Hoyt v. Duluth & Iron Range Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 21 February 1908 |
| Docket Number | 15,432 - (178,179) |
| Citation | 115 N.W. 263,103 Minn. 396 |
| Parties | HERBERT H. HOYT v. DULUTH & IRON RANGE RAILROAD COMPANY; SAME v. THOMAS H. MARTIN and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Two actions in the district court for St. Louis county, one to recover $350 and the other to recover $2,000, for the conversion of certain timber. The cases were consolidated by stipulation and tried together before Dibell, J., and a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the first action for $29.66 and in the second action for $59.33. From an order denying his motion for a new trial in each case plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Conversion -- Evidence of Good Faith.
In an action to recover for the conversion of timber, the evidence considered, and held sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury to the effect that the trespasser from whom the respondents purchased the timber had acted in good faith in the belief that he had the right to cut and sell the timber and that the respondents were therefore liable only for the stumpage value.
Question for the Jury.
Whether a person acts honestly and in good faith in a certain transaction is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.
Question of Good Faith.
Whether a purchaser of standing timber from a person who claims to own or control the same and have the right to dispose of it is justified in relying upon such statements without examining the records for the purpose of discovering who is the actual owner is a question of fact, to be determined from a consideration of the conditions surrounding the parties and their present and past relations, business and personal. A person might in good faith rely upon such a statement under certain circumstances, when he would not be entitled to do so if the circumstances were otherwise. The conclusion of good or bad faith is therefore properly a question for the jury, subject to the ordinary rules which govern courts in reviewing verdicts.
John A. Keyes, for appellant.
H. B. Fryberger, for respondents.
These two cases were by stipulation of the parties consolidated and tried together, and were submitted to this court as one action. The appeal is from an order denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The actions were brought to recover for the conversion by one Hill of certain ties and pulp wood, belonging to the appellant and by Hill sold and delivered to the respondents. It appears that Hill cut the timber upon the land under an arrangement with one Massey, who represented the Price Lumber Company, which furnished the money with which Hill was doing business. It is admitted that the title to the land and timber in question was in the plaintiff, and that a trespass was committed by Hill. The respondents had nothing to do with the cutting of the timber, nor had they any knowledge that a trespass had been committed. They purchased the timber from Hill, and the question is whether Hill was a wilful trespasser, so as to render the respondents liable for the value of the timber at the time and place of its actual conversion by them.
The numerous assignments of error raised but two questions: First, the correctness of various rulings of the trial court under which evidence was received of conversations between Hill and Massey and Massey and a party named Brotherton, who assumed to control the timber, and also statements of Hill and Massey to the effect that they believed they had the right to cut the timber; second, the sufficiency of the evidence upon the issue of good faith.
1. The answer alleged that Hill committed the trespass innocently and inadvertently, while using proper care to ascertain the exact line between the plaintiff's land and the land upon which the defendants were entitled to cut the timber. Upon the trial this line of defense seems to have been abandoned, and evidence was received which tended to show certain conversations from which the jury was asked to infer that the defendants and Hill had acted in good faith. The trial court states that the issue of good faith was litigated by consent. This is denied by the appellant; but the issue is immaterial, as the evidence was admissible under the pleadings.
Good faith, in an action of this nature, is not a defense. It is matter in mitigation of damages only, and therefore need not be pleaded. Hoxsie v. Empire Lumber Co., 41 Minn 548, 43 N.W. 476. Wilfulness is implied from the trespass, and the burden is on the trespasser to show that the trespass was not wilful. Hastay v. Bonness, 84 Minn. 120, 86 N.W. 896. It is wholly a matter of...
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