People v. McBride

• Decision Date: 04 June 1908
• Citation: 234 Ill. 146,84 N.E. 865
• Parties: PEOPLE v. McBRIDE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

234 Ill. 146

84 N.E. 865

PEOPLE

v.McBRIDE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 23, 1908.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1908.

Error to Randolph County Court; S. Lovejoy Taylor, Judge.

John W. McBride was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor in antisaloon territory, and he brings error. Affirmed.H. Clay Horner, James M. Graham, Rufus M. Potts, and Alfred Adams, for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and Joseph B. Simpson, State's Atty. (Ernest A. Schrogin, Church & McMurdy, and Joel C. Fitch, of counsel), for defendant in error.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

John W. McBride, plaintiff in error, obtained a license from the village of Coulterville, in Randolph county, to keep a dramshop and sell intoxicating liquors therein from April 30, 1907, to May 1, 1908. An election was held in Coulterville precinct, which included the village of Coulterville, on November 5, 1907, under the provisions of an act entitled ‘An act to provide for the creation by popular vote of antisaloon territory within which the sale of intoxicating liquor and the licensing of such sale shall be prohibited and for the abolition by like means of territory so created,’ in force July 1, 1907. Laws 1907, p. 297. The vote was in favor of making the precinct antisaloon territory, and the result of the election was duly declared. On December 7, 1907, the state's attorney filed in the county court an information containing two counts, charging plaintiff in error with selling intoxicating liquor within said precinct. Plaintiff in error demurred to the information, and moved to quash it on the ground that said act was in conflict with the Constitution, and therefore null and void, and in the motion 25 specifications were made. The court denied the motion, and the defendant having waived a jury, there was a trial by the court. It was proved that the plaintiff in error, on December 6, 1907, opened his dramshop and sold a glass of whisky, which was drank there by the purchaser. Plaintiff in error offered in evidence an ordinance of the village of Coulterville providing for the issuing of licenses to keep dramshops, and his license issued under the ordinance, and also an internal revenue receipt, called a United States stamp for special tax. He testified that at the time the glass of whisky was sold the unearned portion of his license fee had not been repaid or tendered to him by the board of trustees of the village; that the village of Coulterville contains about 200 acres, and is included in the precinct of Coulterville, which embraces 2 1/2 townships. He was found guilty by the court, and fined $50. The validity of said act was the matter in dispute, and a writ of error was sued out from this court to bring the record here for review.

The sole question to be determined is whether the act under which plaintiff in error was prosecuted is in conflict with provisions of the Constitution, and is thereby rendered null and void. The assignment of errors upon the record includes 25 grounds upon which it is alleged that the act violates the Constitution, and the argument in support of the assignment of errors contains 11 main subdivisions,under which there are very numerous subheadings or specifications, covering all the gradations from important to insigificant, and from serious and substantial to shadowy and tenuous. If it should appear that some of them scarcely deserve a place in an opinion of this court, the fact that they are mentioned and discussed results from an effort to cover, in some form, every question that is raised by the learned counsel for plaintiff in error.

The rule of law is that an investigation like this, concerning the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, begins with the presumption that the act is valid. All doubts or uncertainties arising either from the language of the Constitution or the act must be resolved in favor of the validity of the act, and the court will only assume to declare it void in case of a clear conflict with the Constitution. The duty of the court is to so construe acts of the Legislature as to uphold their constitutionality and validity if it can reasonably be done, and, if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the law. People ex rel. v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N. E. 307;People v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 50 N. E. 599,40 L. R. A. 770;City of Chicago v. Manhattan Cement Works, 178 Ill. 372, 53 N. E. 68,45 L. R. A. 848, 69 Am. St. Rep. 321;Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601,62 N. E. 851,58 L. R. A. 277, 85 Am. St. Rep. 357.

Most of the objections of this act relate to matters which did not arise upon the trial of plaintiff in error, and concern alleged rights of which he was not deprived in any manner. Among those questions are the propositions that the act creates new criminal offenses of forgery and perjury; that it changes the quantum of evidence necessary to convict, by making a United States special tax stamp prima facie evidence; that it regulates sales by druggists; that it conflicts with the commerce clause of the federal Constitution; and that it creates debts of municipalities without their consent. Plaintiff in error was not prosecuted for perjury or forgery. The tax stamp or receipt was not offered in evidence against him. He did not sell as a druggist, and was not engaged in interstate commerce. Counsel dispute the validity of variousother provisions by which plaintiff in error was not injuriously affected, unless such provisions are void, and their invalidity renders the whole act void. Courts do not entertain objections to the constitutionality of an act, unless the objection is made by one whose rights have been in some way affected, and the plaintiff in error is only entitled to a consideration of most of the questions raised by his counsel so far as they may affect the validity of the acts as a whole.

Following the course of the argument of counsel for the plaintiff in error, the first proposition met with is that the act and the title embrace more than one subject, in violation of the provision of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution that: ‘No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.’ Counsel say that bringing antisaloon territory into existence and wiping it out of existence are ideas as wide apart as the poles, and that the title covers these opposite ideas. The objection would properly be made to the body of the act, and not to the title. Plurality of title is not an objection to an act which deals with but one subject. If there is but one subject in the act, and the title expresses more than one, the subject expressed in the title and not embraced in the act would be regarded as surplusage. If the subject is not expressed in the title, or if the act embraces more than one subject, the act will be void, and in this act the creation and abolition of antisaloon territory is expressed in the title and covered by the body. In deciding the question whether the act embraces more than one subject, we are to be governed by certain well-established rules. The only purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to prevent the joining in one act of incongrous and unrelated matters, and the word ‘subject’ is not synonymous with ‘provision.’ Any number of provisions may be contained in an act, however diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject. The requirement that an act shall embrace but one subject is not intended to hamper the Legislature or embarrass honest legislation, but it is intended to prevent incorporating in an act matters not related to the subject of legislation and of which the title gives no hint. An act may contain many provisions and details for the accomplishment of the legislative purpose, and, if they legitimately tend to effectuate that object, the act is not contrary to the constitutional provision. Town of Manchester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964;Meul v. People, 198 Ill. 258, 64 N. E. 1106. The constitutional prohibition against more than one subject, not being directed against the title, but against the act itself, the question now being considered is to be determined by the body of the act, and there is in the act but one general subject. That subject is the determination by the legal voters of a certain district whether the sale of intoxicating liquors shall be prohibited therein. The act merely enables particular communities to determine by popular vote whether sales of liquor may be licensed or not, and, if certain territory is made antisaloon territory, the act also prescribes methods for restoring it to its former condition, so that the question of license shall be left to municipal authorities.

It is next claimed that the provision in question is violated by the creation of two new criminal offenses of which the title gives no hint, and which, aside from the act, would not be crimes. Section 4 of the act provides for filing a petition, with a verified statement that the signatures are genuine and covering other matters relating to the petitioners, and it provides that whoever, in making the sworn statement, shall knowingly, willfully, and corruptly swear falsely, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and whoever forges the signature of any person upon any petition or statement provided for in the act shall be deemed guilty of forgery. These are two of the objections which do not concern the plaintiff in error, unless their invalidity would affect the whole act; and the rule is that, if an act embraces some matter not expressed in the title, it is unconstitutional and void only as to that part, unless the provisions are so connected together in subject-matter, meaning, or purpose...