Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.

• Citation: 491 N.Y.S.2d 90,65 N.Y.2d 189,480 N.E.2d 679
• Parties: , 480 N.E.2d 679 Richard E. SCHULTZ, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Christopher Schultz, Deceased, and as Father and Natural Guardian of Richard Schultz, et al., Appellants, v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 90

491 N.Y.S.2d 90

65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679

Richard E. SCHULTZ, Individually and as Administrator of the

Estate of Christopher Schultz, Deceased, and as

Father and Natural Guardian of Richard

Schultz, et al., Appellants, v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 30, 1985.

David Jaroslawicz, New York City, for appellants.

Franklin N. Meyer, New York City, for Boy Scouts of America, Inc., respondent.

William P. Ford and Stuart C. Levene, New York City, for Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc., respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Richard E. and Margaret Schultz, instituted this action to recover damages for personal injuries they and their sons, Richard and Christopher, suffered because the boys were sexually abused by defendant Edmund Coakeley and for damages sustained as a result of Christopher's wrongful death after he committed suicide. Coakeley, a brother in the Franciscan order, was the boys' school teacher and leader of their scout troop. Plaintiffs allege that the sexual abuse occurred while Coakeley was acting in those capacities and the causes of action before us on this appeal charge defendants Boy Scouts of America, Inc., and the Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc. (sued as Franciscan Brothers of the Poor, Inc.), with negligently hiring and supervising him.

Plaintiffs are domiciled in New Jersey and some of the injuries were sustained there. Thus, a choice-of-law issue is presented because New Jersey recognizes the doctrine of charitable immunity and New York does not. Defendants contend New Jersey law governs this litigation and that its courts have already determined that plaintiffs' claims are barred in a separate action against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark (see, Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531). Following the rationale of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279), and similar cases, we hold that New Jersey law applies and that plaintiffs are precluded from relitigating its effect on the claims they assert.

I

In 1978 plaintiffs were residents of Emerson, New Jersey, where their two sons, Richard, age 13, and Christopher, age 11, attended Assumption School, an institution owned and operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark. By an agreement with the Archdiocese, defendant Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc., supplied teachers for the school. One of those assigned was Brother Edmund Coakeley, who also served as the scoutmaster of Boy Scout Troop 337, a locally chartered Boy Scout troop sponsored and approved by defendant Boy Scouts of America. Richard and Christopher attended Coakeley's class and were members of his scout troop.

In July 1978 Coakeley took Christopher Schultz to Pine Creek Reservation, a Boy Scout camp located in upstate New York near the Oneida County community of Foresport. The camp was located on land owned by Peter Grandy, who was also a resident of Emerson, New Jersey. ¹ The complaint alleges that while at the camp, Coakeley sexually abused Christopher, that he continued to do so when Christopher returned to Assumption School in New Jersey that fall and that he threatened Christopher with harm if he revealed what had occurred. The complaint also alleges that Coakeley sexually abused Richard Schultz and made similar threats to him during a scout trip to Pine Creek Reservation on Memorial Day weekend in 1978. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of Coakeley's acts both boys suffered severe psychological, emotional and mental pain and suffering and that as a result of the distress Coakeley's acts caused, Christopher Schultz committed suicide by ingesting drugs on May 29, 1979. They charge both defendants with negligence in assigning Coakeley to positions of trust where he could molest young boys and in failing to dismiss him despite actual or constructive notice that Coakeley had previously been dismissed from another Boy Scout camp for similar improper conduct.

The complaint contains four causes of action. In the first two, plaintiff Richard E. Schultz, as administrator of Christopher's estate, seeks damages for Christopher's wrongful death and for his psychological, emotional and physical injuries prior to death. In the third cause of action, plaintiff Richard E. Schultz, suing as father and natural guardian, seeks damages for similar personal injuries on behalf of his son Richard. In the fourth cause of action, plaintiffs seek damages for their own injuries, including destruction of their family life, expenditures for medical and psychological care and treatment, mental anguish and psychological injuries.

After answering, defendants moved for summary judgment, urging that plaintiffs' claims were barred by New Jersey's charitable immunity statute (N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:53A-7) and that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the application of the statute because of the prior New Jersey judgment. In opposition, plaintiffs contended that under applicable choice-of-law principles, New York should apply its law, not that of New Jersey, and, alternatively, that even if the New Jersey charitable immunity statute applies under choice-of-law rules, the New York courts should refuse to enforce it on public policy grounds. Special Term granted defendants' motions, severing plaintiffs' causes of action and dismissing the complaint against them on collateral estoppel grounds, implicitly finding New Jersey law applicable. A divided Appellate Division affirmed.

II

A

The choice-of-law question presented in the action against defendant Boy Scouts of America is whether New York should apply its law in an action involving codomiciliaries of New Jersey when tortious acts were committed in New York. This is the posture of the appeal although defendant is a Federally chartered corporation created exclusively for educational and charitable purposes pursuant to an act of Congress (see, 36 U.S.C. § 21) that originally maintained its national headquarters in New Brunswick, New Jersey, but moved to Dallas, Texas, in 1979. New Jersey is considered defendant's domicile because its national headquarters was in that State (see, Rosenbaum v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2 How.Prac. [NS] 45, affd. 100 N.Y. 617; 13 NY Jur.2d, Business Relationships, § 146, at 421). Its change of domicile after the commission of the wrongs from New Jersey to Texas, which no longer recognizes the doctrine of charitable immunity (see, Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 [Tex 1971] ), provides New York with no greater interest in this action than it would have without the change. Our decision recognizing a postaccident change in domicile in Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877, is distinguishable because in that case the defendant's domicile was changed to New York, which was the forum and also the plaintiff's domicile.

The question presented in the action against defendant Franciscan Brothers is what law should apply when the parties' different domiciles have conflicting charitable immunity rules. The Franciscan order is incorporated in Ohio and it is a domiciliary of that State (see, Sease v. Central Greyhound Lines, 306 N.Y. 284, 286, 117 N.E.2d 899; 13 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Business Relationships, § 142, at 416-417). At the time these causes of action arose Ohio, like New Jersey, recognized charitable immunity (see, Williams v. First United Church, 40 Ohio App.2d 187, 318 N.E.2d 562, affd. 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924 [1973]; Gibbon v. Young Women's Christian Assn., 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 [1960]; but see, Albritton v. Neighborhood Centers Assn. for Child Dev., 12 Ohio St.3d 210, 466 N.E.2d 867 [1984] [abolishing common-law doctrine of charitable immunity for nonhospital charities] ). The Ohio rule denied immunity in actions based on negligent hiring and supervision, however (see, Gibbon v. Young Women's Christian Assn., supra ), whereas New Jersey does not (see, Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531, supra ). For this reason, no doubt, defendant Franciscan Brothers does not claim Ohio law governs and the choice is between the law of New York and the law of New Jersey.

As for the locus of the tort, both parties and the dissent implicitly assume it is New York because most of Coakeley's acts were committed here. Under traditional rules, the law of the place of the wrong governs all substantive issues in the action (see, Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268, 158 N.E.2d 128), but when the defendant's negligent conduct occurs in one jurisdiction and the plaintiff's injuries are suffered in another, the place of the wrong is considered to be the place where the last event necessary to make the actor liable occurred (see, Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62; Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692; Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F.2d 970 [2d Cir.] ). Thus, the locus in this case is determined by where the plaintiffs' injuries occurred.

The first and fourth causes of action, the wrongful death of Christopher and plaintiffs' own psychological and other injuries respectively, allege injuries inflicted in New Jersey. New York's only interests in these claims are as the forum State and as the jurisdiction where the tortious conduct underlying plaintiffs' claims against defendants, i.e., the negligent assignment and failure to dismiss Coakeley, occurred. Standing alone, these interests are insufficient to warrant application of New York law, at least when the relevant issue is a loss-distribution rule, like charitable immunity, rather than one regulating conduct (cf. Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 342-343, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513, 213 N.E.2d 796). The second and third causes of action seek damages for the psychological, emotional and physical injuries suffered by Christopher and Richard...