Hudson v. Hall

• Decision Date: 30 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-8104,99-8104
• Citation: 231 F.3d 1289
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) Garrett HUDSON, T. Sherrod Meadows, et al., Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. J.T. HALL, individually and in his capacity as a police officer for the Clayton County Police Department, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, Ronnie Clackum, Chief, in his official capacity as Chief of police for Clayton County, Clayton County, Georgia, Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1289

231 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2000)

Garrett HUDSON, T. Sherrod Meadows, et al., Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. J.T. HALL, individually and in his capacity as a police officer for the Clayton County Police Department, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, Ronnie Clackum, Chief, in his official capacity as Chief of police for Clayton County, Clayton County, Georgia, Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees.

No. 99-8104.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

October 30, 2000.

November 9, 2000.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (No. 97-01487-1-CV-RWS), Richard W. Story, Judge.

Before EDMONDSON, HULL and WOOD^*, Circuit Judges.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

Garrett Hudson, T. Sherrod Meadows, and Shedrick Gaston ("Plaintiffs") brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Clayton County Police Officer J.T. Hall ("Officer Hall"). Plaintiffs alleged that Officer Hall violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights during a traffic stop. Officer Hall moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court-concluding that Officer Hall was entitled to qualified immunity on some, but not all, of Plaintiffs' claims-granted in part and denied in part the motion.

Officer Hall appeals the district court's partial denial of qualified immunity, and Plaintiffs cross-appeal the partial grant of qualified immunity to Officer Hall. On Officer Hall's appeal of the partial denial of qualified immunity, we affirm in part and reverse in part. And, on Plaintiffs' appeal of the partial grant of qualified immunity to Officer Hall, we affirm.¹

I.

A.

On 26 May 1995, Plaintiff Garrett Hudson ("Hudson") was driving his car in Clayton County, Georgia.² Plaintiffs T. Sherrod Meadows ("Meadows") and Shedrick Gaston ("Gaston") were passengers in Hudson's car. Hudson turned right from a gas station onto Tara Boulevard. When Hudson made this right turn, he failed to use a turn signal.

Officer Hall saw Plaintiffs' car turn onto Tara Boulevard without using a turn signal, and he stopped their car. Officer Hall got out of his car, approached the driver's side of Plaintiffs' car, and explained why he had stopped Plaintiffs. He asked Hudson to get out of the car, and Hudson did so. Officer Hall and Hudson walked to the rear of Plaintiffs' car.

At that point, Officer Hall searched Hudson's person. Officer Hall did not ask for and did not receive Hudson's consent before conducting the search. Hudson was wearing a t-shirt and shorts. Officer Hall patted down Hudson's clothing, reached into Hudson's pockets, instructed Hudson to lift his shirt, and looked into Hudson's shorts and underwear. After searching Hudson, Officer Hall asked Hudson for consent to search Plaintiffs' car. Hudson consented to a search of the car. Officer Hall proceeded to then search the car.

Officer Hall-either just before or during his search of the car-asked Meadows and Gaston to get out of the car. Meadows and Gaston complied. After they left the car, Officer Hall asked Meadows for consent to search Meadows' person. Meadows initially refused consent. Officer Hall then said: "If you don't want to be searched, start walking." Meadows then consented to a search. Meadows was wearing a t-shirt and shorts. Officer Hall patted down Meadows' clothing, reached into Meadows' pockets, and looked into Meadows' shorts.

After searching Meadows, Officer Hall approached Gaston and searched Gaston's person. Officer Hall did not ask for and did not receive Gaston's consent to search. Officer Hall patted down Gaston's clothing and reached into Gaston's pockets. He did not look, however, into Gaston's pants.³ Officer Hall's searches of Plaintiffs and of the car revealed no contraband. Officer Hall instructed Plaintiffs to return to their car and to leave the scene.

B.

Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Officer Hall violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights in several ways during the traffic stop. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged: (1) that Officer Hall unlawfully stopped Plaintiffs' car; (2) that Officer Hall unlawfully searched the interior of Plaintiffs' car; and (3) that Officer Hall unlawfully searched Plaintiffs' persons. Officer Hall moved the district court for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

The district court granted Officer Hall's motion in part, and denied the motion in part. The district court concluded that Officer Hall was entitled to qualified immunity for the initial traffic stop because, when Officer Hall stopped Plaintiffs' car, Officer Hall had probable cause to believe that the driver (Hudson) had committed a traffic offense. And the district court concluded that Officer Hall was entitled to qualified immunity for the search of Plaintiffs' car because Hudson freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the car.

The district court, however, concluded that Officer Hall was due no qualified immunity-at least, not at the summary judgment stage-for searching Plaintiffs' persons. First, the district court said that-accepting Plaintiffs' version of the facts-a reasonable officer in Officer Hall's circumstances would have known that he lacked Plaintiffs' free and voluntary consent to search their persons. Second, the district court said that-even assuming that Plaintiffs consented to a search of their persons-Officer Hall clearly exceeded the scope of such consent by looking into Plaintiffs' pants.

II.

Because we are a court of limited jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. 1291 (permitting appeals of "all final decisions of the district courts" to courts of appeal), we first must examine our own jurisdiction in this case. As a general rule, an appeal may be taken under 28 U.S.C. 1291 only where the district court has disposed of all claims against all parties. See Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 886 (11th Cir.1984) (concluding that grant of summary judgment for "fewer than all the claims or parties" is not appealable). But, an exception to the general rule exists in qualified immunity cases: "A public official may file an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity where the disputed issue is whether the official's conduct violated clearly established law." Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.2000); see also Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.1999) ("[C]ourts of appeal have jurisdiction to review interlocutorily denials of summary judgment based on qualified immunity...."). In his appeal of the district court's denial of qualified immunity, Officer Hall asserts that his conduct violated no clearly established law and that the district court erred in concluding otherwise. We properly have jurisdiction of Officer Hall's appeal.

Our jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' cross-appeal, however, is less certain. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the district court's partial grant of qualified immunity to Officer Hall. The jurisdictional exception for qualified immunity cases-allowing interlocutory appeals from the denial of qualified immunity-does not encompass Plaintiffs' cross-appeal. So, we have jurisdiction of Plaintiffs' cross-appeal only if it properly falls within our pendent appellate jurisdiction.

Under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine, we "may address [otherwise] nonappealable orders if they are 'inextricably intertwined' with an appealable decision or if 'review of the former decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter.' " Summit Med. Assoc., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1335 (11th Cir.1999); see also Swint v. Chambers County Com'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212, 1221-22 (11th Cir.1999); Moniz v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 n. 3 (11th Cir.1998); Harris v. Board of Educ. of City of Atlanta, 105 F.3d 591, 594 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1167 n. 10 (11th Cir.1997).

As we have explained, we independently have jurisdiction of Officer Hall's appeal. Because the issues raised by Plaintiffs' cross-appeal are sufficiently related to and intertwined with Officer Hall's appeal, we conclude that Plaintiffs' cross-appeal of the partial grant of qualified immunity to Officer Hall falls within our pendent appellate jurisdiction.⁴ See Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d at 1167 n. 10 (finding issues sufficiently related to permit exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction); cf. Tamiami Partners, 177 F.3d at 1221-22 (concluding issues not sufficiently related to permit exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction). For the sake of judicial economy, we choose to exercise this pendent appellate jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' cross-appeal of the partial grant of qualified immunity to Officer Hall.

III.

We turn now to the question of Officer Hall's entitlement to qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability if their conduct violates no 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Lassiter v. Alabama A&M Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.2000); Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir.1998); GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir.1998).

For the law to be clearly established to the point that qualified immunity does not protect a government official, "pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances." Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150. And, of course, whether a defendant has violated a constitutional right at all is a "necessary concomitant"...