Hudgins v. Sansom
| Decision Date | 07 December 1888 |
| Citation | 10 S.W. 104 |
| Parties | HUDGINS <I>et al.</I> <I>v.</I> SANSOM <I>et al.</I> |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from district court, Johnson county; J. M. HALL, Judge.
Action by Jennie V. Hudgins and others for a partition of the real estate of F. M. Sansom, deceased, brought against M. Sansom, guardian of certain minor devisees, and others interested under the will. From a decree refusing a partition of a tract of land used as a homestead plaintiffs appeal.
Smith & Davis, for appellants. Crane & Ramsey, for appellees.
F. M. Sansom died testate, and by his will gave all his real estate to his daughter, Mrs. J. V. Hudgins, his minor sons, F. M., Otis W., and Leon, and to his grandson Frederick Leggett, each to have one-fifth thereof. To each of his minor sons he gave $3,000; and to them, his daughter Mrs. Hudgins, and his grandson Frederick Leggett, he gave in equal shares all "notes, accounts, debts, dues, and demands due, or to become due, except the proceeds of an insurance policy, of which he gave to his sons, to be shared by them equally, one-third, and to his daughter Mrs. Hudgins, and grandson Frederick Leggett, the remainder, to be equally divided between them. He also made a provision through which he required each of his beneficiaries under the will, other than his daughter, to give to her, in a certain event, $1,000 out of the bequests made to them. His minor sons were members of his family at the time of his death, and Mrs. Hudgins became the guardian of their persons, and by order of the probate court was permitted, with the minor sons, to occupy the rural homestead in which the deceased had lived; but for rent of this it seems her husband paid to the guardian of the estates of the minors the sum of $600 annually. M. Sansom was the guardian of the estates of the three minors. After the estate of the deceased was ready for partition, Mrs. Hudgins, joined by her husband, and by the guardian of the estate of Frederick Leggett, sought in the probate court a partition of the real estate, the other beneficiaries under the will as well as the executors being made parties. The probate court directed all the real estate, except 200 acres, comprising the homestead, to be partitioned, but as to that refused to order partition, on the ground that it had been set apart for the use of the three minors. From that decree an appeal was prosecuted to the district court, where the same judgment was entered, and from that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The sole question in this case is whether the 200 acres comprising the homestead should have been placed in partition. The will through which the parties claim does not attempt to make any specific disposition of the homestead, but embraces it under the general words, "all my real estate, wherever the same may be situated." It is therefore unnecessary, in this case, to consider whether a testator could by will so dispose of property used as a homestead as to prevent the occupation of it by a surviving wife, or by guardian with the minor children, under permission of the proper court. The...
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Thompson v. Kay
...negatively when it may not be partitioned. Articles 3476, 3497, 3501, R. S. The court, per Mr. Justice Stayton, in Hudgins v. Sansom, Guardian, 72 Tex. 232, 10 S. W. 104, 105, said: "The word `partition' is evidently used in the constitution in its legal sense, and means the act or proceedi......
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Bd. Of Educ. Of Glynn County v. Day
...plaintiff, the rule above stated would not apply. Judgment reversed. All the Justices con cur, except PISH, C. J., absent.--------Notes: 1.10 S. W. 104.--------...
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Board of Education of Glynn County v. Day
...... Liggett, 78 Ind. 452; Lowenstein v. Glass, 48. La. Ann. 1422, 20 So. 890; Hanner v. Summerhill, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 764, 26 S.W. 906; Hudgins v. Sansom, . 72 Tex. 229 [ 1 ] . A contrary view has been expressed by. the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Spurr v. Home Ins. Co., 40 Minn. 424, ......
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Cruse v. Reinhard
...impressed with Mrs. Mouton's right of occupancy if it is awarded, in whole or in part, to some one other than Mrs. Mouton. Hudgins v. Sansom, 72 Tex. 229, 10 S.W. 104. Since Mrs. Mouton's right of occupancy is non-transferable — because it automatically terminates when Mrs. Mouton abandons ......