HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n v. Fane (In re MF Global Inc.)

• Citation: 466 B.R. 244
• Decision Date: 07 March 2012
• Docket Number: Adversary No. 11–02924 (MG).,Bankruptcy No. 11–2790 (MG) SIPA.
• Parties: In re MF GLOBAL INC., Debtor.HSBC Bank USA, National Association, Interpleader Plaintiff, v. Jason Fane and James W. Giddens, in his capacity as Trustee for MF Global Inc., Interpleader Defendants.
• Court: United States Bankruptcy Courts. Second Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of New York

466 B.R. 244

In re MF GLOBAL INC., Debtor.HSBC Bank USA, National Association, Interpleader Plaintiff,

v.Jason Fane and James W. Giddens, in his capacity as Trustee for MF Global Inc., Interpleader Defendants.

Bankruptcy No. 11–2790 (MG) SIPA.

Adversary No. 11–02924 (MG).

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York.

March 7, 2012.

Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, By: James B. Kobak, Jr., Esq., Christopher K. Kiplok, Esq., Jeffrey S. Margolin, Esq., Dina R. Hoffer, Esq., New York, NY, for James W. Giddens, Trustee for the SIPA Liquidation of MF Global Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

MARTIN GLENN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019(a) for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement Agreement to Approve Settlement Agreement (the “ Motion ”), filed by James W. Giddens (the “ Trustee ”), as trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of MF Global Inc. (the “ Debtor ” or “ MFGI ”). (ECF Doc. # 7.) ¹ The Motion seeks approval of a settlement agreement (the “ Settlement Agreement ”) among HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“ HSBC ”), Jason Fane (“ Fane ”), and the Trustee (collectively, the “ Parties ”) regarding the ownership and distribution of physical property (specifically, five gold bars and fifteen silver bars) (the “ Property ”). No objections have been filed to the Motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion.

BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2012, this Court issued an order establishing a process by which former MF Global, Inc. (“MFGI”) customers claiming property in the form of physical assets ( i.e., warehouse receipts, precious metal certificates, shipping certificates) and the Trustee would attempt to reconcile any alleged incorrect accounting with respect to the quantity and type of physical property held by the Trustee prior to the scheduled liquidation date of such property on January 31, 2012. (ECF Doc. # 867).

At all times prior to the filing date through the present, HSBC has been in possession of, and has not had any ownership interest in, the Property. HSBC received competing claims to the Property from the Trustee and Fane; therefore, HSBC filed an interpleader complaint to request the Court to determine ownership of the Property. The Trustee, HSBC, and Fane have resolved the issues regarding Fane's Property, and the Motion seeks the Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement that reflects that resolution.

DISCUSSION

Prior to October 31, 2011, the filing date of these SIPA liquidation proceedings, Fane took delivery through an MFGI customer trading account, of five gold futures contracts and three silver futures contracts relating to five gold bars and fifteen silver bars being held by HSBC. Also prior to the filing date, Fane requested that the Property be transferred from HSBC to Fane's Brink's account (the “ Brink's Account ”). Based on the stipulated facts described below, the Property never entered the Trustee's control of the MFGI's liquidation estate created on the filing date.

Because the Trustee has reviewed MFGI's books and records and now acknowledges that the Property is not part of the MFGI estate, the Trustee has instructed HSBC to release the Property to Fane at Fane's cost within ten days upon this Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement. Also pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Parties will exchange general, mutual releases of all claims relating to the Property and the adversary proceeding will be dismissed with prejudice.

A. Legal Standard for Rule 9019 Settlements

Settlements and compromises are favored in bankruptcy as they minimize costly litigation and further parties' interests in expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate. Myers v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir.1996). Under Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “ Bankruptcy Rules ”), the court has the authority to “approve a compromise or settlement.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019(a). A court must determine that a settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is fair, equitable, and in the best interests of the estate before it may approve a settlement. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 134 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991) (citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S.Ct. 1157, 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968)); see also Topwater Exclusive Fund III, LLC v. SageCrest II, LLC (In re SageCrest II), Nos. 3:10cv978 (SRU), 3:10cv979 (SRU), 2011 WL 134893, at *8–9 (D.Conn. Jan. 14, 2011); Cousins v. Pereira (In re Cousins), No. 09 Civ. 1190(RJS), 2010 WL 5298172, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010); In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 593–94 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2010); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, 435 B.R. 122, 134 (S.D.N.Y.2010).

A courts responsibility is to “canvass the issues and see whether the settlement falls below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.” In re Chemtura, 439 B.R. at 594 (quoting In re W.T. Grant, Co., 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir.1983)) (internal quotations omitted). However, the court is not required to go so far as to conduct a trial on the terms to approve a settlement. Id. Before making a determination, however, the court must inform itself of “all facts necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated.” O'Connell v. Packles (In re Hilsen), 404 B.R. 58, 70 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424, 88 S.Ct. 1157) (internal quotations omitted). Although courts have discretion to approve settlements, the business judgment of the debtor in recommending the settlement should be factored into the courts analysis. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commcns Operating LLC (In re Charter Commcns.), 419 B.R. 221, 252 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009). “At the same time, a court may not simply defer to a debtor in possessions judgment, but must independently evaluate the reasonableness of the settlement.” In re Rosenberg, 419 B.R. 532, 536 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2009) (citations omitted). In addition, courts may give weight to the opinion of bankruptcy counsel supporting the settlement. Id. (“In [approving the settlement agreement], the court is permitted to rely upon ‘opinions of the trustee, the parties, and their attorneys.’ ”); Chemtura, 439 B.R. at 594.

To that end, courts have developed standards to evaluate if a settlement is fair and equitable and identified factors for approval of settlements based on the original framework announced in TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 390 U.S. 414, 88 S.Ct. 1157, 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968). The Second Circuit outlined the test for consideration of settlements under the Bankruptcy Rules in Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir.2007). The factors to be considered are interrelated and require the court to evaluate:

(1) the balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's future benefits; (2) the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, “with its attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay,” including the difficulty in collecting on the judgment; (3) “the paramount interests of the creditors,” including each affected class's relative benefits “and the degree to which creditors either do not object to or affirmatively support the proposed settlement;” (4) whether other parties in interest support the settlement; (5) the “competency and experience of counsel” supporting, and “[t]he experience and knowledge of the bankruptcy court judge” reviewing, the settlement; (6) “the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and directors;” and (7) “the extent to which the settlement is the product of arm's length bargaining.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). The burden is on the settlement proponent to persuade the court that the settlement is in the best interests of the estate. See 8 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 3d § 167:2 (3d ed. 2011).

B. Legal Standard for Distribution of Physical Property

MFGI was both a futures commission merchant (“ FCM ”) and a securities broker-dealer before it was placed into liquidation and is thus subject to two separate regulatory regimes: SIPA and the Commodities Exchange Act (the “ CEA ”). Under both regimes, customers are entitled to a pro rata share of the applicable pools of customer property from separate customer account classes. As an FCM, MFGI was required by the CEA and Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the “ CFTC ”) regulations (the “ Part 190 Regulations ”) to segregate or secure funds and property held for its commodity futures customers. Determining commodity customers' claims to customer property incorporates the interplay of the Bankruptcy Code, the CEA and 17 C.F.R. § 190, within the context of a SIPA liquidation.

The CFTC's Part 190 Regulations guide trustees and assist courts in implementing the CEA and subchapter IV of title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 17 C.F.R. § 190 et seq. Those regulations: (1) define what constitutes customer property, see 17 C.F.R. § 190.08; (2) establish a system of customer classes and account classes, which ensures a fair and orderly process of pro rata distribution, see id. §§ 190.01(a), (m), (bb), & (hh); and (3) provide a formula for calculating allowable “net equity claims,” id. § 190.07.

As explained below, according to the Part 190 Regulations, “[t]he property of the debtor's estate must be allocated among account classes and between customer classes....” 17 C.F.R. § 190.08 (emphasis added). Inherent in this distribution scheme is the initial determination that the property in question is indeed “property of the debtor's estate.” If the property in question was not “property of the debtor's estate” on the filing date, then such property is not subject to the distribution scheme for specifically identifiable property (“ SIP ”) pursuant to the Part 190 Regulations. This necessarily must be the...