Hubbs v. Edmond
| Decision Date | 10 July 1936 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | HUBBS v. EDMOND. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Kenneth Wynne, Judge.
Action by Marion Hubbs against Carl A. Edmond to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the reckless disregard of the rights of plaintiff. From a judgment on verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Error and new trial ordered.
In guest's action against driver of automobile, which was crowded off traffic lane in circle at intersection of five streets by another automobile which entered circle from right making turn in front of automobile in which guest was riding instruction that there was a statute, without instruction as to application, requiring drivers to signal before changing direction, was error, since jury should have been informed that, if other driver intended to change direction, statute would apply automatically. Gen.St.1930, § 1628 (repealed); § 1644 (Rev.1949, § 2494).
Joseph F. Berry and Julius G. Day, Jr., both of Hartford, for appellant.
Robert P. Butler and Leon Riscassi, both of Hartford, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.
On April 28, 1935, at about 1:45 a. m., the plaintiff was riding as a guest in an automobile owned and driven by the defendant. The automobile ran into a tree on the north side of Capitol Avenue near Lafayette Circle in Hartford and the plaintiff received injuries. She brought an action against the defendant, claiming that her injuries were caused by his heedless and reckless disregard of her rights in violation of the " Guest Statute." General Statutes, § 1628. The case was tried to the jury, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict from which the defendant has appealed, assigning error in the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict and in its instructions to the jury.
At the trial, the plaintiff offered evidence and claimed to have proved that Lafayette Circle, upon its north side, is divided into three lanes of traffic by means of two concrete isles of safety about 6 inches in height. The defendant entered the Circle from Capitol avenue, proceeding in a westerly direction at a speed of about 25 miles an hour, and headed for the center traffic lane between the two isles of safety. When about 90 feet distant from these, he first saw another automobile about the same distance away proceeding toward the same lane at a speed much greater than that of the defendant's and estimated at 40 miles an hour. The defendant knew that, if he maintained his speed, there would be danger of collision; if he increased his speed, the danger would be increased; and that he could avoid the danger by applying his brakes or by turning slightly to the left and passing through the southerly traffic lane. He nevertheless accelerated the speed of his car about 10 miles an hour in an endeavor to pass between the isles of safety marking the middle lane ahead of the vehicle approaching from his right. Both automobiles arrived at the central traffic lane at very nearly the same time, the one on defendant's right being slightly ahead, and the defendant attempted to pass through at the same time as the other. In so doing, the left front wheel of defendant's car struck the corner of the left-hand isle of safety. He lost control of the automobile, and it proceeded a distance of 155 feet, striking a tree on the north curb of Capitol avenue, whereby the plaintiff was injured.
The defendant claimed that, as he came to the intersection, he noticed an automobile coming up Trinity street at fast speed, and as he reached a point near the isle of safety he watched to see what action the other driver was about to take, when the other automobile sped past and to the left ahead of the defendant's car, missing it by about a few feet. At that time, the defendant's car struck one of the isles of safety. He immediately turned his head in an endeavor to obtain the marker number on the other vehicle when, on looking up, the tree was in front of him and he was unable to avoid colliding with it.
In the course of its instructions, the court made the following statements: ...
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Riley v. Conn. Co.
...Miller v. Connecticut Co., 112 Conn. 476, 477, 152 A. 879; Johnson v. Shattuck, 125 Conn. 60, 63, 3 A.2d 229; Hubbs v. Edmond, 121 Conn. 506, 509, 186 A. 496; Podziewski v. Gaumond, 124 Conn. 157, 159, 198 A. 569; Gross v. Boston, W. & N. Y. St. Ry. Co., 117 Conn. 589, 596, 169 A. 613; McDo......
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Johnson v. Shattuck
... ... the exercise of reasonable case should have known, that the ... assumption had become unwarranted.’ Hubbs v ... Edmond, 121 Conn. 506, 509, 186 A. 496, 497; ... Podziewski v. Gaumond, 124 Conn. 157, 159, 198 A ... 569; Gross v. Boston, W. & N.Y. St ... ...
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Podziewski v. Gaumond
... ... exercise of reasonable care should have known that the ... assumption had become unwarranted. Hubbs v. Edmond, ... 121 Conn. 506, 509, 186 A. 496; Gross v. Boston, W. & ... N.Y. St. Ry. Co., 117 Conn. 589, 598, 169 A. 613; [124 ... Conn. 160] ... ...
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Johnson v. Shattuck
...until he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable case should have known, that the assumption had become unwarranted." Hubbs v. Edmond, 121 Conn. 506, 509, 186 A. 496, 497; Podziewski v. Gaumond, 124 Conn. 157, 159, 198 A. 569; Gross v. Boston, W. & N. Y. St. Ry. Co., 117 Conn. 589, 596, 169 ......