Hubbs v. United Technologies
Citation | 574 F. Supp. 96 |
Decision Date | 01 November 1983 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 80-3972. |
Parties | Janet A. HUBBS, Executrix of the Estate of David A. Hubbs, Deceased, et al. v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES And Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
E. Paul Maschmeyer, William M. Shields, Monteverde, Hemphill, Maschmeyer & Obert, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
J. Grant McCabe, III, William A. Zurzolo, John S. Bagby, Jr., Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
This civil action arises from the crash of a Navy SH-30 helicopter near Willow Grove Naval Air Station on October 26, 1978. Representatives of the estates of three naval reservists killed in the crash brought this diversity action under the Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes. Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment.
All parties agree that the crash was caused by a malfunction in the cyclic pitch axis control system, which controls the pitch or tilt of the helicopter. Defendants contend that the crash was caused during in-flight training maneuvers "when an improperly installed bolt in the cyclic pitch axis control system became disengaged in flight." Plaintiffs contend, however, that the crash occurred when the cyclic pitch control "disengaged in flight because of a defective fastener." The fastener system in question is designed so that when the bolt is properly installed with its designated washer, castellated nut, and cotter pin, disengagement is allegedly impossible. The castellated nut and washer are placed on the end of the bolt and the cotter pin inserted through grooves in the nut and a hole in the bolt.
Defendants move for summary judgment based on what has commonly been termed the "government contractor defense." It is defendants' contention that they are immune from liability because the SH-30 helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft and supplied to the United States Navy in strict accordance with applicable Navy contractual specifications. Defendants further assert that they had no power to alter the Navy's design specifications. Although defendants specifically studied and discussed with the Navy some of the safer design features now urged by plaintiffs, the Navy specifically rejected such design changes.
Plaintiffs allege that the cotter pin in the fastener system on the SH-30 helicopter in question fractured, permitting the nut to work loose in flight as a result of vibration, allowing the bolt to come out and disconnect the flight controls. Plaintiffs assert that this important connection should have been secured by some type of system employing a double fastener such as a self-retaining bolt with a nut and cotter key, a lock nut and a cotter key, or a double bolt with a nut and cotter key, a lock nut and a cotter key, or a double lock nut and a cotter key. Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that the flight control system should have been designed in such a way that the system would fail in mid-range, rather than allowing the helicopter to fall in an extreme nose-down position.
A. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DEFENSE
The government contract defense has been the subject of a substantial amount of recent case law. A comprehensive analysis of the defense as it would apply to the case at bar was set forth by the Ninth Circuit in McKay v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448-50 (9th Cir.1983). In short, the government contract defense protects a government contractor from liability for acts done by him while complying with government specifications during execution of performance of a contract with the United States. The reasons for applying the government contractor defense to suppliers of military equipment with design defects approved by the government parallel those supporting the Feres-Stencel doctrine:1
The government contract defense has been broken down into a three-element analysis which has been adopted by this Court in Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 553 F.Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa.1982). Applying the three-element test to the case at bar, the burden would be on defendant to establish the following three elements in order to succeed on the government contract defense at trial or in the context of a motion for summary judgment:
See id. at 342; In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 534 F.Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.1982).
The Court must now ascertain whether on the basis of the record presently before the Court defendants have established each of the three elements, bearing in mind that pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, summary judgment may only be entered when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party establishes that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. First Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Company v. United States Life Insurance Co., 421 F.2d 959 (3d Cir.1969). Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976).
With respect to the first element of the government contact defense, defendants must prove that the government established the design and specific characteristics of the helicopter. If, however, the contract "set forth merely a `performance specification,' as opposed to a specified product, then the government contract defense would be far more restricted...." In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 534 F.Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N. Y.1982). Defendants allege that the helicopter was manufactured and delivered to the Navy pursuant to a contract that referenced many detailed specifications. Defendants rely chiefly on the October 23, 1981 deposition testimony of Captain Jesse B. Morris, then the Chief Staff Officer for the Office of Naval Research in Washington, D.C. Based on Captain Morris' deposition testimony, defendants conclude that the flight control system and fastening devices within that system were built by defendant Sikorsky exactly as the Navy required, in strict adherence to the Navy's detailed military specifications. According to defendants, that is the...
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