Hoyt v. N.H. Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1942 |
| Citation | 29 A.2d 121 |
| Parties | HOYT et al. v. NEW HAMPSHIRE FIRE INS. CO. and five other cases. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Transferred from Superior Court, Cheshire County; Johnston, Judge.
Actions in assumpsit by Ernest E. Hoyt and others against New Hampshire Fire Insurance Company, Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company, the Boston Insurance Company, the American Eagle Fire Insurance Company, the Niagara Fire Insurance Company, and against the Franklin Fire Insurance Company to recover on fire policies issued by each of the defendants, and covering property owned by the plaintiffs as tenants in common. A question of law was transferred by trial court in advance of trial.
Question answered and case discharged.
Assumpsit, on six fire insurance policies, to recover for a loss which occurred on September 1, 1940. Each policy insured Ernest E. Hoyt, Ernest L. Hoyt and Walter J. Jacobsen, who were tenants in common of the property covered by the policies. The fire which destroyed the property was intentionally set by Ernest L. Hoyt, who has pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with arson. There is no evidence that either of the other plaintiffs had any guilty knowledge of the fire.
In advance of trial, Johnston, J., transferred the following question of law: Can there be any recovery by Ernest E. Hoyt, Ernest L. Hoyt or Walter J. Jacobsen, or any of them, upon the above policies in the absence of evidence that either Ernest E. Hoyt or Walter J. Jacobsen had any guilty knowledge of the fire or were in any way implicated in its setting?
William H. Watson, of Keene, for plaintiffs.
Thorp & Branch and Frederick W. Branch, both of Manchester, for defendants.
While it is essential to the existence of a fire insurance policy that the party insured should have some interest in the subject matter of the insurance (Prince v. Granite Fire Insurance Co., 86 N.H. 160, 164 A. 765, and cases cited), it is not necessary that the extent of the insured's interest be set forth in the policy (Clark v. Ætna Insurance Co., 87 N.H. 353, 179 A. 352). Thus, 3 Joyce, Insurance, 2d Ed., § 1691, and cases cited.
The defendants concede that each of the plaintiffs might have insured his interest in the common property separately, and that if that had been done, those plaintiffs who had no "guilty knowledge of the fire" would be entitled to recover. They contend, however, that there can be no recovery in the present actions since the plaintiffs have not so insured their individual interests but are jointly named in each of the policies in suit, and that since this is so, the violation of a condition of the policies by one of the three plaintiffs binds the other two.
The mere fact that the language employed may be sufficient to "express a joint covenant" is not conclusive. 1 Williston, Con., § 325. See, also, Wills v. Cutler, 61 N.H. 405, 410. Whether the rights of obligees are joint or several is a question of construction (1 Williston, Con., § 325), and in construing an insurance contract the test is not what the insurance company intended the words of the policy to mean but what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood them to mean. Watson v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 83 N.H. 200, 202, 140 A. 169; Cartier v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 84 N.H. 526, 527, 153 A. 6; Studley Box, etc., Co. v. National Fire Insurance Co., 85 N.H. 96, 101, 154 A. 337, 75 A.L.R. 248; Duhaime v. Prudential Insurance Co., 86 N.H. 307, 308, 167 A. 269; Trepanier v. Mercantile Insurance Co., 88 N.H. 118, 122, 184 A. 866, 185 A. 656; Penn, etc., Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 88 N.H. 351, 354, 189 A. 345; Merchants, etc., Co. v. Lambert, 90 N.H. 507, 510, 11 A.2d 361, 127 A.L.R. 483.
The ordinary person owning an undivided interest in property, not versed in the nice distinctions of insurance law, would naturally suppose that his individual interest in the property was covered by a policy which named him without qualification as one of the persons insured. And the fact that...
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