Hudgins v. McAtee

• Decision Date: 29 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-9109-CV-406,49A02-9109-CV-406
• Parties: Maurice HUDGINS, Appellant-Plaintiff Below, v. Joseph McATEE, Sheriff and Unknown Female Correction Officers of Marion County Sheriff's Department, Appellees-Defendants Below. 1
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 286

596 N.E.2d 286

Maurice HUDGINS, Appellant-Plaintiff Below, v. Joseph McATEE, Sheriff and Unknown Female Correction Officers of Marion County Sheriff's Department Appellees-Defendants Below.

No. 49A02-9109-CV-406. ¹

Court of Appeals of Indiana Third District.

July 29, 1992.

Maurice L. Hudgins, appellant pro se.

Barbara Malone, City-County Legal Div., Indianapolis, for appellees.

STATON, Judge.

Maurice Hudgins appeals the dismissal of his claim for deliberate indifference to personal safety filed against Sheriff Joseph McAtee and unnamed correction officers (McAtee) under the Tort Claims Act, IND.CODE 34-4-16.5-1, et seq. (1988). Hudgins alleges receiving personal injuries while he was incarcerated at the Marion County Jail. He raises the following four issues for our consideration, restated as:

I. Whether the trial court erroneously dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. Whether the trial judge abused her discretion during the discovery stage of the proceeding.

III. Whether Hudgins was denied his constitutional right to due course of law.

IV. Whether Hudgins was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts of this state.

Additionally, McAtee urges this court to dismiss the appeal, arguing that there is no final appealable order from which an appeal may be taken.

Reversed and remanded.

We first address McAtee's argument that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because the trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss was not a final judgment. McAtee relies primarily on Constantine v. City-County Council of Marion County (1977), 267 Ind. 279, 369 N.E.2d 636, where our supreme court dismissed an appeal from the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss. The court in Constantine dismissed the case because the trial court did not enter final judgment on the dismissal. The trial court in that case merely stated: "Defendant's motion to dismiss granted." Id. However, in this case, the trial court dismissed the defendants from the lawsuit, stating:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the defendants, Joseph A. McAtee, Marion County Sheriff, and Correctional Officers (females, names unknown) are hereby dismissed from this action.

Record, p. 160. It is clear that the trial court in this case adjudicated the dismissal of the defendants from the action. See Parrett v. Lebamoff (1979), 179 Ind.App. 25, 383 N.E.2d 1107. See also Haste v Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1978), 178 Ind.App. 394, 382 N.E.2d 989 n. 1, trans. denied.

Moreover, courts in Indiana have found that the dismissal of a party from a lawsuit filed under the Tort Claims Act is a final appealable order. For instance, our supreme court in Burks v. Bolerjack (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 887, found that the trial court order sustaining the dismissal of a plaintiff's lawsuit against a governmental entity "was a 'judgment' both final and appealable; it left nothing for resolution between the parties." Id. at 889. See also Board of Commissioners of Cass County v. Nevitt (1983), Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 333, trans. denied. The dismissal in this case likewise leaves nothing for the trial court to resolve. We conclude that the trial court entered judgment in this case, and accordingly, we will address the merits of this appeal.

I. Motion to Dismiss

Hudgins first argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss. In determining whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true. Dismissal is appropriate only where it appears that under no set of facts could plaintiffs be granted relief. Thiele v. Ind. Dept. of Highways (1985), Ind.App., 472 N.E.2d 1274. In the order granting McAtee's motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded:

1. Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-16.5-3(7) provides a governmental employee or agency acting in the scope of its employment is immune from liability if the loss alleged resulted from the enforcement of a law.

2. Pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 36-2-15-5(a)(7) the Sheriff has a duty to care for those imprisoned in the county jail. Said duty has been held to be "enforcement of the law", and therefore, while acting under said duty, immunity applies to the Sheriff and his employees. See Sauders v. County of Steuben, 564 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1991), Tittle v. Mahan, 566 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1991).

3. Since the Plaintiff's complaint alleges the negligent acts of the defendants [who] had a duty to care for him in and a duty to enforce the law by said imprisonment, the defendants are immune from liability pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Even if everything in Plaintiff's Complaint were proven to be true, the defendants cannot be held liable under the facts alleged.

Record, p. 159. While this may have been a correct statement of the law at the time, our supreme court has recently interpreted the "enforcement of the law" exception of the Tort Claims Act as limiting immunity to "those activities attendant to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law." Tittle v. Mahan (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796, 801. The court specifically concluded that the law enforcement exception, IC 34-4-16.5-3(7), does not extend to activities associated with the administration of detainees at a county jail. Id. Because McAtee was engaged in the activity of administrating detainees, including Hudgins, in the county jail, he is not immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case with instructions to reinstate Hudgins' complaint.

II. Discovery

Hudgins argues the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on a number of pre-trial motions pertaining to discovery. In September of 1990, McAtee secured an extension of time to answer interrogatories and produce documents requested by Hudgins. However, McAtee did not provide the requested answers and documents. On June 20, 1991, Special Judge Cynthia Emkes issued orders on all matters pending in the case, and ordered McAtee to answer Hudgins' interrogatories and produce documents by July 15, 1991. McAtee did not respond until July 16, 1991, when defendants requested until August 15, 1991 to respond to the discovery requests (averring that no prior enlargements had been requested). One week later, on July 24, 1991, McAtee filed the motion to dismiss. Hudgins then filed an objection to the enlargement request, and moved for sanctions. The trial court granted McAtee's request for an extension of time in which to answer Hudgins' interrogatories, and denied (by phone) Hudgins' motions. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial judge granted McAtee a further extension of time in which to complete discovery, though no formal request had been made. During the hearing, the trial court denied Hudgins' request for a continuance. Hudgins claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for sanctions and a continuance, by overruling his objection to defendants' request for an extension of time, and by granting defendants' motion.

The grant or denial of motions for discovery, motions for sanctions, and motions for a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Keesling v. Baker & Daniels (1991), Ind.App., 571 N.E.2d 562, 566, trans. denied (discovery); Nesses v. Specialty Connectors Co., Inc. (1990), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 322, 327 (sanctions); Danner v. Danner (1991), Ind.App., 573 N.E.2d 934, 937, trans. denied (continuance). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts of the case. Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Trueblood (1991), Ind.App., 579 N.E.2d 1342, 1345, reh'g denied.

We do not believe that the special judge abused her discretion in extending the time in which McAtee could respond to the discovery requests for two reasons. First, the facts known to Judge Emkes, as indicated by the averment on McAtee's motion for enlargement of time, indicated that this was the first such motion. Though McAtee had in fact filed an earlier motion, it was filed before another judge. Second, the special judge indicated that it was likely the motion to dismiss would be granted, in which case the need for compliance with the discovery request would have been obviated.

We also conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Hudgins' request for sanctions. Though sanctions may have been appropriate, they are not mandated under Ind.Trial Rule 37. However, because we reverse and remand, and because the defendants have now had a total of four extensions of time, the special judge will have an opportunity to fashion an appropriate order to insure completion of discovery.

An abuse of discretion will be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the movant has shown good cause for granting the motion. T.R. 53.5; Fetner v. Maury Boyd & Associates, Inc. (1990), Ind.App., 563 N.E.2d 1334, 1338, trans. denied. However, no abuse of discretion will be found when the movant is not prejudiced by the denial of the motion. Hunt v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 307, 313. Hudgins did not demonstrate...