Huang v. Lee

• Decision Date: 05 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-CV-1279.,89-CV-1279.
• Citation: 734 F. Supp. 71
• Parties: Suliao Zhou HUANG, as administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits which were of Rodger Huang, a/k/a Chang Huang, a/k/a Roger Wong, deceased, and Suliao Zhou Huang, Plaintiffs, v. Frank LEE and Janny Lee, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

734 F. Supp. 71

Suliao Zhou HUANG, as administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits which were of Rodger Huang, a/k/a Chang Huang, a/k/a Roger Wong, deceased, and Suliao Zhou Huang, Plaintiffs, v. Frank LEE and Janny Lee, Defendants.

No. 89-CV-1279.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

April 5, 1990.

Stanley J. Kaufman, Brooklyn, N.Y., for plaintiffs.

Callan, Regenstreich & Koster, New York City (Warren S. Koster, of counsel), for defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

BARTELS, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Suliao Zhou Huang, ("Plaintiff"), a New York domiciliary and administratrix of the estate of her son, Rodger Huang ("Huang"), sues for her son's conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death arising out of two causes of action based upon an unfortunate incident which occurred at the New Jersey home of Frank and Janny Lee (the "Defendants"). The event occurred sometime between the evening of December 30, 1987, and the early morning hours of December 31, 1987. Huang had accepted an invitation from his uncle, Frank Lee, to spend the night at the Lee's home in Closter, New Jersey. Due to the crowded conditions, Huang, along with other guests, slept on the floor, near the heater, in the living room. On the morning of the 31st, the Defendants awoke to a malodorous smell and discovered Huang, unconscious, lying on the living room floor. The local police were summoned and pronounced Huang dead. According to the autopsy findings, Huang succumbed as a result of carbon monoxide intoxication. At the time of his death, Huang, a college student, lived in New York with his parents.

Defendants move for a pre-trial ruling regarding two choice-of-law questions. Specifically, the Court is asked to determine, in this multistate tort action, whether (a) New York or New Jersey standard of care governs the issue of liability where a guest from New York is injured at the home of a New Jersey domiciliary; and (b) New York or New Jersey law determines the damages permissible in a wrongful death action brought by a New York domiciliary on behalf of the estate of her child.

DISCUSSION

A. LIABILITY FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING

Different standards of care have been adopted by New York and New Jersey with respect to the duty of care an occupier of land owes to third persons coming thereon. New Jersey continues to adhere to the traditional common law view that the duty is determined according to the status of such third persons, i.e., invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 311-312, 153 A.2d 1 (1959).¹ New York, on the other hand, abandoned this approach and instead adopted a rule whereby the land owner's conduct is governed by a single standard of reasonable care.² Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976).

Historically, New York³ resolved choice-of-law conflicts in multistate tort actions by applying the law of the place of the wrong; in other words, the immutable principle of lex loci delicti governed. This remains the general rule today unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Zangiacomi v. Saunders, 714 F.Supp. 658, 662 (S.D.N.Y.1989); Kohn v. United States, 591 F.Supp. 568, 572 (E.D.N.Y.1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.1985); Cooperman v. Sunmark Industries Division of Sun Oil Co. of Pa., 529 F.Supp. 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442, 376 N.E.2d 914, 915 (1978); Rakaric v. Croation Cultural Club, 76 A.D.2d 619, 430 N.Y.S.2d 829, 835 (2d Dept.1980). New Jersey law would apply under lex loci delicti since Huang's injuries occurred at the Defendants' New Jersey home.

This determination may be changed if extraordinary circumstances, i.e. the place of the wrong is merely fortuitous or New York residents require protection from unfair and anachronistic treatment, warrant application of another jurisdiction's law. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1963); Zangiacomi, 714 F.Supp. at 662.

To determine whether or not the situs of the injury was fortuitous, New York courts have "traditionally ... distinguished fixed location from transient (fortuitous) cases ... and in fixed cases, they often place greater emphasis on the law of the situs of the tort." Zangiacomi, 714 F.Supp. at 662 (citations omitted). This is not a case in which the place of the wrong is purely fortuitous. Unlike the airplane or automobile passenger, whose relationship with the state in which the injury occurs may be very tenuous, Huang, sleeping bag in tow, crossed the Hudson River, into New Jersey, for the specific purpose of spending the night at the Defendants' home. He had a very direct and substantial nexus with New Jersey. Factual similarities appear in this case and Zangiacomi (New York resident injured while working in Connecticut—Connecticut law applied to determine homeowner's liability), and Gray v. Busch Entertainment Corp., 886 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1989) (vacationing New York resident injured at amusement park in Virginia—Virginia contributory negligence standard applied), wherein the court held that the injured party's presence in the state at the time of the accident was not fortuitous.

Nor is the Court presented with a scenario in which a New York resident needs protection from unfair or anachronistic treatment. Zangiacomi, 714 F.Supp. at 662 (citing Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 748, 191 N.E.2d at 282; Gray, 886 F.2d at 16.) In Gray, the Second Circuit found that applying Virginia's law to a New York resident-plaintiff was neither unfair nor anachronistic, despite the fact that under Virginia's contributory negligence rule⁴ the plaintiff might be denied recovery. While the standards of care differ in this case, and New York's rule may arguably be more Plaintiff oriented, application of New Jersey's law neither bars the cause of action nor does it preordain a verdict in favor of the Defendants. Consequently, the result would not be unfair or anachronistic. Zangiacomi, 714 F.Supp. at 663. Since the place of the injury was not fortuitous and the application of New Jersey's law would be neither unfair nor anachronistic, it would be unjustified to depart from the rule of lex loci and impose New York's standard of care.

Realizing that the indiscriminate application of lex loci could result in harsh and illogical results New York adopted interest analysis as an alternative means to resolve choice-of-law problems. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279. Under interest analysis "controlling effect is given to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation." Id. 240 N.Y. S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283. Assuming this Court found that extraordinary circumstances were present and applied interest analysis, it would inexorably reach the same conclusion—New Jersey law would govern.

While it has not always been easy to determine which jurisdiction has the greatest interest, certain principles have been established which enable the Court to reach a conclusion. For instance, in tort cases, "the significant contacts are, almost exclusively, the parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort." Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 195, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 95, 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (1985). Furthermore, "the relative interests of the domicile and the locus jurisdictions in having their laws apply will depend on the particular tort issue in conflict" ... and when the rules involve standards of conduct⁵ "the law of the place of the tort `will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive concern'". Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d at 284); Murphy v. Acme Markets, Inc., 650 F.Supp. 51, 53 (E.D.N.Y.1986); Cameron v. G & H Steel Serv. Inc., 494 F.Supp. 171, 173 (E.D.N.Y.1980). See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 comment d, at 417-418 (1971) ("subject to only rare exceptions, the local law of the state where the conduct and injury occurred will be applied to determine whether the actor satisfied minimum standards of acceptable conduct").

This case presents the paradigm situation for application of New Jersey's law since (1) New Jersey is the situs of the alleged wrongful acts; and (2) New Jersey has the predominant interest in regulating the conduct of its property owners, and its law should govern where the issue is the liability of a New Jersey landowner with respect to injuries sustained by third persons on his property.

Plaintiff argues⁶ that a house guest's luggage also carries with it his domiciliary state's standard of care. If this were so, the Defendants could be subject to numerous different standards of care. At the same time such a theory would undermine "the locus jurisdiction's interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on it to govern their primary conduct." Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 198, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96, 480 N.E.2d at 684-85. Under Plaintiff's formulation, the Defendants would have to familiarize themselves with the standards of care of each of their guests domiciles and adjust their conduct accordingly. The Court rejects such a theory. It also rejects Plaintiff's contention that New York law should govern because it establishes a higher standard of conduct, thereby affording greater protection to New York residents who visit other states, such as Huang. "By entering the state or nation, the visitor exposes himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject persons living there to a hazard that their law has not created." D.F. Cavers, The Choice-Of-Law Process (1965).

B. WRONGFUL DEATH

It seems only logical that the Court predicate its decision with respect to the measure of damages in a wrongful death action upon interest analysis. The Court so reasons...