Hubbard v. State
| Decision Date | 09 June 1904 |
| Citation | 72 Neb. 62,100 N.W. 153 |
| Parties | HUBBARD v. STATE. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
1. A court of equity will not interfere for the purpose of granting a new trial in a criminal case on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
2. The district court possesses no inherent or common-law power to grant new trials in criminal cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence at a subsequent term to that at which a verdict of guilty was found.
3. The authority and jurisdiction of the district courts to grant new trials in criminal cases are derived from the statute, to which resort must be had in determining the extent of their powers regarding the subject.
4. The provisions of sections 490-492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the granting of new trials in criminal cases on the ground of newly discovered evidence are the exclusive source of power of the district court to grant such new trials.
5. The provisions of section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizing the granting of new trials in civil actions at a subsequent term to that at which the judgment was rendered, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, are not applicable to the granting of new trials in criminal cases.
Proceeding by Melvin G. Hubbard for new trial. Judgment for the state, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.J. H. Broady, and W. L. Henderson, for plaintiff in error.
W. D. Funk and Frank N. Prout, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff, in the district court of Knox county, was duly prosecuted and convicted of the crime of rape upon a female under the age of consent, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of seven years. From the judgment of conviction, error proceedings were prosecuted in this court, resulting in an affirmance of the judgment rendered in the trial court. Hubbard v. State, 65 Neb. 805, 91 N. W. 869. In the same court, and at a subsequent term to that at which the conviction was had, the plaintiff commenced proceedings, by the filing of a petition and the issuance of summons; the object and purpose being to secure a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. In the main, the newly discovered evidence consisted of statements and declarations under oath since made by the prosecutrix and her father to the effect that the former was at the time of the alleged offense over the age of 15 years; both having testified on the trial that she was under that age. There was also some new evidence offered tending to show that the prosecutrix was, previously to the time of the act charged, of unchaste character, which fact, in connection with evidence as to her being over 15 years old, would, under the statute, if proven, establish a perfect defense to the crime of which the plaintiff was convicted. We refer to the character of the newly discovered evidence on which a new trial is sought only in a general way. Without determining its sufficiency, had the application for a new trial been seasonably presented, we shall for present purposes assume its sufficiency, and address ourselves to a consideration and discussion of the authority and jurisdiction of the district court to grant a new trial upon the application as made, and at the time presented.
The Code of Criminal Procedure (sections 490-492) contains provisions, complete in all respects, authorizing and regulating new trials in criminal cases. Under these provisions, however, the application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is required to be made at the same term at which the verdict of guilty is rendered, and on all other grounds upon which new trials may be granted at the same term, and within three days of the rendition of the verdict, unless unavoidably prevented. Ex parte Holmes, 21 Neb. 324, 32 N. W. 69;Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 240, 47 N. W. 851.In the latter case it is said: Citing Bradshaw v. State, 19 Neb. 644, 28 N. W. 323, and Ex parte Holmes, supra.
Are the above-mentioned sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure exclusive? Counsel for plaintiff say they are not, and that resort may be had to other sources of power for the authority which it is asked shall be exercised in the case at bar. Counsel say: “We shall contend that a court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to administer justice in such a case, and, if need be, will apply section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure to such a case.” We do not understand counsel as arguing that the general equity jurisdiction of the district courts can be invoked for the purpose of obtaining a new trial in a criminal case, nor is it believed that respectable authority can be cited in support of the proposition. The plaintiff seeks only a new trial. Not because he is, beyond peradventure of doubt, innocent and the victim of a miscarriage of justice, but on the ground that the new evidence which he has discovered raises a reasonable probability that a second trial may result in a verdict different from the first; that, with the additional evidence, a jury might entertain a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the crime charged, and therefore acquit. But a court of equity cannot try issues arising in the prosecution of a criminal indictment, and the judgment therein would be unenforceable. Equity can neither prevent the commission of crimes, interfere with their prosecution, nor pardon a punishment. Eaton's Equity Jurisprudence, 28. In Paulson v. State, 25 Neb. 344-347, 41 N. W. 250, the rule is stated to be that “the doctrine that courts of equity cannot grant relief against judgments in criminal cases has long since been established, and cannot be questioned.” Citing Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371; Attorney General v. Cleaver, 18 Ves. 211; Mayor v. Pilkington, 2 Atk. 302; Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 893. It is not to be doubted that the rule as thus stated is the correct one, and it applies with the same force to the case at bar that it does to the case cited, and in which enunciated.
We find no authority for saying the district court possesses the inherent or common-law power to grant a new trial in a criminal case, outside of statutory authority, as justice may demand. The authorities point rather to the contrary. In Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220, it is declared in the headnotes that “at common law courts had no power to grant new trials in cases of felony, and it was held that they had no power to revise or correct their judgments in such cases.” In the opinion it is said by Maxwell, J.: “At common law the finding of the jury of the guilt of the accused was conclusive of that fact, and the court possessed no power to set the verdict aside and grant a new trial on the merits of the motion of the accused, even where the verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence.” Citing Hilliard, New Trials, 114; Queen v. Bertrand, 1 P. C. 520; The King v. Fowler, 4 Barn. & Ald. 275; 1 Ch. C. L. 653. And continues the author: “Therefore the utmost caution was required in capital trials, in favor of life, and if irregularity materially affecting the trial occurred, to the injury of the accused, the court usually represented such matter to the crown, and a pardon was granted.” Citing Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 534. The authority of the district courts to grant new trials in criminal cases, and especially after the term at which a conviction is had, must, we think, if existent, be found in the statute; and, if...
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