, 1966; (2) withdrawing from the jury the question of the defendant's failure to keep a proper lookout; (3) instructing the jury that in order to recover plaintiff must prove negligence against both the railroad and the engineer, Fred Brown; and (4) prejudicially repeating and emphasizing throughout the instructions duty of decedents to exercise due care.

I. The first assignment raises an issue which has never been directly ruled upon by this court. It involves an interpretation of section 321.341, which we set out as far as it is applicable here:

'Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing and warning is given by automatic signal or crossing gates * * * or otherwise of the immediate approach of a train, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than ten feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so safely. * * *'

This was an open crossing. Except for the cross-buck already mentioned, there were no signals, crossing gates, or mechanical warnings. We have already referred to the evidence that the engineer gave a warning by both bell and whistle for some distance before reaching the crossing.

Plaintiff asked that the specification of negligence claiming he was contributorily negligent for failing to stop before reaching the crossing in violation of section 321.341 be withdrawn from the jury. Plaintiff argues that statute refers only to mechanical or automatic warnings given by signal installations At the crossing and does not embrace warnings given From the train. The trial court ruled against plaintiff and submitted the issue by an instruction based on section 321.341, to which proper and timely objection was made.

The question reduces itself to a determination of the meaning of a single word--'otherwise'--as used in the statute. In resolving this issue we are obliged to give the language used its usual and ordinary meaning. We are also bound to give that construction to All of it. Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1288, 136 N.W.2d 410, 416 (1965); Monroe Community School District v. Marion County Board of Education, 251 Iowa 992, 996, 103 N.W.2d 746, 748 (1960).

We cannot agree that the section deals only with warnings physically and permanently installed at the crossing site or those given by a flagman. The statute first refers to such warnings and then goes on to embrace warnings 'otherwise' given.

We cannot say, as plaintiff would have us do, that the statutory language excludes a warning emitted by a sounding device attached to the train. If the word means anything--and we must assume it was inserted for a purpose--it is broad enough to include a warning given by train whistle or bell.

We have little authority to rely on except our own conclusion as to legislative intent; but we are satisfied the result reached reflects that intent. To hold otherwise would require us to delete the significant word 'otherwise' from this statute. Of course, we cannot do that. See In the Matter of the Estate of DeVries, 203 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 1972); Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 190 N.W.2d 583, 594, 595 (Iowa 1971).

We point out our conclusion is limited to the record now before us, where the only objection urged went to the argument that section 321.341 excludes from its terms warnings or signals given from an approaching train.

No claim was made that the bell-and-whistle signal was insufficient to give 'warning of the immediate approach of a train.' This is what the statute requires.

Whether a signal meets such a test is dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case. Plaintiff perhaps was entitled to an amplification to '(tailor) the instruction to the facts of the case.' Baker v. Wolfe, 164 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 1969); Gibbs v. Wilmeth, 261 Iowa 1015, 1021, 1022, 157 N.W.2d 93, 97 (1968). However, no such instruction was asked, and the charge as given was sufficient in the absence of a request that it be applied to the particular facts in controversy. In re Estate of Andrews, 245 Iowa 819, 829, 64 N.W.2d 261, 267 (1954); Daniels v. Bloomquist, 258 Iowa 301, 311, 138 N.W.2d 868, 874 (1965).

We hold the trial court was right in submitting this specification to the jury.

II. Plaintiff next urges us to reverse because the trial court erroneously withdrew the issue of defendant's lookout from the jury. Once more we agree with the trial court.

We have serious doubts whether the refusal to submit this specification of negligence, even if it were erroneous, could be prejudicial. The jury found defendants negligent. It is of no help to plaintiff's case to establish negligence on an additional ground; one is enough. However, plaintiff argues it is important because it could have influenced the jury's consideration of contributory negligence. Assuming this to be true--although not deciding that it is--we consider the assignment on its merits.

We have already summarized the evidence, and it is apparent there is nothing which would permit a finding defendants had failed to keep a proper lookout.

The engineer and brakeman both testified unequivocally that they first observed the Hoyt car when it was 'on the bridge'--some 750 feet from the crossing. The train was then at least 1200 feet from the point of impact. Both said they observed the car without interruption until the crash. The engineer also said he put the train 'on emergency' as soon as he saw Hoyt did not intend to stop.

Plaintiff argues the question of lookout should have been submitted despite this testimony because the jury could disbelieve what the train crew said. We concede that is true; but it wouldn't help plaintiff because there would still be no evidence of failure to keep a proper lookout.

This case is much like Strom v. Des Moines and Central Iowa Railway Co., 248 Iowa 1052, 1065, 82 N.W.2d 781, 788 (1957), where we held it was error to submit lookout under a record more favorable to plaintiff than is the one now before us. There we said:

We find no substantial evidence of this fourth charge (of failure to keep a proper lookout.) * * * (T)wo of defenda...