Train Collision at Gary, Ind. on Jan. 18, 1993, In re
| Decision Date | 18 January 1993 |
| Citation | 670 N.E.2d 902 |
| Parties | IN RE: TRAIN COLLISION AT GARY, INDIANA ON |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. As a result of a tragic passenger train collision a four count class action lawsuit was filed against various persons and entities (referred to collectively as Defendants). Class representatives (referred to collectively as Dillon) alleged negligence in Count I, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count II, and products liability and negligence in Counts III and IV. On motion by Defendants the trial court dismissed Counts II, III, and IV. Dillon now appeals contending the trial court erred in so doing. We disagree and therefore affirm.
On January 18, 1993 an eastbound passenger train traveling from Chicago, Illinois to South Bend, Indiana and a westbound passenger train traveling from South Bend, Indiana to Chicago, Illinois converged simultaneously toward a single-track bridge near Noble Street and 3rd Avenue in Gary, Indiana. The trains collided on the bridge killing seven passengers and injuring numerous others. Representatives of the estates of those killed in the crash along with 142 persons who were injured filed a four count class action lawsuit. Count I alleged negligence on the part of the Chicago South Shore & South Bend Railroad Company and the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, both of which allegedly owned, operated and maintained the railroad. 1 Count II alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the two railroad companies along with Gerald Hanas, Northern's general manager and chief executive, and David Riordan and Willard Blewett, the engineers on the two trains. Counts III and IV asserted claims of products liability and negligence based on alleged defects in the design and structure of the train cars. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District along with the Sumitomo Corporation of America, Nippon Sharyo Seizo Kasha, Ltd., and Louis T. Klauder & Associates were named as defendants in Counts III and IV.
After Dillon amended his complaint for the fifth time, defendants Northern, Hanas, and the train engineers (referred to collectively as Northern) filed a motion to strike Count I of the complaint due to alleged procedural defects and because Dillon allegedly requested damages in excess of limitations contained in the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). Northern also requested dismissal of Count II on grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, Northern contended the complaint failed to allege a constitutional violation but rather merely stated a cause of action in tort. In the alternative Northern contended that the claim was barred by res judicata. 2 As to Counts III and IV Northern asserted that the state law on which the claims were based had been preempted by the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-29, 31-34. The remaining defendants also filed motions to dismiss Counts III and IV on the same grounds as those which Northern asserted.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions and thereafter entered an order dismissing Counts II, III, and IV of the complaint against all defendants. The motion to strike Count I was denied. Under provisions of Ind. Trial Rule 54(B) the trial court entered final judgment, and this appeal ensued in due course.
When reviewing a 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted this court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Hudgins v. McAtee, 596 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Dismissal of a complaint is proper only when it appears that the claimant would not be entitled to recover under any set of facts represented by the pleadings. Union Fed. Sav. Bank v. Chantilly Farms, 556 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).
Dillon first contends the trial court erred in dismissing Count II which, according to Dillon, alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, subjects a citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws. Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 415. In order to recover damages under § 1983 a plaintiff must show that: (1) he held a constitutionally-protected right; (2) he was deprived of this right; (3) the defendants acted with reckless indifference to cause this deprivation; and (4) the defendants acted under color of state law. Patrick v. Jasper County, 901 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir.1990). In support of his § 1983 claim Dillon alleged that Northern: (1) failed to install and equip the trains and track near the trestle with motion sensors or other detection devices which would have warned the motormen sufficiently in advance of an imminent collision, (2) failed to properly maintain, repair, remove or re-design the Penn-Wabash gauntlet bridge despite defendants' knowledge that the trestle and track configuration posed an extreme hazard to the safety of passengers, (3) failed to provide adequate warnings or signalization at the Penn-Wabash gauntlet bridge despite a history of repeated signal failures and complaints made by motormen regarding the signals, (4) failed to formulate and implement a safe operating schedule so that trains would not simultaneously converge from opposite directions toward the gauntlet on a regular basis, (5) failed to formulate and implement proper training and testing of engineers and conductors, (6) failed to install and equip the trains and/or the track near the Penn-Wabash gauntlet bridge with devices which would provide the positive separation of trains and which would automatically stop all eastbound and westbound trains and/or would be fail-safe in the event that eastbound and westbound trains converged simultaneously upon the bridge, (7) failed to timely apply brakes in order to slow the trains prior to the collision and instead quickly accelerated immediately prior to the collision, and (8) failed to operate the railroad for the benefit of the public safety but instead operated and managed the railroad for the personal and pecuniary benefit of Northern management. According to Dillon, Northern's custom and policy of operating the railroad in such a manner was grossly negligent, reckless and deliberately indifferent to Dillon's rights to life, liberty, freedom from bodily harm, personal security and safe travel under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 1983 was designed to prevent state actors from violating the constitution and federal statutes and to compensate injured plaintiffs for deprivations of those federal rights. However, the United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize § 1983 liability where the wrong committed by the state actor was traditionally governed by tort law principles. For example, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 126, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), the widow of a sanitation department worker who died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line attempted to state a cause of action under § 1983 against the city for her husband's death. She alleged that her husband "had a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm to his body, mind and emotions and a constitutional right to be protected from the city of Harker Heights' custom and policy of deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees." Id. at 117, 112 S.Ct. at 1064. She further alleged that the city violated that right "by following a custom and policy of not training its employees about the dangers of working in sewer lines and manholes, not providing safety equipment at job sites and not providing safety warnings." Id. The court determined the plaintiff's claim that the city had a constitutional obligation to provide its employees with certain minimal levels of safety and security to be "unprecedented" and "quite different" from claims that the State owes a duty to take care of those who have already been deprived of their liberty. Id. at 127, 112 S.Ct. at 1069. Rather, the claim was analogous to a "fairly typical state-law tort claim: The city breached its duty of care to her husband by failing to provide a safe work environment." Id. at 128, 112 S.Ct. at 1070. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1983.
In like fashion our own supreme court reached a similar conclusion in Culver-Union Township...
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