Huckaba v. Cox
| Decision Date | 21 May 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 34687,34687 |
| Citation | 150 N.E.2d 832,14 Ill.2d 126 |
| Parties | A. C. HUCKABA et al., Appellants, v. Paul COX et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Jack Austin, Mattoon, (Thomas J. Lugue, of counsel), for appellants.
Moran, Klockau, McCarthy & Johnson, Rock Island, and Craig & Craig, Mattoon (Frank G. Schubert, Rock Island, and Loren J. Kabbes, Mattoon, of counsel), for appellees.
Plaintiffs, partners in a construction company, filed suit for property damages in the circuit court of Coles County against the owners of three taverns under the Liquor Control Act. They appeal from an order dismissing their amended complaint, contending that section 14 of article VI of the act, as amended by H.B. 834 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 43, par. 135) is unconstitutional.
On October 6, 1956, suit was filed under the act for damages to their property alleged to have occurred on July 27, 1955, as a result of the intoxication of one Paul R. McNabb, which intoxication is alleged to have been caused by the defendants. The complaint alleges that McNabb, disregarding warning and safety devices, drove through a steel barricade and collided with road building equipment of the plaintiffs and severely damaged same. Two of the defendants, later joined by the other two, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred because it was not filed within one year next after the cause of action accrued.
Prior to the 1955 amendment a two-year period of limitation was in effect. The amendatory act became effective July 1, 1956 (three months and five days before the plaintiffs filed their suit), and reduced the limitation period to one year.
After defendants filed their motion, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege that the act as so amended is unconstitutional in that it is vague, indefinite, uncertain, unintelligible, and without meaning in failing to state against whom the cause of action for loss of means of support will lie, in contravention of article III of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A.; and that because of this uncertainty it violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions, Const. art. 2, § 2; U.S.Const. Amend. 14. The complaint further alleges that the invalid portion of the statute cannot be separated from the remainder, thereby rendering the whole act unconstitutional; and that the act remains in force and effect as it was prior to the adoption of such amendment.
The trial court allowed defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the act as amended is constitutional and valid; and that since the plaintiffs failed to commence their action within the one-year-limitation period their action was barred. The court entered judgment against plaintiffs for costs.
Defendants contend that the plaintiffs cannot contest the validity of the statute in question since their constitutional attack is against the loss-of-means-of-support provision and does not affect their cause of action for damages to property. Plaintiffs, on other hand, contend that the portion of the statute complained of is of such character as to render the act void in its entirety. In support of their position, the defendants refer to the well settled rule that a court will consider the validity of a statute only at the instance of the parties directly affected by its invalidity. However, the same rule also provides that if the unconstitutional feature is of such a character as to render the entire act void this court will entertain objections against its validity. People v. Reiner, 6 Ill.2d 337, 129 N.E.2d 159; DuBois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill.2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 166, 84 N.E. 865.
Although we recognize that plaintiffs' attack is tempered by their desire to avail themselves of the two-year period of limitations, their contentions are of such character that, if sustained, they would render the entire statute void. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs' day in court will not be denied. Plaintiffs argue that that part of the act as amended providing an action for loss of means of support is incomplete, vague and uncertain in that it fails to state against whom or what class of persons or property the action will lie. They further argue that a person is unable to ascertain his rights from a reading of the act as amended, and the failure to designate the class of persons or property upon whom the liability for loss of means of support will fall renders the entire act incomprehensible and ambiguous. They assert that upholding the validity of the amendatory act would constitute legislation and thereby violate the separation of powers article of the constitution.
Plaintiffs rely upon such cases as Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N.E.2d 761, and ...
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...is so pervasive as to render the entire act invalid (People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill.2d 1, 6, 345 N.E.2d 97; Huckaba v. Cox (1958), 14 Ill.2d 126, 129, 150 N.E.2d 832). Moreover, the city defendants have acknowledged throughout these proceedings that the city council intended the restrict......
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