Huck v. Huck, 19180
| Decision Date | 04 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 19180,19180 |
| Citation | 734 P.2d 417 |
| Parties | Rainer Frederick HUCK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Patricia Ann HUCK, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Roger D. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff appeals the property division and award of temporary support and attorney fees made in this divorce case.
The plaintiff, Rainer Huck, and the defendant, Patricia Huck, met and began dating in 1972 while doing graduate work at the University of Utah. During the course of their relationship, defendant became pregnant. Plaintiff suggested that she have an abortion. Defendant, however, wanted to marry plaintiff and give birth to the child. Plaintiff, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to the marriage, and plans were made for a wedding in April of 1975. On April 9, one day prior to the wedding, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement containing the following provisions:
1. All property owned by either party prior to the marriage shall remain the exclusive property and province of such person....
2. [Sets out specific property of each brought into the marriage.]
3. ... [A] mutual agreement as to the disbursement of property acquired after the marriage shall be made by the parties themselves or in the event they cannot agree, that they shall allow a court of law to divide such property....
4. ... [S]hould divorce or legal separation proceedings be filed within two years from the undersigned date, Pat shall totally support any children ... provided, however, that in the event Pat is unable to support said children from her own income Rainer will assume all responsibility and child support, even though any children remain in Pat's custody.
5. It is mutually agreed that neither party shall be responsible or liable for the other party's debts or obligations existing prior to marriage.
6. In the event of divorce or separation Pat specifically waives any alimony or support payments provided that she is capable of self-support at such time.
7. ... [T]his document shall be interpreted under Utah Law....
8. ... [I]f such marriage does not take place then this agreement shall be null and void.
9. The parties hereby acknowledge that each of them has been represented by counsel of their choice and has been advised of their rights and liabilities....
During the marriage, defendant worked and attended school. She paid most of the household expenses, food, medical care and insurance, as well as child care and her own personal expenses. Plaintiff provided the house they lived in and paid the taxes thereon and the utilities except for electricity, which defendant paid. He managed the rental properties he had acquired before the marriage and seven additional properties he acquired during the marriage. The property at 224 Iowa Street, Salt Lake City, was acquired by funds contributed by both plaintiff and defendant, and title was taken as tenants in common. All other properties acquired during the marriage were either obtained by funds generated from the rental properties (and title taken in plaintiff's name alone) or purchased jointly by plaintiff and his attorney.
In April 1979, plaintiff filed for divorce. Defendant received temporary child support of $175 per month and temporary alimony of $75 per month during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court invalidated the prenuptial agreement, finding that defendant had been coerced into signing it. Defendant was awarded custody of their daughter, Sophy, and child support of $200 a month. Along with her separate personal property, she was also awarded real property located at 224 and 215 Iowa Street and 629 Harmony Street in Salt Lake City, all of which were acquired during the marriage. Plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant's attorney fees in the amount of $2,750. Plaintiff appeals, raising the following issues:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT VOID?
The trial court found that defendant was coerced into signing the prenuptial agreement because she was already pregnant and plans for the wedding had been made when she was asked to sign. However, the court also found that invalidating the prenuptial agreement did not prejudice plaintiff. He contends that he was prejudiced by the voiding of the prenuptial agreement in that he was ordered to pay child support and temporary alimony, which defendant had waived in the agreement as long as she was capable of self-support at the time of a divorce. Because defendant had a gross income of $1,140 per month at the time of the divorce, plaintiff contends that the court should have found her capable of self-support and that the failure to do so, coupled with the voiding of the prenuptial agreement, prejudiced him in the amount of child support and temporary alimony he was required to pay.
The agreement only attempted to limit defendant's right to child support in the event that divorce proceedings were filed within two years of the signing of the agreement. The agreement was signed April 9, 1975; plaintiff filed for divorce in April of 1979, four years later. Therefore, even had the agreement been enforced by the trial court, it would not have had any effect on child support. In any event, no agreement between the spouses could act to deprive the child of "the basic and unalienable right to child support, since such right is vested in the minor." Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982). See Strong v. Strong, 548 P.2d 626 (Utah 1976).
As to temporary alimony, defendant waived her right to alimony in the agreement, "provided she was capable of self-support" at the time of the divorce. Defendant presented evidence that her expenses exceeded her income by $700. Thus, even under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, the trial court could have properly awarded temporary alimony. An agreement or stipulation between the parties as to alimony is not binding on the court, but serves only as a recommendation; it is within the court's power to modify such an agreement or stipulation at the time of the decree or subsequently. Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 37, 261 P.2d 944, 946 (1953).
Plaintiff does not claim that any other term of the agreement was unsatisfied or that he suffered any other prejudice by the court's failure to enforce the prenuptial agreement. This Court need not reach the issue of whether defendant was coerced into signing the agreement, since even if the trial court erred in so...
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...property distributions has never limited a wife to recovering only what she monetarily contributed to the marriage. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). We hold in accordance with the court's finding that plaintiff contributed to and supported defendant's educational achievements. The ca......
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