Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 02-12357.

• Decision Date: 25 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-12357.,No. 02-13284.,02-12357.,02-13284.
• Parties: Joe J. HUDGENS, Phyllis Hudgens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BELL HELICOPTERS/TEXTRON, Defendant, DynCorp, Defendant-Appellee. Francis Mark Crawford, Becky Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DynCorp, Defendant-Appellee, Bell Helicopters/Textron, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1329

328 F.3d 1329

Joe J. HUDGENS, Phyllis Hudgens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BELL HELICOPTERS/TEXTRON, Defendant, DynCorp, Defendant-Appellee.

Francis Mark Crawford, Becky Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DynCorp, Defendant-Appellee, Bell Helicopters/Textron, Defendant.

No. 02-12357.

No. 02-13284.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Decided April 25, 2003.

Bruce J. McKee, Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert W. Bradford, Jr., Paul A. Clark, Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Joe and Phyllis Hudgens and Francis and Becky Crawford appeal from grants of summary judgment in favor of defendant DynCorp in these diversity actions arising out of a helicopter crash in Shelby County, Alabama.

Francis Crawford and Joe Hudgens were piloting a United States Army helicopter on a Medivac mission on May 1, 1999 when the helicopter's tail fin separated from the aircraft, resulting in a crash in which both men were severely injured. Each of the pilots and their respective wives filed separate suits on August 6, 1999 in the Northern District of Alabama.

After the accident, investigations conducted by the Army and the aircraft's manufacturer, Bell Helicopters/Textron ("Bell"), determined that the tail fin's separation resulted from a rupture of the helicopter's forward vertical fin spar ("fin spar" or "spar"), a component of the structural assembly by which the helicopter's tail rotor blade is attached to the pilot's carriage.¹ An external skin covers the structural frame of which the fin spar is part. The investigating authorities concluded that the rupture was caused by a crack that originated at a rivet hole near the base of the fin spar.

The accident helicopter was part of the "Flat Iron" fleet of UH-1, or "Huey," helicopies maintained at the Army's Fort Rucker base in Alabama. Under the terms of a contract entered into by the Army and DynCorp, DynCorp was to maintain Army aircraft located at the base. The agreement required DynCorp to "determine the airworthiness condition of ... aircraft as required by applicable regulations and publications. Such a determination shall be based on inspection, maintenance operational checks, and test flying as required by applicable Army publications and directives." The publications contemplated by the contract have been entered in the record in the form of inspection checklists and manuals providing instructions for the maintenance and repair of UH-1 aircraft. See R.1-36, Tab H, exhibits 1-3.² One checklist identifies a series of inspections to be completed every day a helicopter is flown; another prescribes a more intensive series of procedures to be carried out at longer intervals; and a third manual, spanning well over a thousand pages, prescribes appropriate means for repairing a variety of defects. Army personnel stationed at Fort Rucker monitored DynCorp's performance to ensure compliance with these instructions for the maintenance of the UH-1 fleet. See R.1-36, Tab G, at 2; R.1-44, Tab S, at 1.

Prior to the accident, several authorities familiar with Bell's UH-1 line of helicopters had already identified the fin spar problem that authorities later identified as the cause of the subject accident. In 1997, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") circulated an "Airworthiness Directive," which reported the FAA's determination that repeated engagement of the UH-1 and related models in heavy lifting operations could create fatigue fractures that would compromise the fin spar. In an effort to prevent such failures, the FAA directive mandated that civilian operators of these models modify the fin spar in a manner designed to facilitate inspection for cracks. The directive required that such modifications be completed within the first eight flight hours subsequent to the directive's issuance. Thereafter, operators were to inspect the modified fin spar for cracks at least once during each subsequent eight hours of flight time, using a bright light and a 10X magnifying glass to enhance the visibility of any fractures. In 1998, Bell Helicopter/Textron circulated a "Military Alert Bulletin" likewise advising that cracks had been found on some aircrafts' fin spars and recommending "tap hammer" and fluorescent dye penetrant inspections within 25 flight hours of the bulletin's receipt and thereafter at 180-day intervals.

The Army is not bound by the FAA's airworthiness directives or Bell's alert bulletins in its operation of Army-owned aircraft. Nonetheless, the Army officers responsible for the development of inspection procedures pertaining to the UH-1 reviewed both the FAA and Bell warnings. R.1-36, Tab P, at 1-2. Reasoning that its own UH-1 helicopters had not been engaged in heavy-lifting operations and that its history of using UH-1 helicopters had been without accident, the Army decided not to adopt the recommended inspection protocols.³ Instead, it adhered to a regimen in which the only aids used during inspections of the fin spar were a flashlight and inspection mirror. R.1-44, Tab U.

After the crash of the accident helicopter, however, the Army departed from its inspection procedures and instituted new protocols reflective of the concerns expressed in the FAA and Bell advisories. Specifically, the Army provided for frequent inspections to be conducted with the aid of a 10X magnifying glass, and for additional periodic inspections to be made via x-ray examination, fluorescent dye penetrant, and tap hammer. Post-accident x-ray inspections of the seven other UH-1 helicopters within the Flat Iron fleet led to the discovery of cracks in the vertical fin spars of four additional aircraft. None of these cracks were visible to the naked eye at the time they were discovered via X-ray.

Although their complaints originally stated numerous additional causes of action, the Hudgens and Crawfords now primarily assert that DynCorp was negligent under Alabama law for failing to properly maintain the helicopter and/or to make necessary repairs.⁴ After discovery, DynCorp moved for summary judgment on the basis of its asserted entitlement to the "government contractor defense" established in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). Boyle articulated a three-pronged test for courts to apply when required to decide whether protection of federal policymakers' discretion demands preemption of state tort law imposing liability on contractors for design defects in products supplied to the government.

Despite the identity of all facts implicated by DynCorp's motion for summary judgment as to the Hudgens' and Crawfords' separate suits, the plaintiffs' actions were not consolidated and thus two different district court judges ruled on the motions. Both rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the government contractor defense applies only to design defects, holding instead that the defense extends to contracts of the kind entered into by DynCorp and the Army. Additionally, both judges ruled that the evidentiary materials submitted by the parties, as modified by slightly different rulings striking certain expert opinion evidence, showed no genuine issue of material fact as to DynCorp's satisfaction of the defense's three elements.

On appeal, the Hudgens and Crawfords argue first that Boyle's government contractor defense does not apply to service contracts. Alternatively, they argue that even if the government contractor defense applies, the district court nonetheless erred in striking expert opinion testimony and in holding that DynCorp had demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to its satisfaction of the defense's three elements.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the trial court. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). We review the district court's exclusion of expert opinion evidence for abuse of discretion. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir.1999).

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). DynCorp's motion for summary judgment rested exclusively on its asserted entitlement to the protection of the government contractor defense. See R.1-49. Accordingly, we need only resolve whether the district court erred in ruling that this defense protects DynCorp from the particular claims asserted by the Hudgens and Crawfords.

We begin with the district court's determination that the government contractor defense applies to service contracts like the one between the Army and DynCorp.

I. Applicability of Government Contractor Defense to Army-DynCorp Maintenance Contract

In Boyle, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of "when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502, 108 S.Ct. 2510. The Court approached this question as one of whether the Constitution or laws of the United States had "so committed" a relevant matter "to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts." Id. at 504, 108 S.Ct. 2510.⁵ Preemption of this kind is warranted, it held, only when the imposition of liability under state law would create a "significant conflict" with federal policy in an area of "uniquely federal interest." Id. at 507, 108 S.Ct. 2510.

The...