Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.

Decision Date19 March 1987
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. N-85-3143.
Citation656 F. Supp. 984
PartiesGary E. RAMEY, et al. v. MARTIN-BAKER AIRCRAFT CO.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Patrick A. O'Doherty, and Thomas B. Wheeler, Baltimore, Md., and David M. Williams, Chestertown, Md., for plaintiffs.

Jay I. Morstein, Deborah L. Robinson, and Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Md., for defendant Martin-Baker Aircraft.

Joseph G. Finnerty, Jr., and Andrew E. Shipley, Baltimore, Md., for defendants McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Quinten Rix.

Thomas E. Waller, pro se defendant.

MEMORANDUM

NORTHROP, Senior District Judge.

This lawsuit arises out of an accident at the Naval Test Center at Patuxent River, Maryland. Plaintiff Gary Ramey, an aircraft mechanic, suffered a serious injury while attempting to remove an ejection seat from a Navy F-18 aircraft. Following the accident, Gary and Amanda Ramey1 initiated suit against McDonnell Douglas Corporation ("McDonnell"), Martin-Baker Aircraft Company Ltd. ("Martin-Baker"), Quinton Rix ("Rix") and Thomas Waller ("Waller") in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County, Maryland. Following the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of McDonnell,2 the defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In a Memorandum and Order dated May 20, 1986, this Court granted defendant Rix's motion for summary judgment.3 Presently before this Court is Martin-Baker's motion for summary judgment based on the government contract defense. After a careful review of the pleadings and supplemental documentation submitted by the parties, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 6.

I.

On October 27, 1981, Rix, a McDonnell assistant foreman, assigned Ramey and Waller, another mechanic, the task of removing a Martin-Baker SJU-5 ejection seat from Full Scale Development ("FSD")4 F-18 Aircraft No. 3 for the purpose of performing maintenance. The ejection seat is intended to provide pilots with an automatic emergency escape route. It operates by way of a catapult behind the ejection seat which is powered by the firing of three ballistic charges. A rocket motor under the seat provides additional propulsion to propel the seat from the aircraft. An F-18 air crewman need only pull an ejection handle located between the crewman's legs to initiate the ejection process. Upon ejection, trip rods fixed to the aircraft structure pull sears from the drogue gun and the time release mechanism ("TRM").5 Thus activated, the drogue gun fires and deploys two small drogue parachutes, which immediately act as a stabilizing brake for the seat and its occupant. The TRM, or the "brains" of the seat, delays the release of the drogue parachute and the separation of the crewman from the seat until the seat reaches a safe speed, position and altitude. The SJU-5 ejection seat is designed to permit a safe ejection from both a stationary F-18 aircraft on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier and from an F-18 moving at speeds of 600 knots at any altitude.

There is no genuine dispute that the assignment of removing the SJU-5 ejection seat from FSD Aircraft No. 3 is potentially dangerous due to the very nature of the components making up the ejection system.6 On the day of the accident, this danger was compounded by three unfortunate circumstances. First, neither Ramey nor Waller was qualified to remove the ejection seat from the aircraft. Second, the portable cranes customarily used to lift ejection seats out of cockpits were not available. This meant that the ejection seat had to be removed by manually disassembling its various pieces. Lastly, Ramey and Waller followed McDonnell's admittedly ambiguous instructions,7 known as Quality Planning Instruction Sheets ("QPIS"), for removal of the ejection seat bucket and ejection seat. (See Defendant's Exh. 5, QPIS 74-82-06; Defendant's Exh. 6, QPIS 74-82-02).

Following a logical interpretation of McDonnell QPIS 74-82-06 for seat bucket removal, Ramey and Waller removed the seat bucket and the entire safety pin set, which, when installed, prevent the ballistic rocket and catapult components from firing.8 It appears from the record that, while it may have been wrong to remove all of the safety pins, it was impossible to remove less than all of the pins because they were centrally connected.9 Once all of the pins were removed, the ejection seat was like a "gun with its safety off." (Charleville Dep. at 147).

Ramey and Waller next turned to QPIS 74-82-02 for guidance on how to remove the remainder of the seat. There is some dispute as to whether this QPIS was the correct instruction to follow for manually removing the seat.10 In any event, following this QPIS, Ramey and Waller disconnected the trip rods from the aircraft structure and left them dangling from the firing sears on the ballistic TRM and the ballistic drogue parachute gun, despite instructions 9 and 12 of QPIS 74-82-02 which require the trip rods to be secured to the ejection seat. (Defendant's Exh. 6 at ¶¶ 9, 12). Ordinarily, this would not have created a dangerous situation, but as the safety pins for these ballistic components had been removed, the trip rods on the FSD aircraft would fire the ballistic charges in the components if either rod was pushed downward or upward. (Burrell Affidavit at ¶¶ 10, 15; Charleville Dep. at 140-42, 146).

Ramey then stood above the aircraft cockpit, straddling the ejection seat, and attempted to lift the seat out of the cockpit. Realizing that the seat was too heavy, Ramey dropped it back into the cockpit. According to the Navy and McDonnell investigators, the lowering of the ejection seat caused the unsecured TRM trip rod to contact the hull of the aircraft. This caused sear removal which, in turn, fired the drogue gun ballistic charge. (Defendant's Exh. 1 at 9). Ramey fell from the aircraft when the ballistic charge detonated and injured himself.

In the complaint, plaintiffs assert product liability claims against Martin-Baker based on theories of negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability. They elaborate on these theories in their opposition to the summary judgment motion by stating that the design of the trip rod, firing lever and sears components of the ejection seat was defective in that these components could be activated by either a downward force or an upward force, notwithstanding the fact that only a downward force was contemplated for emergency ejection purposes. Thus, plaintiffs conclude that, if the components had been designed as a single-action device, the inadvertent detonation would not have been possible and the accident involving Ramey would not have occurred. Further, plaintiffs assert that Martin-Baker should have placed a warning on the ejection seat cautioning that the ballistic cartridges be removed prior to seat removal. Lastly, plaintiffs claim that Martin-Baker should have provided instructions such that maintenance on the ejection seat could be performed safely.

Martin-Baker has moved for summary judgment asserting that the government contract defense bars plaintiffs' claims.11 Both parties have blurred the issues and Martin-Baker has not fully addressed all of plaintiffs' claims. However, for the reasons stated below, this Court holds that Martin-Baker is entitled to the government contract defense as to plaintiffs' design defect claims. For reasons elaborated in part III of this Memorandum, summary judgment will not be granted to Martin-Baker on the claims that it failed to place a warning on the ejection seat and failed to provide maintenance instructions.

II.
A. The Government Contract Defense

The government contract defense is founded on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the theory that, if a contractor manufactures a product according to government specifications, it is entitled to share in the government's privilege of immunity and is protected by that immunity to the extent that the government would be protected had it manufactured the product itself. See Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L.Rev. 1025, 1051 (1982) (hereinafter cited as "Note"); In Re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 762, 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (hereinafter referred to as Agent Orange I). The defense developed in response to claims against public work contractors for property damage. See Annot., Right of Contractor with Federal, State, or Local Public Body to Latter's Immunity from Tort Liability, 9 A.L.R.3d (1966). The contractor was generally held not liable for damages occurring while carrying out work pursuant to a validly conferred authority under a contract with the government. Id.; see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 60 S.Ct. 413, 84 L.Ed. 554 (1940) (this case is generally considered the first case from which the government contract defense is derived); Johnston v. United States, 568 F.Supp. 351 (D.Kan.1983). While the government contract defense applies only where a contractor has manufactured a product in accordance with government contract specifications, its justification rests on public policy grounds rather than on negligence principles, because of the government's involvement, and thus, is a complete bar to claims based on strict liability, breach of warranty, as well as negligence.12Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir.1986); see also, Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1985) (the reasoning underlying the defense applies equally well to design defect cases based on strict liability as well as negligence and breach of warranty).

Recently the defense has been applied frequently in cases involving military equipment suppliers. Tillet, 756 F.2d 591; McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043, 104 S.Ct. 711, 79 L.Ed.2d 175 (1984); Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F.Supp. 96 (E.D.Pa.1983); In Re Agent...

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    ...involve claims based on either a theory of defective manufacturing, defective design, or failure to warn. Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F.Supp. 984, 999 (D.Md.1987). The government contractor defense does not shield government contractors from liability for manufacturing defects, ......
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